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FROM THE EDITORS
After the Persian Gulf, the East Asian littoral is the most likely arena of maritime 
conflict and crisis in today’s world� In “The Architecture of Japan’s Maritime-
Security System in the East China Sea,” Kentaro Furuya provides an authoritative 
analysis of the Japanese government’s approach to managing China’s activities in 
its territorial waters, especially in the area surrounding the disputed Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu Islands� He lays out the details of the policy and legal frameworks that 
guide the relationship between the Japan Coast Guard and the Japan Maritime 
Self-Defense Force in asserting Japanese rights under international law while 
carefully avoiding actions that could provoke conflict� Kentaro Furuya is a pro-
fessor at the Japan Coast Guard Academy and a former commander in the Japan 
Coast Guard�
The Korean Peninsula offers a set of different challenges in the same region� In 
“Exploring North Korea’s Asymmetric Military Strategy,” Mirko Tasic argues that 
the common perception of the North Korean leadership as irrational and unpre-
dictable fails to grasp the extent to which the country has deliberately pursued an 
“asymmetric” approach to its military strategy with respect to the United States 
and its regional allies, one that has unfolded over several phases in recent years� 
He focuses particularly on the too-little-discussed maritime dimension of this 
approach� Mirko Tasic is a professor at Webster University’s Thailand campus�
Artificial intelligence (AI) is perhaps the most hotly debated topic in the 
defense, technical, and policy communities, mostly in relation to alleged ethical 
dilemmas stemming from reliance on autonomous weapon systems in scenarios 
of future warfare� Christian H� Heller’s “Near-Term Applications of Artificial 
Intelligence: Implementation Opportunities from Modern Business Practices” is 
a wide-ranging and well-informed survey of current uses of AI in the business 
world that have near-term applications for the U�S� military and the Navy and 
Marine Corps in particular� Because these uses are nonkinetic, he points out, they 
are relatively uncontroversial, and offer potentially enormous payoffs in terms 
of administrative efficiencies and operational capability, notably in areas such as 
logistics that too often are off the radar in discussions of this subject� Christian H� 
Heller currently serves as an intelligence officer in the U�S� Marine Corps�
In “Exploring the Options: The Development of USN Tactical Doctrine, 
1913–23,” Trent Hone analyzes a formative period in the history of the U�S� 
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Navy, one that saw the creation of a learning culture that enabled the Navy to 
survive the initial shocks of World War II and eventually to prevail� Contrary to 
popular belief, Hone argues, the Navy indeed did possess a “doctrine,” developed 
in those years through the interplay of experimentation in the Atlantic Fleet, 
wargaming exercises at the Naval War College, and the experience of World War 
I� This doctrine, Hone suggests, had more in common with the command style of 
Admiral Horatio Nelson than with that of the rule-bound Royal Navy of the 
Battle of Jutland� Trent Hone writes frequently on the history of the U�S� Navy in 
the twentieth century�
Geoffrey Sloan’s article, “The Royal Navy and Organizational Learning: The 
Western Approaches Tactical Unit and the Battle of the Atlantic,” nicely comple-
ments Hone’s� It offers a case study of successful wartime innovation by the 
British in antisubmarine warfare in the most critical naval battle of World War 
II� Sloan also emphasizes the importance of doctrine (and the effective teaching 
of doctrine) as well as technology and organization in the creation of a military 
“learning organization�” Geoffrey Sloan is a professor in the Department of Poli-
tics and International Relations at the University of Reading�
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters 
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W309, 330, 333, 
334, 335)� For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at 
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-
841-2236)�
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THE HATTENDORF PRIZE LECTURE, 2018
History, Truth Decay, and the Naval Profession
In 2018, the Naval War College awarded Dr. Geoffrey Till the Hatten-
dorf Prize for Distinguished Original Research in Maritime History. The 
following piece is derived from a lecture that will be delivered as part of 
this honor.
 Why in this age of constant technological, economic, social, and political change should navies actively concern themselves with the naval past? 
Herein I will try to answer this question, one often asked by skeptics anxious 
to insert into the developing courses of professional military education (PME) 
material that seems so much more relevant to the contemporary problems they 
face� The result easily can lead to efforts to cut history out of the syllabus or, more 
insidiously, to reduce it to the level where it becomes little more than a means 
of socializing new entrants and developing team spirit, necessary and laudable 
though those aims might be� After all, it has been said, with some justice, that a 
navy that does not know its history has no soul�1
I will start by reviewing some of the basic problems that today’s navies face� 
Then I will consider the contribution that naval history might make to dealing 
with those problems, first as a quarry of processed experience and second as an 
intellectual exercise� Finally, I will seek to show the particular value of history in 
developing naval professionalism in a challenging social media age� By way of 
conclusion, I will look at some of the responsibilities that all this lays on historians�
CONTEXT: SOME CURRENT PROBLEMS FOR NAVIES
The basic point is that navies need to understand their function�2 This isn’t easy, 
these days� The potential tasks of navies have expanded, have grown more com-
plex, and increasingly are seen as relatively more important, as the burgeoning 
navies of the Asia-Pacific region so amply demonstrate� For the navies of the 
twenty-first century, it is no longer enough to understand the war-fighting and 
deterrent war-prevention roles, analyzed by the likes of Mahan and Corbett at the 
beginning of the last century, as they are affected by the international, technologi-
cal, and social realities of this one� That is difficult enough�
NWC_Autumn2019Review.indb   5 8/23/19   9:18 AM
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Now we have to add a whole series of nontraditional, “postmodern” tasks 
associated with Maritime Security (with capital letters)� These include the chal-
lenges presented by drug runners, trafficking in illegal migrants, international 
terrorism, humanitarian action, disaster relief, environmental protection, search 
and rescue, capacity building, security sector reform, and so on� In many cases, 
early and effective engagement in these so-called Phase 0 activities will head off 
the need to exercise traditional war-fighting skills later on�3 But preparing for 
what the British military currently calls contingency is an inherently complicated 
business�4
One problem in the pursuit of guidance for making unavoidably difficult deci-
sions about relative operational priorities is that of having to “see through a glass 
darkly�” It is uniformly and intrinsically difficult for foreign ministries, treasuries, 
or defense and naval staffs to predict the future or to gauge its requirements� This 
difficulty is demonstrated by the problems that all navies face these days in get-
ting their kit because the lead times normally required to produce sophisticated 
naval weapons, sensors, and platforms and their probable service lives are likely 
to be very long� A great many of the ships of the fleets of the 2030s are already 
at sea or at an advanced stage of design�5 This, together with rising costs and 
reduced budgets, makes the acquisition of naval matériel increasingly difficult� 
One set of victims of the procurement process (taking a leaf out of Jane Austen’s 
book) have remarked recently, “It is a truth universally acknowledged that de-
fence equipment acquisition is one of the most challenging of human activities � � � 
a uniquely demanding bureaucratic morass littered with military, technological, 
economic, and political pitfalls�”6
Future-oriented procurement strategies tend to suffer badly from the unpre-
dictability of the future economic, budgetary, and strategic environments� All too 
frequently, this development risk produces cycles of boom and bust that make 
sustained planning over, say, a thirty-year period almost impossible for manufac-
turers and their customers� Typically, this will result in constant delays, cost in-
creases, and iterative tinkering with original specifications—and eventually in the 
failure or chronic delay of the program in ways that mean that the navy tends to 
acquire new matériel in a piecemeal, opportunistic way rather than as part of an 
overall strategic plan� This manner of acquisition may undermine a navy’s capac-
ity to perform its present roles, not to mention its future ones� No navy has shown 
itself immune to such pressures and constraints; all navies need to be encouraged 
to think about how best to get around, if not to overcome, such difficulties�
Another problem is that, to some extent at least, the requirements of these 
possible contingency tasks conflict with those of the more familiar war-fighting 
ones� The funds expended on a carrier, for example, could generate any number 
of capable offshore patrol vessels� Again, the more sailors train for things such 
NWC_Autumn2019Review.indb   6 8/23/19   9:18 AM
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as the detection and apprehension of drug runners, the less they can train for 
antisubmarine operations� Given that resources, both human and material, are 
finite, choices have to be made�
Paradoxically, this is partly an unexpected product of success� Because of the 
fundamental flexibility of sea power, navies can deliver everything from bombs to 
babies, so they often are called on to do more or less everything at sea and quite 
often on land as well� Since the world’s navies thus have shown themselves to be 
of such utility across the full spectrum of possible maritime operations, their suc-
cess has increased the painful matter of operational and strategic choice dramati-
cally in the setting of priorities for which they prepare� This is not an entirely new 
problem for them, of course, since navies always have had to take on functions 
other than those of simply obliterating one another, but there is a strong argu-
ment for saying that their resulting dilemmas of choice are much greater now 
than they ever have been before�
Worse still, all these possible roles and requirements are in a state of constant 
change� A force at sea, even one already engaged in prosecuting its dedicated 
mission, can find itself also having to confront and respond to a whole host of dif-
ferent high- and low-intensity challenges across the spectrum, especially when, as 
they usually do, events combine to confound initial expectations about the nature 
and almost certainly the length of the original mission� As is so often said in such 
dynamic situations, it is unwise to assume your plan’s survival once contact with 
the problem is made� Thus when a number of Western powers thought they were 
intervening in the civil war in Libya in 2011 merely to avert a humanitarian crisis 
in Misrātah and elsewhere, the situation morphed into something much more 
demanding, which has yet to be resolved�
Mahan and Corbett do not seem to have much guidance to offer on such 
matters, because the focus of their thought was largely on higher-intensity opera-
tions, although they were perfectly well aware of the requirement for, and the po-
tential challenge of, lower-intensity ones� They assumed that once a navy’s major 
high-end tasks were dealt with satisfactorily, the rest could look after itself� But 
now the “rest” quite often has become the major focus of concern�
This is because today’s situation has become more volatile, uncertain, com-
plex, and ambiguous (VUCA, for short!), partly because some of today’s leading 
states want it to be, and so pursue “a multidimensional and multidisciplinary 
strategy that consciously blurs the classical distinctions between warriors and 
non-combatants, front and rear, peace and war, state and proxies, and fact and 
fiction; and which employs a variety of tools—military technology and op-
erations, information and cyber, economic pressure, ethnic bridgeheads and 
sensitivities—in order to manipulate both rival societies and [the states’] own�”7 
Although such techniques are certainly not new, the extra attention they warrant 
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today creates an ambiguous, confusing, and, frankly, potentially demoralizing 
situation� But if understood, they provide opportunities as well as challenges�
So how can the study of past events in naval history, as part of a well-rounded 
package of PME, possibly help navies prepare for the issues they will face? We 
will look at this from two different angles: naval history as a quarry of potentially 
relevant data and—arguably more important, especially these days—naval his-
tory as an intellectual process�
THE POWER OF EXAMPLE FROM THE PROCESSED PAST
History is processed experience� Naval history is a source of innumerable ex-
amples of the way things have been done in the past� For all the historians’ reluc-
tance to think of the lessons of history, or even their norms, the past is a source 
of previous experience that might well help present practitioners in comparable 
but not identical situations to understand their problems better and to think 
through what they should do to solve them�8 Although, as frequently has been 
said, history does not repeat itself—it rhymes�9 As Michael Howard reminded 
us back in 1962, there are patterns: “Wars still resemble each other more than 
they resemble any other human activity�”10 Naval professionals, arguably, should 
know those patterns, but in their search for what the Russians call the “norms” of 
military experience, or what they generally should expect, it is vital that they also 
should spot the differences as well as the similarities between their situation and 
perhaps only superficially similar ones in the processed past�
Looking at something such as the sinking of the Royal Navy’s Prince of Wales 
and Repulse off Malaya by Japanese aircraft in December 1941, for example, 
teaches us all sorts of things about the need for interservice cooperation, sustain-
able balances between resources and commitments, not underestimating your 
adversary, and so on� For all its dangers, not least the evident danger of mythmak-
ing, there is much to be said for the simple notion of seeing the past as providing 
previous examples of the problems of the present and future�11 Such historical 
case studies are also ideal means for advancing understanding by way of coun-
terfactual questions: What would have happened, for example, if the British in 
the autumn of 1941 had sent hundreds of tanks and aircraft to Singapore instead 
of to Russia? Why didn’t they?12
The point also can be exemplified by reverting to the problems of naval pro-
curement already discussed� While the past is indeed another country, today’s 
planners in the defense procurement field are facing problems and issues that 
are not that dissimilar from those faced by their predecessors� Those responsible 
for the design and procurement of today’s Queen Elizabeth–class aircraft carriers 
in the United Kingdom hardly can fail to have been aware of the demoralizing 
experience of their predecessors in the 1960s� This second time around, at the 
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broadest level, the needs to be sufficiently clear about the projected roles of the 
ship, to keep unavoidable interservice competition down to manageable limits, 
and not to get too far away from what would seem to be financially viable in the 
circumstances of the time all seem to have been hoisted in�13 The difficulty of 
their task, though, clearly provides an incentive for growing the smart customer, 
and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that study of the way in which such difficul-
ties were handled in the past will provide at least some guidance for the present 
and the future�
Another area in which history as processed experience—a source of 
example—can be argued to have something to offer is in leadership� Leadership, 
of course, varies enormously in its character and its function� On the face of it, the 
kind of leadership required to command in battle is not necessarily the same as 
that required to lead a design team in a submarine-acquisition project or to run 
a shore establishment� But is that true? Again, looking at past examples of these 
kinds of leadership at the very least should encourage discussion and increase 
understanding of this otherwise very slippery concept�14 In short, looking at pre-
vious examples of a campaign, problem, or issue enables people at least to ask the 
right questions and so to develop a broader understanding� It cannot be said too 
often that the dissimilarities between the past and present cases are likely to be at 
least as important as the similarities in this process�
One of the reasons for this is the crucial role of the broader context in deter-
mining outcomes� For this reason, Michael Howard emphasizes the importance 
of studying history in context as well as in width and depth�15 Naval history can 
be a powerful way of reminding professionals of the importance of context, so it 
should be designed to encourage them to take a wider view of the impact of the 
international, technological, social, and financial backgrounds to their opera-
tions� “Was the Gallipoli campaign of 1915 lost on the beaches of the peninsula 
or around the conference table in London?” is the sort of question that, as his-
torians, we should be getting students to think about if they are to understand 
not only the purpose, planning, and conduct of operations but the management 
of defense more widely� Getting people to look above the parapet and not to be 
focused exclusively on the all-too-demanding problems of their part of the ship 
(to meld a few analogies, in the spirit of jointness) is, or should be, an essential 
objective of PME�
As an aside, it is also hard to think of an approach better designed to encour-
age reflection about the three levels of war—tactical, operational, and strategic— 
and the manner in which they interact� Encouraging students to track the conse-
quences of the strategic decision-making process in London all the way down to 
the deficiencies in preparation on the landing beaches of the Gallipoli Peninsula 
(such as the lack of sufficient medical facilities, water supply, and so forth) and 
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then to follow the tactical consequences back up through the hierarchy of deci-
sion to those ultimately responsible for making strategic-level decisions hardly 
can fail to help develop a more rounded understanding of military operations�
The list of areas like this in which naval history as processed experience can 
provide helpful examples for constructive reflection by today’s warriors of course 
could go on almost indefinitely, but there’s also another aspect to history as a 
quarry of illustrative, if not explanatory, material to be noted� That aspect is to 
consider the past as prologue to the present, and maybe to the future, too�
History helps us to understand the context and explains how we have arrived 
at where we are today, and therefore it also helps us to understand the present 
rather better, and from that to design sustainable policies for the future�16 Take, 
for example, the increasingly contentious issue of the historic freedom of naviga-
tion for warships� Naval activity is, and always has been, framed by contempo-
rary interpretations of the law, and vice versa; understanding the background 
to those changing interpretations is an essential part of the professional sailor’s 
intellectual kit bag� Or at least it should be, if sailors are to hold their own in the 
expressions of differences of opinion at sea and in the defining of operational 
priorities� Arguably, the ability to comprehend, to deploy, and to make use of 
the law of the sea has become an ever-more-crucial component of twenty-first-
century sea power� At all levels of command, understanding its development and 
its importance confers advantage�
At the moment, some aspects of this remain matters of contention as the U�S� 
Navy and other Western navies try to defend the basic notion of freedom of 
navigation against what they see as a continentalist tide that is seeking, in effect, 
to territorialize the sea by insidiously claiming more and more jurisdiction over 
what once was regarded uniformly as the high seas� This has given rise to a host of 
regrettable incidents� All concerned in the matter of freedom of navigation, most 
particularly of warships, really need to understand the issues—what’s at stake, in 
other words—and how this situation has arisen�
Knowing what the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea says, 
for example, about the rights of warships in others’ exclusive economic zones is 
not enough, because the wording of the convention (being a political bargain) 
has enough ambiguity in it to allow (just about, and at a stretch) different inter-
pretations—and there are strong operational and emotional reasons why some 
countries seek to exploit, or even ignore, vague or unhelpful provisions of the 
pact altogether� International law, after all, is nothing more than a set of political 
agreements that apply to a certain time and place, and is in any case susceptible 
to change through subsequent state practice� As one of its leading experts has 
remarked, “The history of the law of the sea has been dominated by a central and 
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persistent theme—the competition between the exercise of governmental au-
thority over the sea and the idea of the freedom of the seas� The tension between 
these has waxed and waned through the centuries, and has reflected the political, 
strategic, and economic circumstances of each particular age�”17
For this reason, simply knowing and enforcing the law are not enough� What 
navies ought to be doing as well is not just pontificating about what they think the 
law says on freedom of navigation for warships but explaining why upholding it 
is a good thing for everyone� This task cannot be left to lawyers alone� Only naval 
history can show us exactly why this apparently arcane principle is important 
enough to risk lives for, and all concerned need to know it, not least those whose 
lives might in the present or future be in question because of it�
The same kind of developmental approach can be applied, of course, to all 
other aspects of sea power, in which knowing how we got to where we are pro-
vides probable guidance to where we should go next; although sadly, but perhaps 
inevitably, lessons identified are not necessarily learned� This approach also 
has been lampooned by skeptics who liken it to trying to drive down a twisting 
country road while peering through the back window of the car� This overstates 
the point� The truth is that when driving, while we look through the front 
windscreen most of the time, it’s good to keep an occasional eye on the rearview 
mirror as well�
Christopher Andrew, the historian of the British Security Service, has drawn 
attention to the lamentable consequences of such people not knowing their own 
history and identifies what he calls a “historical attention-span deficit disorder” 
(HASDD, for short) as the root cause of the problem� Hal Brands and William 
Inboden recently have done the same for those who would practice statecraft, ar-
guing the unwisdom of neglecting “a fount of information and insight for leaders 
grappling with the challenges of statecraft in a messy world�” But this argument 
should not be overdone either, for all but the most obsessive of historians would 
admit that history isn’t the only thing that matters�18
NAVAL HISTORY AS AN INTELLECTUAL EXERCISE
The second angle on the value of naval history for PME is not as a quarry of data, 
material, and example, but more as an intellectual discipline that encourages the 
development of thinking and of analytical, and very possibly behavioral, skills 
that should help make naval professionals smarter� As a former commandant at 
the U�K� Joint Service Command and Staff College (JSCSC) used to say, the mod-
ern airman, soldier, and sailor have to respond to perhaps unprecedented levels 
of strategic ambiguity� They have to improvise creatively, as jazz musicians do 
around a central theme, responding dynamically to changes set by others and to 
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the effects of contingency, chance, and general chaos� No more can they fall back 
on the laboriously choreographed musical scores set by the kind of constantly 
rehearsed operational plans that characterized, for example, the Cold War�19
Instead they have to be prepared for surprise; as Mike Tyson once graphically 
remarked, “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth�”20 Hence 
the need for what is described gruesomely as the end state of a student at the 
JSCSC: “to have developed a mind that is flexible and able to analyse and con-
ceptualise in a military context in order to make timely and logical decisions in 
all types of subsequent appointments�”21
To cope with a complex and often bewildering future in which you easily 
can get punched in the mouth by unexpected events, those students will need 
the capacity to analyze incomplete and ambiguous data� They need to be able to 
think through problems and their consequences, and, most importantly, to keep 
thinking them through, long after their staff course, or indeed their latest opera-
tion, has ended� They need to be independent learners� Some at least of what is 
taught in a one-year staff course certainly will have a limited shelf life, because 
the world moves on� Accordingly, students have to be encouraged to develop the 
independent interest and the habits of thought and of continuing inquiry that 
animate the best historians� This helps produce that very necessary characteristic 
that some would call insight�22 This can, and should, include as a “golden thread” 
a continuing interest in the naval past and its developing relationship with the 
naval present and the naval future�
Charles Darwin indeed reminds us that it was not necessarily the strongest but 
the most adaptable that won the evolutionary race� Naval history helps develop 
an openness of mind to uncomfortable ideas that confound and upset one’s own 
emerging conclusions� This really amounts to an early acceptance of the notion 
that there is no final and complete answer to anything� To paraphrase Napoléon, 
we have to tie knots and carry on, always progressing hopefully to what some 
have called a higher level of ignorance�23
In this, naval history can help, or maybe it should help, elevate thinking from 
the empirical to the conceptual—from the concerns of the tactical, technological 
nitty-gritty of yesterday’s or today’s battle to that wider, shaping context that links 
the levels of war and conflict� All the same, both the empirical and the conceptual 
are necessary parts of the mix� We should not, however, allow the perpetual fasci-
nation with the drums and smoke of battle to obscure the more-abstract realities 
that in many cases determine outcomes� Naval history, in short, can and should 
help us understand the critical business of strategy and policy making�24
Using history in this way is a much more widely practiced activity than is often 
realized� By the time strategists and policy makers have reached such elevated 
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positions, they have engaged with history, absorbing views about the relevance 
of the past, even if only through a process of osmosis� Either consciously or un-
consciously, they use history as a guide for how to think about future policy in a 
whole variety of ways�25 The design teams developing the Royal Navy’s Type 26 
global combat ship or those responsible for shaping a navy’s training programs 
cannot insulate themselves from the past, however hard they may try� They adapt 
and adopt its conceptual consequences as they both reflect and help create stra-
tegic thinking, in a continuous iterative cycle of reflection and action� It is quite 
likely that in many cases they do not realize they are doing it! Internet bloggers 
and the young naval enthusiasts who come together to create online think tanks 
such as the Center for International Maritime Security, on the other hand, do so 
quite consciously, aiming to study the past as a guide to the future, and their in-
fluence undoubtedly will seep out in all directions� History, in short, is unavoid-
able, and it shapes not just conclusions but also approaches and ways of thinking� 
The real question is not whether to admit its relevance to today’s problems but 
how to make the best use of it.
For all that, unfortunately, a sizable constituency of thought in the United 
Kingdom felt bound to react to what they considered to be Britain’s frankly 
embarrassing Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of 2010 with the 
fear that the country was no longer capable of “doing” strategy, or even thinking 
about it constructively—an impression apparently confirmed, in their minds 
at least, by the experience of the later stage of the second Iraq and Afghanistan 
wars� This concern was triggered initially by the Royal United Services Institute 
address of December 2009 by the outgoing Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief 
Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, in which he claimed that Britain had lost the habit of 
making strategy�
But one thing that’s struck me in my present role, and that I think requires urgent 
action over the next year, is the degree to which we seem to have lost an institution-
alised capacity for, and culture of, strategic thought� I’m not saying that we don’t have 
people who can think strategically, or that we haven’t evolved a proper strategic basis 
for our actions� But we’ve seized on ability where we’ve found it, and as a result our 
formulation of strategy has been much harder than should have been the case� We’ve 
been hunter/gatherers of strategic talent, rather than nurturers and husbandmen�26
It was followed up through a series of inquiries by the House of Commons 
Public Administration Select Committee and highly critical articles from a large 
number of academics� Their concerns were reinforced by the uncertain conse-
quences of Britain’s engagement in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars� The suggestion 
was that the United Kingdom had not thought through what its involvement in 
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these wars was supposed to achieve, nor the requirements or likely consequences 
of this involvement, largely because it had lost the habit of consulting the rear-
view mirror and developing the agnostic and questioning ways of thought that 
develop from that� Did anyone ask for evidence that Britain’s intervention in the 
intense factionalism of Afghanistan would be any more successful this time than 
it had been the first, second, and third times that Britain had tried it?27
While the urgency of the need to cut government expenditure and to require 
the Ministry of Defence to start filling in the “black hole” in its finances perhaps 
offers some excuse for the failings of the SDSR, this is less true of Britain’s opera-
tional failings� These are hard to explain except in terms of the speed of events 
to which the United Kingdom felt it must respond (allowing insufficient time for 
consultation and strategic reflection) and, perhaps, the lack of defense experience 
among the political class� Nor is the quality of the advice that the military offers 
to ministers exempt from academic and insider criticism�28
Nor, sadly, is this inability to do strategy all that uncommon� A good case can 
be made that it applied to the Germans and especially the Japanese in the Second 
World War; they managed to combine tactical and operational brilliance with a 
strategic insouciance in a manner that now appears quite breathtaking� The point 
is that failing to take full advantage of what the historical approach has to offer 
means missing a chance to reduce the prospects of strategic failure�
But once again, how, more exactly, can history help? Such help probably lies 
much less in the delivery of the facts, or answers, and prescriptions for the fu-
ture than in identifying the questions about strategy that those conducting it, or 
those trying to understand it, should ask� A brilliant recent review of four very 
good books about the causes of the First World War (a subject one might think 
conclusively studied for a century now) found that “they [did] not even come 
close to agreeing � � � [and that] historical consensus on the causes of the First 
World War appears no closer than it was 50 or 75 years ago, nor does it appear a 
shared view will ever be achieved� � � � This means we must be both cautious and 
humble when generalizing about war and peace and making policy recommen-
dations based on our understanding of the conflict�”29 Much the same, if on a less 
elevated plane, still could be said about interpretations of the course and conse-
quence of the Battle of Jutland and a host of other such familiar naval subjects� 
The Dutch historian Pieter Geyl made the essential point that “history is argu-
ment without end�”30 But this is not an apology� In the training it provides for 
the kind of intellectual dialectic of argument and counterargument that deepens 
understanding, history makes a major contribution to our capacity to analyze�
Lawrence Freedman, in his recent magisterial book on strategy, makes a 
similar point�31 The intrinsic diversity and ambiguity of our subject—the conduct 
of military operations, not least at sea—mean that it is very easy to get things 
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fundamentally wrong, but it is sadly hard to get them right, and harder still to 
achieve an overall consensus on what is right and what is wrong� Analyzing past 
examples to see whether we can work out why some things went well and some 
did not at least should identify the questions that we, or anyone else trying to 
do strategy or to make policy in the naval realm, should be asking� In this, the 
process of naval history—the asking of questions, the analysis of data, and the 
testing of hypotheses—is more important than the product, the answers� Making 
the journey, in other words, can be more useful than arriving at the destination� 
This is what Dwight D� Eisenhower meant when he famously observed regarding 
preparing for battle, “I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is 
indispensable�”32
TRUTH DECAY
There is now—in the age of all-pervasive social media—one final justification for 
naval people to have more than a passing familiarity with the disciplines of naval 
history� That is the contemporary phenomenon of what some have called truth 
decay�33 By this they mean the impact that easy accessibility to and the potentially 
overwhelming power of social media is having on people’s trust in authority and 
in traditional forms of expertise� Imperfectly controlled, this platform empow-
ers cranks, bigots, and those who willfully would deceive by according them the 
same apparent status as experts� “Don’t you see,” asks one of the characters in 
George Orwell’s novel 1984, “that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the 
range of thought?”34 It is increasingly difficult for people, deluged with showers of 
contradictory information, deliberate misinformation, fake news, and conspiracy 
theories, to know what to believe, which encourages them to fall back on that 
very human trait of believing what they want to believe and forming up into dis-
sonant tribes, unable to relate to, or even understand, the others�
Collectively, this threatens the social order� Some would go further: “We 
are facing nothing less than a crisis in our democracy based on the systematic 
manipulation of data to support the relentless targeting of citizens, without 
their consent, by campaigns of disinformation and messages of hate�”35 In the 
words of the recently released European Union code on dealing with disinfor-
mation, “open and democratic societies depend on public debates that allow 
well-informed citizens to express their will through free and fair political 
processes�”36
As citizens, naval personnel and navies in general are as vulnerable to this as 
any other social group—perhaps more so given their generally very high level of 
computer literacy and the stringent time demands of their profession� As ordi-
nary citizens, they too have an interest in the general well-being of the society 
in which they live and that they try to protect against more-traditional forms of 
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threat� Moreover, whether they like it or not, they are living in a world of compet-
ing narratives than can often be state directed�37
Illustrating the point, in 2009 the Kremlin established the “Commission to 
Prevent the Falsification of History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests” to 
counter Baltic and central European narratives about Soviet occupation and 
wartime collaboration�38 For its part, Singapore has established a “Select Com-
mittee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods,” thinking it is important to support 
social cohesion by cultivating an informed public and encouraging a culture of 
fact-checking�39 Staying afloat in this whirlpool of conflicting currents requires a 
continued capacity for independent judgment� Navy people (whose basic job is to 
defend the states and the societies that pay for those navies) also may be thought 
to have an even greater incentive than ordinary citizens to be at least aware of, 
and ideally able to help to defeat, these insidious challenges to domestic stability�
Moreover, navies themselves are vulnerable to such campaigns of targeted 
disinformation� Their missions and activities can be traduced by adversaries, 
with deleterious impacts on public esteem and their operational effect�40 More 
sinister and dangerous still, sailors—often living a tight shipboard life, even 
ashore—always have proved vulnerable to the effects of uninformed gossip� In 
these continuing circumstances it is easy to imagine the possibilities of greater 
access to social media morphing into a kind of mega-scuttlebutt, with possibly 
disastrous consequences for a navy’s cohesiveness and morale� For the same rea-
son, this could be a significant target of opportunity for imaginative adversaries, 
both foreign and domestic� Thus, it does not seem unreasonable for navies to 
regard this possibility as a new battleground for them to take seriously�
Once again, how might a familiarity with naval history, both as processed 
experience and as an intellectual discipline, offer some modest help against these 
potentially ominous developments? It will be modest, because in an age when 
most people get their news from Facebook and Twitter feeds, and in which tradi-
tional journalism may well be in terminal decline, this is a fundamental problem 
way beyond easy solutions�41 But nonetheless, for naval personnel, history may 
help a little� First, perhaps history can show that this is an old, almost-familiar 
problem, now reappearing in a new and potentially more virulent form� This 
could be done, for example, by looking at the role of misinformation in naval 
mutinies and other such disasters, as a way of alerting naval personnel to the dan-
gers they confront, and maybe to ways of dealing with them—or even employing 
them against their adversaries�42
More importantly, perhaps, the discipline of history itself encourages open-
mindedness, the careful weighing of evidence, and the asking of questions, and it 
provides other such intellectual defenses when confronted with purported infor-
mation and what very well could prove to be fake news� Any kind of serious study 
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could serve this function, of course, but naval history is more accessible and, for 
other reasons discussed earlier, is especially relevant to the naval profession�
While much of what has been said may be true for all disciplines and subject areas 
and for all types of history, for national leaders, strategic decision makers, and 
operational commanders, the obvious salience of specifically naval history for 
sailors, given the undeniable continuities of operations at sea over the centuries, 
means naval history is particularly useful in this regard� Moreover, for sailors at 
all levels, naval history, whether conscious and constructed or not, is unavoid-
able� Whatever historians might think of it, naval students, strategists, and policy 
makers will go on using what they at least think is history as a guide to future 
behavior�
This being the case, it lays considerable responsibility on naval historians� 
First, as John Hattendorf has reminded us, historians need to recognize that their 
subject does not end in 1945 or with the closing of the Cold War (assuming that 
conflict has even ended!)�43 History is yesterday as well� This poses unavoidable 
evidential problems� Analysis, therefore, has to be preceded by the availability 
of primary material� In any case, much of what in the past would have produced 
survivable paper copies (or much less survivable photostats) now appears only 
as transitory e-mails, exchanges in chat rooms, and so on� Since “recovering the 
unrecorded past” is at least as important as it was, tomorrow’s historians and 
their naval students will need their twenty-first-century skills as well as the more 
traditional ones employed by yesterday’s historians�44
Second, historians need to encourage their navies to be receptive to the past, to 
preserve and process the records (or what these days passes for records) of what 
they have done to build a bank of experience for the future� They need to nurture 
those veterans who actually had that experience and are willing to talk about it, if 
they only had the encouragement to do so� The results of this testimony need to 
be preserved in accessible form and made available for appropriate use� Today’s 
practitioners need to know that something similar to their current preoccupa-
tions probably has happened before�45
Third, historians need to encourage thinking about things in the round: pay-
ing due regard to context and avoiding narrow fixations on monocausal explana-
tions� They need to understand the technological and logistical realities of what 
it is actually like to be at sea—hence the particular value of ex-sailors who are 
also historians� They also need to avoid unconscious hindsight and to sympathize 
with their subjects, who clearly could not enjoy its advantages�
Fourth, they need to ensure that what they deliver is accessible, interesting, 
and even enjoyable� My experience at a variety of service educational establish-
ments is that naval students usually do rather enjoy doing naval history—or at 
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least freely concede that they found that engaging in a modicum of historical 
research was worthwhile� In this, historians are likely to be pushing on an open 
door; at the very least, they should do everything possible to stop it from shut-
ting� One way of doing this is to ask the speculative “What if?” counterfactual 
questions referred to earlier� The process of isolating and altering one variable in 
the historic equation invites speculation about the difference it could have made 
to some past and completed event, and often will stimulate both insight into and 
enthusiasm for the subject�
Finally, they should make their subject policy relevant, wherever possible� For 
some this will be difficult� Some historians, knowing how their findings can be 
distorted to suit a different time, seek—for the best of professional reasons—to 
insulate their discipline from the contaminating fingers of strategists and policy 
makers and would have nothing to do with their world� However understandable, 
this purist approach is unwise for all but a few keepers of the sacred flame�
The pressure of other urgent PME requirements means the default position of 
those responsible for its implementation is all too likely to reduce the teaching of 
history as much as possible� The long and generally depressing story of the Royal 
Navy’s neglect or misuse, or both, of its own really rather spectacular history 
(and its sometimes dire operational consequences) unfortunately illustrates the 
point�46 Historians need to counter this modernist tendency to the extent they 
can�
In sum, history, similar to the poor and taxes, is always with us, whether we 
like it or know it or not� We cannot avoid it� This being so, it is plainly the duty of 
naval historians to do their best to ensure that what they deliver is valid as both 
processed experience and an intellectual discipline� They owe this to the future 
as much as to the past�
GEOFFREY TILL
Dr. Till is the Dudley W. Knox Chair for Naval History and Strategy at the Naval 
War College. He is the author of over two hundred articles and book chapters. The 
fourth revised edition of his book, Seapower: A Guide for the 21st Century, was 
published in 2018.
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wings of gold in 1989. Chatfield was awarded the Na-
vy’s Political/Military Scholarship and attended the 
Kennedy School of Government, receiving a master 
in public administration from Harvard University in 
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
IT IS A GREAT PROFESSIONAL and personal honor to address 
you as the newly installed fifty-seventh President of the U.S. 
Naval War College. No other institution has contributed more to the history and 
heritage of our great Navy than this remarkable school. Located along the shores 
of beautiful Narragansett Bay, this College has been the nexus of nautical schol-
arship, cutting-edge research, and maritime-security cooperation for 135 years. 
I recognize that I have some large shoes to fill in assuming the post once held 
by such distinguished naval officers as Stephen Luce, Alfred Mahan, Raymond 
Spruance, Stansfield Turner, James Stockdale, my friend John Christenson, and 
more than four dozen others.
As a career helicopter pilot, I have been fortunate to lead America’s most 
skilled and dedicated men and women in times of peace and in times of conflict. 
As a lifelong learner, I was able to fall in love with the study of leadership and 
pursue it throughout my undergraduate, master’s, and doctoral studies. This is 
not to imply that I have all the answers. However, I believe that my experience 
and education will provide unique perspectives as I work with our world-class 
faculty and staff to ensure that our compelling curriculum continues to provide 
educational opportunities for the future leaders of our armed forces, our govern-
ment, and our partner nations.
Our Navy and our Nation will need to become more agile, innovative, and 
creative in the ways in which we train and educate our future leaders, in how we 
adapt to the rapidly changing technological environment, and in how we ensure 
that the contributions of every citizen are included in framing the future we all 
hope to see evolve. The Naval War College will not merely observe these changes; 
it will contribute actively to the conversations and to the solutions needed.
A Return to New England
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On a personal note, I am thrilled to be returning to New England. Some of my 
most enjoyable days were spent on the campus of Boston University and in the 
Kennedy School Forum. While my most recent assignment to the tropical island 
of Guam was incredibly rewarding, I must admit that the prospect of seeing our 
historic campus on Aquidneck Island blanketed in snow has a certain charm.
My husband, David Scovel, and I look forward to getting to know the entire 
Naval War College family and working with each of you to build on the College’s 
remarkable legacy. I commit to you that I will seek to knit together our entire 
team of active-duty personnel, government-service employees, and contractors. 
I am grateful for our strong supporters from the Naval War College Foundation. 
The Chief of Naval Operations recently called the College a “strong and vibrant 
institution.” With your help, we will ensure that it remains so in its 135th anni-
versary year and far beyond.
SHOSHANA S. CHATFIELD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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THE ARCHITECTURE OF JAPAN’S MARITIME- 
SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE EAST CHINA SEA
The Dual-Layer Security System and the Role of the  
Japan Coast Guard
Kentaro Furuya
 Security operations in the East China Sea (ECS), particularly around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, have become a very high priority for the Japanese 
government� Its stance on the Senkakus is that the islands constitute an integral 
part of Japanese territory, both historically and under international law, and that 
the Japanese government has administered the islands effectively�1 In contrast, 
the Chinese government began to assert ownership over the islands after the 
United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East conduct-
ed research in 1968 that indicated the possibility of oil and gas resources beneath 
the seabed in the area�2 Additionally, the Chinese government steadily expanded 
its dispatch of China Coast Guard (CCG) ships to the islands after 2012, when the 
Japanese government decided to transfer ownership of some of the islands from 
private parties to the Japanese government (see the figure)� Since then, bigger, 
strengthened, and armed CCG ships frequently have shown their presence by 
approaching and intruding into territorial seas off the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands�3
How does the Japanese government peacefully secure and guard its maritime 
border against ships operated by a foreign authority? Since Japan is an island 
nation, it has no land borders, only maritime ones� Two organizations are re-
sponsible for securing and guarding Japanese territorial seas and maintaining 
order at sea around Japan: the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the Japan Maritime 
Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)� The JCG is a nonmilitary, civilian law-enforcement 
agency, whereas the JMSDF is a military and naval agency� This article includes 
analysis of the different functions of the two organizations�
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The Japanese government considers that CCG ships in the Japanese territorial 
waters under discussion are not exercising the right of innocent passage under in-
ternational law, and it regularly deploys JCG ships to counter the CCG ships� The 
JCG patrol ships are the primary actors during peacetime, exercising their police 
powers at the maritime borders by conducting guard and security operations� In 
exceptional cases, JMSDF ships are deployed to counter threats; however, such 
measures still fall within the scope of law-enforcement operations governed by 
Japanese domestic law� This Japanese policy—of having two layers of protection 
that normally confine their functions to law enforcement—is unique, including 
in the way in which it applies in the East China Sea�
In the East China Sea, although JCG and CCG ships face off against each other 
almost every day, tensions in the vicinity have remained relatively low� Although 
the ships of the two services often operate close together, even side by side, in 
the contiguous zone and territorial sea, there has been no collision, shouldering, 
or bumping between patrol ships� According to JCG statistics, in 2015 the CCG 
intruded into Japan’s territorial sea thirty-five times, involving ninety-five ships, 
and cruised in the contiguous zone on 240 days, with a count of 709 ships�4 Over-
all, this means that CCG ships showed their presence within the contiguous zone 
on almost every nonstormy day, while they intruded into the territorial sea oc-
casionally� Beyond that, the situation deteriorated further in 2015 as, for the first 
time, CCG ships fitted with arms aboard were continuously present on the scene�
In August 2016, the JCG found a swarm of Chinese fishing boats—some two 
to three hundred—escorted by thirteen CCG ships, approaching the Senkaku Is-
lands; subsequently, a record number of CCG ships—eleven—intruded simulta-
neously into the territorial sea� During this incident, even though JCG and CCG 
ships operated close together, even side by side, not a single incident or accident 
occurred of patrol ships colliding with or shouldering each other, nor did the 
situation escalate into a military confrontation�5
The JCG is the primary organization charged with conducting operations 
to guard and secure the Senkakus� Many consider it to be more than a “mere” 
law-enforcement organization� Richard J� Samuels describes the JCG as being 
“quasi-military” and constituting the “fourth branch” of the Japanese military, 
and points out that Japan altered its security policy to integrate police and mili-
tary functions at sea�6 Lyle J� Morris further concludes that the JCG has become 
capable of using force for defensive purposes� He drew this conclusion after 
studying the law-enforcement operation that the JCG conducted off Amami- 
Ō-shima in Japan’s Ryukyu Islands in 2001, in which JCG ships exchanged fire 
with a spy boat from North Korea until its crewmembers apparently blew up 
their own boat�7 Regarding the roles of the JCG and JMSDF in the security sys-
tem, David Leheny describes the JCG as “the canary in the coal mine,” using that 
NWC_Autumn2019Review.indb   29 8/23/19   9:18 AM
35
Naval War College: Autumn 2019 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 3 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
metaphor to suggest that the JCG is used to test public opinion on whether an 
extension of the JMSDF’s role would be found acceptable�8 Céline Pajon further 
points out that, barring an exceedingly clear and well-established legal frame-
work for separate roles of the JCG and JMSDF in providing maritime security, 
the two services need to extend and expand their interoperability—which would 
mean the JCG playing more of a military role�9 None of these analyses, however, 
addresses the distinction between the functions and roles of the JCG and JMSDF 
in guarding and security operations� Furthermore, it appears that no published 
articles have analyzed the architecture of the Japanese maritime-security system�
This article analyzes the Japanese maritime-security architecture by using 
operations in the East China Sea as an example� First, it examines the legal 
framework of maritime-security operations, the duties the JCG and JMSDF 
perform, and the interrelations between the services� Under Japanese law, the 
JCG is a civilian law-enforcement agency only, with no military role� Thus, it is 
prudent for the Japanese government to be ready to mobilize JMSDF assets even 
for law-enforcement operations� This requires careful study of mechanisms to 
avoid military confrontations, especially any escalation of the situation in the 
East China Sea� The Japanese government endeavors to maintain the rule-based 
order at sea by exercising the police power—regardless of which agent, the JCG 
or JMSDF, it uses to do so� In furtherance of its policy, the Japanese government 
clearly separates the roles and functions of the JCG from those of the JMSDF� 
The two services are the constituent parts of the Japanese dual-layer maritime-
security system� The JCG, a civilian law-enforcement agency, goes on scene as the 
primary actor to take necessary measures, while the JMSDF becomes the primary 
actor only when the situation goes beyond JCG capabilities� This architecture 
contributes to the maintenance of order in the East China Sea�
AN OVERVIEW OF THE DUAL-LAYER SECURITY SYSTEM
The JCG is tasked to perform law enforcement and maintain good order at 
sea� The JCG’s duties and functions are laid out in articles 2 and 5 of the Japan 
Coast Guard Act�10 The service is the first responder for various incidents at 
sea� Guarding and security operations in the vicinity of maritime borders and 
remote islands constitute a major duty of the JCG� But when the Japanese gov-
ernment deems a situation involving maritime security at sea to have exceeded 
the capabilities of the JCG, it may initiate a maritime security operation (MSO), 
as provided under article 82 of the Japan Self-Defense Forces Act (JSDF Act)�11 
When this second layer is reached, units of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) 
are tasked to respond� When an MSO is ordered, the JMSDF, as the naval arm of 
the JSDF, becomes the primary actor during the operation and takes over from 
the JCG the function of maintaining good order at sea�
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It is noteworthy that MSOs are defined as law-enforcement operations even 
though Japan’s naval organization becomes the actor� Therefore, the general rules 
for the use of force by police officers apply� However, when an armed attack from 
outside the country is threatened or it becomes clear that Japan is in imminent 
danger of suffering an armed attack, the Japanese government may switch from 
conducting a law-enforcement operation to a defense operation, under article 
76 of the JSDF Act�12 Until that point, it is merely a matter of which service, the 
JCG or the JMSDF, is designated to take the necessary measures; either way, the 
operation remains within the paradigm of law enforcement� The Japanese gov-
ernment prefers to use the law-enforcement power to maintain good order at sea 
and adheres to this policy as strictly as possible�
The First Layer: The JCG
The Role of the JCG. The JCG is a nonmilitary law-enforcement organization� 
When the service was established in 1948, Japanese ports and ships, having been 
the primary targets during World War II, were still devastated� In addition, over 
seventy thousand underwater mines had been left behind after the war’s conclu-
sion, which hindered the safety of navigation in coastal areas�13 Moreover, po-
litical confusion and the disestablishment of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) 
allowed heinous criminal activities at sea, such as the smuggling of people, drugs, 
and other commodities� Because the prewar maintenance of good order and the 
conduct of law-enforcement operations at sea had been heavily dependent on the 
IJN, there was no police force to deploy at sea after the war� The need for a mari-
time police force to maintain good order at sea was obvious and became a matter 
of interest to the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Al-
lied Powers (GHQ) as well� On April 27, 1948, the first version of what is now the 
JCG Act was promulgated, and on May 1 the agency was inaugurated officially�14 
Thus, under the occupation of Japan, it became the responsibility of the Japan 
Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA), which was renamed the JCG in 2000—not the 
navy—to enforce laws and regulations for the maintenance of good order and 
safety at sea�
The Korean War broke out in 1950� Soon after, the GHQ ordered the Japanese 
government to establish the National Police Reserve and the Maritime Security 
Force�15 Since the Allied force essentially departed for the Korean Peninsula, the 
need to fill the vacuum back in Japan made the establishment of a new defense 
organization essential� The Maritime Security Force was organized as a department 
within the JMSA� In August of that year, the Maritime Security Force was reorga-
nized as one department of the National Safety Agency, an independent organiza-
tion� In 1954, the National Safety Agency was renamed the JMSDF as a result of 
establishing the JSDF�16 Thus, historically the JCG and the JMSDF were created as 
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parts of the same body, but subsequently were separated and have developed inde-
pendently into organizations exercising police and military powers, respectively�
Duties and Functions of the JCG. The duty of the JCG to maintain safety and se-
curity at sea is set out in article 2 of the JCG Act� The service fulfills various roles 
and performs various functions, including maintaining good order at sea, patrol-
ling the territorial seas, suppressing and investigating crimes, conducting search 
and rescue, protecting the marine environment, carrying out hydrographic sur-
veillance, and ensuring the safety of maritime traffic� In this provision, sea means 
not only the Japanese territorial seas and the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) 
that are under Japanese sovereignty and sovereign rights, respectively, but also 
seas in general, including the high seas�17
It also is salient that JCG officers are authorized to act as judicial police 
of f icers—reinforcing the 
characterization of the JCG as 
a law-enforcement authority�18 
JCG officers are authorized to 
exercise such police powers 
as conducting investigations, 
performing arrests, executing 
search-and-seizure warrants, 
conveying the results to the 
public prosecutor’s office, and 
contributing to follow-up investigations�
It also is noteworthy that the JCG Act was amended to clarify that the main-
tenance of maritime order is a primary duty and function of the JCG� In 2011, 
the Japanese government initiated a review of the JCG’s maritime police power 
to meet the needs of the modern security environment off the Senkaku Islands� 
It decided to amend the JCG Act to enable the service to exercise its police power 
more rapidly and effectively� Previously, establishing a legal basis to warn, say, 
CCG ships that they were not exercising the right of innocent passage was a 
shared function among government institutions, not a primary responsibility of 
the JCG� The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) determined whether the activ-
ity constituted a breach of international law, and if it did so the MFA could ask 
the JCG to warn the offender and request that the activity stop� This process was 
often time-consuming and redundant� An amendment passed in 2012 made “the 
maintenance of good order of ships’ navigation” a primary duty and function of 
the JCG�19
This amendment was significant in the context of the possibility of taking 
measures against Chinese ships operated by Chinese authorities in the ECS� 
In August 2016, the JCG found a swarm of 
Chinese fishing boats . . . approaching the  
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Escorting them were 
. . . CCG ships—triple the usual number. . . .  
CCG ships intruded into Japan’s territorial 
sea. . . . Nevertheless, the Japanese government 
did not order an MSO to supplement the JCG 
ships with JMSDF destroyers.
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Japanese domestic law cannot be applied against these Chinese ships owing to 
exemption clauses, and such vessels enjoy immunity from enforcement jurisdic-
tion under international law� Under such circumstances, the JCG could not take 
enforcement measures on the basis of domestic law, even though these activities 
breached rules under international law and disrupted good order at sea� But 
while activities such as public ships not exercising the right of innocent passage 
in Japanese territorial seas do not constitute a violation of Japanese domestic 
laws, because of the exemption clause, when ships do not comply with the rules 
for exercising the right of innocent passage their activities do, in fact, constitute 
a disruption of the good order of ships’ navigation� Another example is when a 
foreign ship operated by a foreign authority conducts maritime scientific research 
within Japan’s EEZ without the consent of the government; this is considered a 
breach of international law�20 However, it does not constitute a violation of Japa-
nese domestic law, owing to a similar exemption clause in the relevant act� This 
amendment clarified that the JCG could take administrative measures against 
these activities, in accordance with relevant provisions in the JCG Act, even 
though the breach was not of national laws but of international laws�
As stressed in the JCG Act, the salient aspect of the JCG is its nonmilitary na-
ture� Even though the service was modeled after the U�S� Coast Guard, which is 
one of the armed services of the United States, article 25 of the JCG Act explicitly 
denies that the JCG is a military institution or that it may function as such, since 
at the time of the JMSA’s establishment the Allies did not want it to be part of any 
remilitarization of Japan� Today this nature of the service is well established—and 
it becomes more important when the JCG is put under the control of the Min-
istry of Defense, as may happen in exceptional circumstances�21 Even then, the 
operations of the JCG remain restricted to the duties and functions defined in 
the JCG Act, and the service is prohibited from engaging in any military opera-
tions� In such cases, the JCG is expected to restrict its role to countersmuggling 
and search-and-rescue operations and the like� Thus, the JCG legally is a civilian 
law-enforcement agency at all times�
Relevant Statutory Authority of the JCG and Its Officers. For the JCG to pursue 
its duties and functions, the JCG Act provides its officers with statutory authority� 
Among other things, article 17 of the act provides the authority to board and 
visit a ship, ask questions of its captain and other relevant persons, request docu-
ments and certifications for verification, and inspect both vessel and cargoes� 
When a ship is under way, JCG officers may order it to stop for boarding and 
inspection� If the ship does not comply, and if deemed necessary, the officers may 
board the ship coercively�
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However, to be subject to inspection, ships need to be under Japanese juris-
diction� For example, when sailing on the high seas a foreign ship remains under 
the exclusive jurisdiction of its flag state; JCG officers are allowed to board it 
only with the authorization of the flag state or in accordance with international 
law, such as in cases of piracy� Foreign ships may exercise the right of innocent 
passage through Japan’s territorial sea; therefore, the officers need to exercise cau-
tion in considering whether the situation allows boarding and inspection under 
international law as well as domestic law�
Second, when it is determined that a crime is about to be committed at sea 
or that the public order at sea is likely to be seriously disturbed, JCG officers 
may take measures immediately, without waiting for warrants or decisions from 
a court� When officers find—on the basis of “a reasonable judgment, from the 
appearance of the vessel, manner of navigation, abnormal behavior of the crew 
members, and other surrounding circumstances”—that no appropriate alterna-
tives exist, article 18(2) allows JCG officers to take measures such as stopping 
the ship, altering its course, or moving it to a designated area� Thus, this article 
provides the JCG with some of the powers necessary for maintaining good order 
at sea�
Use of Force by JCG Officers. Regarding the use of force by JCG officers in law-
enforcement operations, the general rule applicable to the use of force by police 
officials applies� Article 20(1) of the JCG Act prescribes that “Article 7 of the Law 
Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials (Act No� 136 of 1948) 
shall apply mutatis mutandis to the use of arms by Coast Guard officers�” Article 
7 of that law reads as follows: “A police officer may use his weapon in case there 
is reasonable ground to deem it necessary for the apprehension of a criminal or 
the prevention of his or her escape, self-protection, or protection of others, or 
suppression of resistance against the execution of his official duty, within limits 
judged reasonably necessary in the situation�”22
An additional element is necessary to meet the requirement for any use of 
force that may injure a person� Such exceptions apply in cases of legal defense (ar-
ticle 36 of the Criminal Act [Law No� 45 of 1907]) and emergency refuge (article 
37 of the same law), and when a person who has committed a serious crime—one 
rendering him eligible for the death penalty or imprisonment for more than three 
years—resists officers in the execution of their duties, including arrest, and when 
no alternative measures are deemed to exist�23 In short, the general rules on the 
use of force, including the standards on proportionality and necessity, always 
apply to the use of force by JCG officers, and only when no alternative measures 
exist may officers use force against a person� Thus, the use of force by police of-
ficials, including JCG officers, is strictly controlled under domestic law�
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However, there are two situations in which JCG officers may use force beyond 
the general rules discussed above: when countering spy-boat operations and in 
the course of counterpiracy operations� In the former case, article 20(2) of the 
JCG Act applies� This provision allows for an expanded use of force if JCG of-
ficers find grounds—applying reasonable judgment to the given situation—to 
believe that no other means are available to stop a suspicious boat that ignores 
orders to heave to and resists JCG personnel in the performance of their duties� 
Under such circumstances, the JCG commandant may find—given the appear-
ance of the boat, its mode of navigation, the behavior of its crewmembers, other 
surrounding circumstances, or related information—that it is reasonable to apply 
the provision� Under the provision, the following conditions apply: (1) the vessel 
in question is a foreign ship not exercising the right of innocent passage, but is 
not a warship or a ship owned or operated by a foreign government and used only 
for noncommercial purposes; (2) such navigation is likely to be repeated in the 
future; (3) it cannot be excluded that the purpose of the navigation is to prepare 
to carry out heinous criminal activities in Japan; and (4) unless the JCG conducts 
a boarding and inspection of the boat and takes necessary measures, the criminal 
activities cannot be avoided in the future�24 This provision was drafted very care-
fully, and cannot be applied to any incident other than a spy-boat case� Thus, no 
matter how serious the current guard and security operations in the ECS become, 
this provision would not apply, since spy boats are not the issue there�
In the case of counterpiracy operations, article 6 of the Act on Penalization of 
Acts of Piracy and Measures against Acts of Piracy (Law No� 55 of June 24, 2009, 
as amended, hereafter the Japanese Counterpiracy Act) applies a general rule for 
the use of force by police officers, then further provides that JCG and JMSDF of-
ficers engaged in counterpiracy operations under the act may use weapons to “the 
extent judged to be reasonably necessary by the circumstances if there are suf-
ficient grounds to believe that there are no other means to stop the pirate boat�”25 
This provision enables the firing of warning and disabling shots against a pirate 
boat, even if such use of force may cause injury to people on board� The under-
lying rationale is that once pirates successfully board another ship, measures to 
secure the lives of the seafarers on the ship being attacked become significantly 
restricted—pirates likely would use seafarers as human shields�26 This provision, 
however, does not apply to guard and security operations against public ships that 
do not qualify as pirate vessels under international law�
The Second Layer: The JMSDF
MSOs and the Role of the JMSDF under the JSDF Act. The JSDF has two kinds of 
duties� First, article 3 of the JSDF Act prescribes the primary duties of the JSDF as 
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defending Japan’s peace, independence, and security� Second, the act prescribes 
as a secondary duty the maintenance of security and good order, thereby enabling 
the second layer of the Japanese maritime-security system, in the form of MSOs�
However, until the Japanese government activates the MSO provision, a 
JMSDF unit has no legal authority to conduct security operations at a scene� 
The JSDF Act provides a “positive list” of legal bases for mobilizing JMSDF units 
to counter threats� Unless and until one of the provisions listed in the act is ap-
plied, the JSDF has no legal basis to mobilize for particular purposes� The act’s 
article 82, inter alia, is relevant to security operations at sea� “[W]hen especially 
necessary to protect life or property or maintain public order at sea, the Minis-
ter of Defense may, with the approval of the Prime Minister, order Self-Defense 
Forces units to undertake the necessary operations at sea�”27 Under this article, 
“especially necessary” is construed as a situation that requires capabilities beyond 
those of the JCG�28 Moreover, the mention of “life or property” in this provision 
is interpreted to refer to those of Japanese citizens�29 However, the geographical 
area of the operation is not restricted to Japan’s territorial seas but includes the 
country’s EEZ as well as the high seas�30
Examples of MSOs. From the establishment of the JSDF in 1954 to the end of 
2017, only three MSOs have been ordered� The first case occurred in 1999�31 On 
March 23 of that year, the JMSDF discovered two suspicious fishing boats in its 
territorial sea, in the Sea of Japan� As the first responder, the JCG dispatched 
patrol ships and airplanes to the vicinity for identification, boarding, inspections, 
and detention, as necessary� When patrol ships and helicopters spotted these 
boats, the spy boats started to flee at high speed from the JCG units’ pursuit� The 
patrol ships fired warning shots to stop the boats, but they were ignored, and the 
JCG could not stop the boats� The Japanese government decided to order the 
first-ever MSO to pursue and stop the boats� JMSDF destroyers and airplanes 
pursued the boats and fired repeated warning shots, but the boats left the Japa-
nese air-defense identification zone (ADIZ) and escaped toward North Korea� 
At this stage, the Japanese government terminated the MSO, since it hesitated 
to use air assets beyond the ADIZ; it sought to avoid unexpected encounters or 
incidents with other military airplanes�32
The second case occurred in 2004� On November 10, the JMSDF spotted a 
submerged submarine, later identified as a Han-class Chinese submarine, near 
Japan’s territorial sea off Ishigaki Island in Okinawa Prefecture� Once the subma-
rine entered Japan’s territorial sea between Miyako and Ishigaki Islands, the Japa-
nese government initiated an MSO� The intent was to request that the submarine 
surface or to expel it from the territorial sea and watch its subsequent direction 
of travel� Later, the Japanese government lodged a diplomatic protest with the 
Chinese government, which expressed regrets in response�33
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In the third and most recent use, an MSO was invoked to counter Somali 
piracy in 2009� Since the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean constitute 
vital shipping lanes for Japan and acts of piracy had affected the Japanese ship-
ping industry, the Japanese government determined to take actions to prevent 
criminal activities targeting both Japanese and other ships� The government 
ordered the JCG to conduct a feasibility study of the service’s capability to deploy 
patrol ships to the vicinity, in its role as Japan’s primary law-enforcement author-
ity at sea� The study determined that the JCG Act contained no geographical 
limitation, so law-enforcement operations in the Gulf of Aden could fall within 
the JCG’s scope of duties� However, it was not feasible to deploy the JCG’s assets 
to the Gulf of Aden since the JCG had too few patrol ships capable of performing 
counterpiracy operations on the high seas at that distance from Japan for months 
at a time� Besides, the design, 
construction, and subsequent 
structure of the patrol ships 
(e�g�, the damage-control sys-
tems) were not appropriate 
for use against pirates’ possi-
bly heavy weapons, nor were 
the communication systems 
of the patrol ships appropri-
ate for interchanges with warships deployed to the vicinity for joint operations� 
Therefore, the Japanese government ordered that an MSO be conducted until 
adoption in June 2009 of the Japanese Counterpiracy Act, which made counter-
piracy operations a new function of the JSDF�34
In two additional circumstances an MSO may be initiated, through a cabinet 
order� In the first scenario, a need arises to counter a submerged submarine in the 
territorial sea or internal waters of Japan� The first such order was promulgated 
in 1996, prior to the actual case of the Han-class submarine in 2004, at the time 
of Japan’s ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)�35 
Article 20 of UNCLOS provides that, in such circumstances, a submarine is re-
quired to navigate on the surface and show its flag� The Japanese government de-
cided to set out the procedures through which JMSDF units could be mobilized 
smoothly should a submerged submarine be found within the territorial sea in 
the future� After the 2004 Chinese submarine incident, the government reviewed 
its policies and adopted accelerated procedures for conducting the decision-
making process by phone�
The second cabinet order for an MSO applies to scenarios involving noninno-
cent passage of foreign “warships�”36 This change followed the increase in activity 
by China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy ships around Japan’s remote islands 
If the Japanese government does not provide 
sufficient explanation and information re-
garding the justification for and appropriate-
ness of its invocation of an MSO, it will not 
obtain support from the Diet and the public, 
which are particularly sensitive to the mobili-
zation of JSDF units.
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(including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands)—not necessarily within the territorial 
sea�37 When the Japanese government determines that foreign warships in Japan’s 
territorial sea are not exercising the right of innocent passage, it requests that the 
warships leave the territorial sea immediately, in accordance with international 
law� The cabinet orders the MSO immediately, pursuant to article 82 of the JSDF 
Act� This cabinet order aims to ensure that necessary measures are taken against 
unlawful activities, they are executed in a seamless manner, and the closest co-
operation and coordination are facilitated, including the exchange of relevant 
information among different government agencies� As of the end of 2017, there 
has been no case in which the Japanese government has needed to initiate an 
MSO in this manner�
Conditions for Initiating an MSO: A Preliminary Assessment. The foregoing dis-
cussion of the instances in which MSOs have been ordered and the two cabinet 
orders laying out other possible scenarios shows that the Japanese government 
takes a cautious approach to invoking MSOs� It addresses each possibility objec-
tively and on a case-by-case basis�
For example, the government does not decide whether to initiate an MSO on 
the basis only of the level of intensity of activity, even though it is an influential 
factor� Note that it ordered an MSO in the spy-boat incident in the Sea of Japan 
in 1999, whereas it elected not to order an MSO in the similar spy-boat case in 
2004, in which the boat sank in an explosion during a shoot-out with the JCG off 
Amami-Ō-shima�38
Moreover, since the 1999 spy-boat incident, JCG patrol ships’ capabilities 
have been enhanced in terms of speed, maneuverability, and armament� So that 
JCG ships could stop spy boats in the future, the Japanese government decided 
to introduce new patrol ships capable of higher speeds and with more-accurate 
fire-control systems� The availability of these patrol ships, along with the 2001 
amendments to the JCG Act that permitted extended use of force against spy 
boats, enhanced the JCG’s ability to respond, which led to a higher bar for the 
invocation of an MSO� This explains, in part, why no MSO was invoked in the 
later spy-boat case, even though the intensity of the second case was higher�
Other elements, such as the number of ships and boats subject to law- 
enforcement measures, would be considered when deciding whether to order an 
MSO, but would not be decisive factors either� In August 2016, the JCG found 
a swarm of Chinese fishing boats—on the order of two to three hundred— 
approaching the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands� Escorting them were thirteen CCG 
ships—triple the usual number� A record-high eleven of the CCG ships intruded 
into Japan’s territorial sea simultaneously�39 Nevertheless, the Japanese govern-
ment did not order an MSO to supplement the JCG ships with JMSDF destroyers� 
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The next month, more than two hundred Chinese fishing boats, allegedly en-
gaged in coral poaching, were spotted off the Ogasawara Islands, south of Hon-
shu, the main island of Japan, but no MSO was invoked�40
However, should the scenarios anticipated in the cabinet decisions—namely, 
submarines operating submerged or warships operating in Japanese territo-
rial seas in a manner not in keeping with the exercise of the right of innocent 
passage—occur, an MSO will be ordered� The decisions establish situations al-
ready deemed to be beyond the capability of the JCG to respond� JCG patrol ships 
cannot detect and issue a warning to a submerged submarine and demand that 
it surface, so the counteroperation is best conducted by the JMSDF� In a case of 
noninnocent passage of warships—again considering the weaponry systems and 
other equipment fitted aboard the respective ships and the signals traditionally 
used between naval ships—the JMSDF would be the best choice to conduct any 
counteroperation�
Political sensitivity adds another element to interpreting and applying what is 
considered to be beyond the capability of the JCG� If the Japanese government 
does not provide sufficient explanation and information regarding the justifi-
cation for and appropriateness of its invocation of an MSO, it will not obtain 
support from the Diet and the public, which are particularly sensitive to the 
mobilization of JSDF units� In addition, the government needs to consider the 
signals it might be sending to other states and international society, and related 
implications�
Therefore, the government will initiate an MSO only when both technical 
and political conditions are met� Until then, the basic policy of the Japanese 
government is to take full advantage of the JCG and its police power� As much 
as possible, to avoid political turbulence, the service works autonomously, in ac-
cordance with established laws and regulations, with no need to seek or invoke 
political decisions in particular cases�
Statutory Authority of JMSDF Units under an MSO. Under the JSDF Act and 
in an MSO, JMSDF units at sea can take “necessary measures,” but those are re-
stricted to law-enforcement measures� First, the JSDF Act clearly distinguishes 
the MSO from defense operations� Therefore, the law-enforcement principles of 
proportionality and necessity apply strictly to actions taken pursuant to an MSO� 
For example, article 93 of the JSDF Act provides that article 7 of the Police Duties 
Execution Law—the general rule on the use of force by Japanese police officers, 
incorporating the principles of proportionality and necessity—applies mutatis 
mutandis to the use of force by JSDF officers in an MSO� In addition, under ar-
ticle 20(2) of the JCG Act, while force may be used by those engaged in counter-
ing a spy-boat incident, that latitude does not apply to other cases�
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Second, other police powers that JCG officers are authorized to exercise under 
article 17, such as conducting boardings and inspections and asking questions, 
and the coercive measures with immediate effect authorized under article 18, ap-
ply to units (whether maritime, air, or even ground) conducting an MSO as well� 
However, since JMSDF officers are not authorized to act as judicial police officers 
under the Criminal Procedure Act (Law No� 131 of 1948), they cannot investi-
gate, conduct interrogations, or execute judicial warrants; JSDF officers engaged 
in an MSO must cooperate with JCG officers when an investigation is necessary�
Interoperability between the JCG and JMSDF. It is worth noting that the JCG 
and JMSDF barely have interoperability� First, the equipment and design of JCG 
patrol ships and of JMSDF destroyers represent different operational concepts� 
Article 4(1) of the JCG Act stipulates that patrol ships should have the structure, 
equipment, and function appropriate to pursue coast guard roles and functions—
in other words, not for military purposes� The assets and equipment available to 
the JCG emphasize the service’s identity as a civilian police agency� For example, 
the operating systems and equipment of JCG patrol ships are similar to those 
on merchant ships, whereas the JMSDF applies military specifications (specs), 
which often require more sophistication� The information a commercial system 
obtains may not satisfy military specs� The weapons systems on JCG patrol ships 
are for warning and disabling purposes, not for destroying ships� These differ-
ences in structure and equipment make it difficult for the two types of ships to 
operate together even when in the same theater�
Second, the different functions, operations, and cultures of the two orga-
nizations influence their potential interoperability�41 The JCG, as a dedicated 
maritime law-enforcement organization, must comply with the necessity and 
proportionality principles whenever it takes coercive measures that include the 
use of force� Its operations are restricted by human rights law, including the right 
to life and liberty� The ultimate purpose of police activity is to suppress criminal 
activities and maintain good order� Doing so at sea typically involves stopping 
and boarding ships and arresting—alive—those aboard bearing responsibility 
and delivering them for prosecution by a criminal court� Article 25 of the JCG 
Act does not allow operations of the JCG to include military functions, and JCG 
officers do not identify themselves as military personnel� In contrast, the JMSDF 
is a military organization, and its function is to defend the nation and its politi-
cal independence and territorial integrity from external threat� Although certain 
norms must be observed even during armed conflict, including humanitarian 
law, the JMSDF may be called on to destroy enemy ships when necessary� These 
differences in functions, operations, and cultures hinder sharing between the 
command-and-control systems of the two organizations, so interoperation be-
tween the two organizations rarely occurs�
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However, there are indications that these two organizations are moving to-
ward operating in closer cooperation� First, after the 1999 spy-boat incident that 
initiated the first MSO, the JCG and JMSDF began drafting what subsequently 
became a joint-operation manual�42 This process provided opportunities to un-
derstand both the differences between and the similarities in JCG and JMSDF op-
erations� Later, counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden provided increased 
opportunities to work together� Assignment of JCG officers to law-enforcement 
detachments (LEDs) embarked in JMSDF destroyers to facilitate judicial proce-
dures continues to improve the relationship between the two organizations�
Accomplishing a seamless and smooth transition from the JCG to the JMSDF 
when an MSO is ordered is the key to a successful operation� Since the command-
and-control mechanisms and the maneuverability of the ships of each organiza-
tion are so different, and since by definition the threat posed extends beyond 
the capability of the JCG assets, JCG vessels are likely to withdraw from the 
theater once JSDF units arrive on the scene� In such cases, on-site information 
exchange—including possession of a common operational picture and shared 
understandings of intended strategy—is essential�
SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE EAST CHINA SEA
As noted, the Japanese government attempts to contain guard and security op-
erations in the East China Sea within a law-enforcement paradigm� To do so, it 
first evaluates any entrance of CCG ships into Japan’s territorial sea around the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands under international and national law� Then it analyzes 
the options it may choose to pursue as law-enforcement measures in accordance 
with international and national law�43
Rights and Actions
The Japanese government acknowledges the right of innocent passage by war-
ships and foreign ships owned and operated by other governments for noncom-
mercial purposes (except those carrying nuclear weapons)�44 So, legally speaking, 
CCG ships may exercise the right of innocent passage through Japan’s territorial 
sea�45 However, the stance of the Japanese government is that when CCG ships 
encroach into Japan’s territorial sea around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands they are 
not exercising the right of innocent passage under the provisions of UNCLOS�46
For instance, in December 2008, CCG ships entered into the territorial sea 
around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and cruised, hovered, and drifted for ap-
proximately nine hours� The Japanese government did not consider this behavior 
to comply with the definition of passage under article 18 of UNCLOS� More-
over, the Chinese government announced that the CCG ships were conducting 
“law-enforcement activities�”47 Law-enforcement activity by foreign ships in 
Japan’s territorial sea can be regarded as “any other activity not having a direct 
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bearing on passage,” which is the formula given in article 19(2), item (l) of 
UNCLOS—if not a violation of Japanese sovereignty—thus rendering the pas-
sage not innocent� Therefore, the Japanese government determined that the CCG 
ships in the territorial sea were not exercising the right of innocent passage�
As of the end of 2017, the Japanese government continued to maintain this 
interpretation� It considers the frequent encroachments by and continuous pres-
ence of CCG ships in Japan’s territorial sea to constitute neither an invasion nor 
a state of hostilities�48 As far as the Japanese government is concerned, the behav-
iors of the CCG ships constitute a failure to exercise the right of innocent passage 
in keeping with international law, making it a law-enforcement matter, to which 
it is the consistent policy of the government for the JCG—its primary maritime 
law-enforcement actor—to respond with appropriate measures�
However, what those available measures are is debatable� First, article 25 of 
UNCLOS provides the coastal state a right of protection, allowing it to “take nec-
essary steps to prevent passage 
which is not innocent” in its 
territorial sea� Although this 
provision of the convention 
does not define necessary steps 
in detail, the term may be 
interpreted within a broader 
context, leading to the conclu-
sion that such steps against a 
vessel not properly exercising the right of innocent passage include requesting 
that the ship stop for inspection, arresting persons on board, and detaining the 
ship; shouldering and bumping the ship to expel it from the territorial sea; and 
even, as a last resort, using force against it�49 Such ships would fall under the full 
jurisdiction of the coastal state�50 The conditions governing these measures in the 
article are that they are aimed at preventing noninnocent passage and are to be 
performed within the territorial sea�
Second, article 32 of the convention recognizes the immunity of warships 
and other government ships operated for noncommercial purposes� Since patrol 
ships are categorized among the latter, they enjoy immunity from the enforce-
ment jurisdiction of the coastal state� Therefore the coastal state cannot exercise 
its enforcement jurisdiction, including the stopping, boarding, arresting, and 
seizing functions discussed previously� Significantly, the use of force would 
not be allowed except for domestic law-enforcement purposes� Article 301 of 
UNCLOS, which reflects article 2(4) of the UN Charter, prohibits any threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state when a party state exercises its rights and duties under UNCLOS� In 
In December 2008, CCG ships entered into the 
territorial sea around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Is-
lands and cruised, hovered, and drifted for ap-
proximately nine hours. The Japanese govern-
ment did not consider this behavior to comply 
with the definition of passage under . . .  
UNCLOS.
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addition, Japanese domestic law substantially restricts the use of force in a law- 
enforcement operation� As explained in the previous section, a JCG officer may 
use force only (1) to apprehend criminals or prevent criminals from escaping, (2) 
for self-protection or the protection of others, or (3) to suppress resistance to the 
execution of his official duties� Since CCG ships, as patrol ships, are exempted 
from Japanese domestic laws and regulations and thus fall outside the scope of 
their application, the conduct of these ships does not constitute a criminal viola-
tion; therefore, case (1) above does not apply� Case (3) is construed to apply only 
when officers must take coercive measures to suppress resistance� Because CCG 
ships enjoy immunity, the JCG would have little cause to exercise its enforcement 
jurisdiction and take coercive measures in support thereof, so case (3) hardly 
applies either� Thus, only case (2) represents a realistic scenario in which JCG of-
ficers might use force� And if all the officers on scene carefully observe the rules 
of national and international law, including the immunity of warships and patrol 
ships, the likelihood that force would end up being used would be quite low�
Considering these rights under international law and the relevant restrictions, 
the measures the Japanese government would take may not include the exercise 
of enforcement jurisdiction� Under UNCLOS, a coastal state has a right of protec-
tion, but CCG ships enjoy immunity from enforcement jurisdiction� Therefore, 
if CCG ships do not exercise innocent passage, JCG ships issue warnings and 
request that they leave the territorial sea immediately�51 They may sail side by side 
with such ships to prevent them from approaching the territorial seas and the 
islands� However, they do not board, inspect, search, seize, or arrest, since such 
activities would be construed as exercising enforcement jurisdiction� If CCG 
ships perform any further malicious activities, such as risking lives on Japanese 
ships, the stance of the Japanese government is that the JCG ships may take pro-
portional measures against that conduct, as far as is permissible under interna-
tional law� In such cases, the Japanese government does not consider the use of 
force to be excluded, but it nonetheless is severely restricted, as discussed above�52
Evaluation of Past and Ongoing ECS Security Operations
From the point of view of maritime-security strategy, it sounds reasonable for 
a coastal state to use its navy—the most robust power at sea—to maximize 
the power of guard and security operations in its maritime border zones� The 
Chinese government is procuring more, and more heavily armed, patrol ships� 
This implies that more-capable CCG ships may be deployed in the East China 
Sea� It would become more difficult for JCG ships to deal with these CCG ships� 
However, employing JMSDF assets—Japan’s second layer—in the East China Sea 
likely would lead to deterioration of the situation, since the Chinese side likely 
would feel the need to counter by deploying its naval assets to restore the balance� 
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A regional arms race probably would ensue, involving further deployments of 
much larger and more-sophisticated warships, and the confrontation would 
escalate� Thus, this balance-of-power strategy does not work for maintaining the 
status quo�
Alternatively, if relevant states remain within the paradigm of law 
enforcement—by exercising self-restraint and restricting their actions—they can 
maintain the status quo� In the East China Sea, the Japanese government exercises 
self-restraint by maintaining its law-enforcement approach and by refraining 
from advertising the presence of the JMSDF, the system’s second layer� Remain-
ing within the paradigm of law enforcement means that the measures taken are 
governed and restricted by international and national law that reflects the basic 
principles of law enforcement�
As long as China follows a similar policy, with the states merely maintaining 
order by observing international and national law in the East China Sea, it is 
reasonable for Japan to remain within the paradigm of law enforcement� Unless 
a Chinese ship takes further dangerous actions, such as risking life at sea, inter-
national law during peacetime barely allows the employment of robust measures, 
including the use of force, because of the immunity that patrol ships enjoy� Even 
when exceptional circumstances permit the use of force, such use still must fol-
low strictly the principles of necessity and proportionality� Besides, the weaponry 
systems fitted on Japanese patrol ships are minimal, intended solely to enable law-
enforcement operations, not war fighting and ship sinking� Therefore, the JCG, as 
a civilian law-enforcement authority, does not represent a threat of hostilities, so 
it can serve as a buffer, helping to avoid a military confrontation in which a single 
miscalculation could lead to rapid deterioration of the situation� Adherence to 
the law-enforcement paradigm—by observing both international and national 
law and exercising a coast guard police power—can contribute to maintaining the 
rule-based order in a more suitable way�
The essential intent of the dual-layer system is to keep military elements away 
from the scene of confrontations whenever possible� There are at least three good 
reasons to attempt to do so� First, the presence of JCG patrol ships implies that 
Japan is governing and administering the islands effectively� Since the precon-
dition of exercising jurisdiction is that the islands properly fall under Japanese 
jurisdiction, the presence of patrol ships enforcing domestic laws implies that 
the Japanese government administers and governs the islands� This is in confor-
mity with the Japanese policy position that there is no territorial issue in the East 
China Sea� In contrast, a continuous presence of JMSDF destroyers would suggest 
the possible existence of a territorial issue, thereby evidencing a discontinuity 
with Japanese policy� So the absence of military elements and the presence of 
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civilian law-enforcement patrol ships represent a constant reinforcement of the 
government’s position�
Second, the dual-layer system allows the allocation of a single function to 
each layer—a significant advantage� If the system had only a single layer, the navy 
would have to provide both functions: deterrence and active measures� The navy 
indeed has the capabilities to do both; however, the presence of excessive power 
at the scene is not desirable in politically sensitive circumstances� The other side 
would adjust its capabilities to the same level, escalating the situation to a navy-
on-navy confrontation� The advantage to a state of using a dual-layer system is 
that it can deploy, as the first layer, assets with capabilities appropriate to dealing 
with situations at the scene, while it uses the second layer as a deterrent while re-
serving its remaining power farther from the scene� In this manner, the Japanese 
government keeps on-scene confrontations manageable�
Third, the role of coast guards is to provide protection and maintenance of 
the rule-based order, and such services are expected to work for safety; they 
often are likened to a shield� One function of the police power is to enforce 
national laws to materialize legal interests� When a domestic law is enforced 
in the maritime arena by a coast guard, the coast guard exercises its power in 
accordance with international law, including respecting the scope of states’ 
jurisdiction and the immunity of warships and public ships operated by govern-
ments for noncommercial purposes� Under international law, proper exercise 
of the police power does not harm any foreign state� Therefore, a coast guard 
functions as a defensive shield and is not offensive at all� By using the JCG to 
maintain the legal order in the East China Sea, the Japanese government shows 
that it intends to do so in a way that avoids escalation and military confronta-
tion� In contrast, the use of a military organization, which is likened to a pike, 
may render provocative and offensive implications, including a suspicion that 
future escalations are possible�
Besides, coast guards cooperate substantially with neighboring states in pursuit 
of performing their duties better� Coast guards need to cover vast areas of oceans 
with a relatively small number of assets� Therefore, international cooperation 
among coast guards is essential, such as when coordinating search-and-rescue 
operations and suppressing transnational crimes at sea; maintaining dialogue, 
building confidence, and expanding mutual understandings are significant inter-
ests for coast guards� For example, the JCG and CCG have a history of cultivating 
cooperation and mutual understandings in the performance of their duties� To 
cultivate international cooperation further, the JCG added to existing bilateral 
dialogues by initiating multilateral frameworks, such as the North Pacific Coast 
Guard Forum and the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting, to both 
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of which the CCG is a party� Notwithstanding tensions in the East China Sea, 
communication and dialogue among coast guards are maintained through 
these meetings, and mutual understandings are fostered through joint exer-
cises and joint fishery-surveillance patrols� The respective services expect these 
confidence-building structures and activities to assist in avoiding rapid escalation�
This article has analyzed Japan’s maritime-security architecture in the East China 
Sea� It portrayed that Japan’s policy is to endeavor to remain within the paradigm 
of law enforcement and thereby keep the overall level of confrontation in the East 
China Sea manageable� To do so, it employs a dual-layer system whose constitu-
ent parts are the JCG and the JMSDF�
The JCG represents the first layer of the system and the primary actor in 
confrontations with Chinese counterparts in the East China Sea� The JMSDF, 
the second layer of the system, displaces the JCG as the main actor only when 
the Japanese government determines that a situation has extended beyond the 
capabilities of the JCG, and implements an MSO� Until then, the JMSDF’s main 
role is deterrence; this maximizes the flexibility of Japanese strategy�
The analysis found the current guard and security operations that the JCG 
performs in the East China Sea to be law-enforcement operations conducted 
in accordance with existing domestic and international law� The Japanese gov-
ernment deems the current overall confrontational situation to constitute not 
hostilities but a breach of international law, and in response takes measures that 
remain within the limits of national and international law� This approach reflects 
Japan’s maritime-security strategy, which respects the rule of law and freedom of 
navigation�
The article also analyzed the mechanisms that work to maintain tensions at 
a manageable level� The situation suggests that Tokyo and Beijing do not want 
any further escalation in the East China Sea, and that they understand that coast 
guards are more appropriate for supporting the rule-based order than maintain-
ing a balance of power using naval assets would be�
Nonetheless, challenges to the effective working of the system remain� First, 
the assets of the JCG and its personnel need to be enhanced� Even with the de-
terrent effect of the second layer, the Japanese government needs to maintain a 
continuous presence of JCG units around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands� Given the 
Chinese government’s “salami-slice tactics,” by which it pursues its interests and 
asserts its claims step by step, the Japanese government must be able to demon-
strate that the islands are under continuous Japanese governance�53 To counter 
salami slicing, such as the use of drones from patrol ships and the use of maritime 
militia disguised as fishermen, the JCG needs to review its capabilities; JCG assets 
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deployed in the vicinity must have sufficient capacity to perform guard and secu-
rity operations while countering whatever Chinese assets are present�
Second, to maximize the deterrent effect of the second layer, close cooperation 
between the JCG and JSDF is essential� Until the second layer is activated under 
an MSO, the JSDF’s primary role is deterrence� Added to the capabilities of the 
JCG, the thick and robust second layer of the JSDF provides collective deterrence� 
So even when JSDF assets do not participate directly in on-scene confrontations, 
the deterrence they provide helps with the implementation of Japanese policy 
and contributes to its flexibility� Yet the JSDF may need to strengthen this deter-
rent effect further through its close alliance with the U�S� Navy� This alliance has 
been the linchpin of the security environment in Northeast Asia� Making the link 
between the two navies even 
closer would reinforce collec-
tive deterrence�
Third, the JCG and the 
JSDF, as well as other govern-
mental institutions, need to 
develop their collective capa-
bility to gather and analyze 
the information necessary to determine whether an MSO should be activated� 
Almost any activation of an MSO would lead to the conclusion that the Japanese 
government had escalated the situation� After that, decision-making becomes 
much more difficult� Therefore it is essential to support policy makers’ determi-
nation of whether to initiate an MSO by exchanging information and contribut-
ing to analysis within an appropriate time frame� The relevant institutions need 
a system through which all actors can provide, pool, and draw on information so 
that the necessary decisions can be made without delay�
Fourth, as the Japanese government endeavors to maintain the rule-based 
order in the East China Sea, it should maintain its policy of relying on the police 
power as much as possible� In March 2018, the Chinese government announced 
a restructuring of various governmental bodies�54 Although governance of the 
CCG is not yet fully clarified, the service was placed under the People’s Armed 
Police, a paramilitary organization, and under the direction of the Central Mili-
tary Commission� With this change, CCG ships might be deemed naval ships, 
making it more likely in future confrontations that the Japanese government 
would implement an MSO under the existing cabinet decision� The Japanese gov-
ernment has not revealed its stance on this matter, but it should continue to exert 
the police power of the JCG as its first response� The government should continue 
to profit from the dual-layer system in which the JCG and the JMSDF each plays 
[T]he JCG, as a civilian law-enforcement 
authority, does not represent a threat of hos-
tilities, so it can serve as a buffer, helping to 
avoid a military confrontation in which a 
single miscalculation could lead to rapid dete-
rioration of the situation.
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a single role until the situation escalates beyond the capabilities of the JCG. When 
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government may activate an MSO, in line with the cabinet decision. Until then, 
the JCG is the more suitable tool for maintaining order in the East China Sea.
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 The United States missed two particularly advantageous opportunities to resolve the problem of a nuclear North Korea: prior to the first nuclear test 
on October 9, 2006, and after the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011�1 
The window of opportunity for successful resolution of the North Korea prob-
lem is shrinking, and it seems that not much can be done that could halt further 
development of North Korea’s military capabilities in support of its asymmetric 
strategy� Even Kim Jong-un’s recent initiatives in 2018 and 2019 to meet and talk 
with leaders of the United States and South Korea, and ostensibly to explore a 
resolution to the nuclear issue, have been received with a great dose of skepticism�
Yet do we really have a clear understanding of North Korea’s missile and 
nuclear programs and all their implications? North Korea is pursuing advanced 
military capabilities, but its intent may be neither offensive nor defensive� Per-
haps the aim of its unconventional approach to military strategy is simply for 
that strategy to be asymmetric; that is, different from that of any of its perceived 
potential opponents� Such a concept can be understood only within the geostra-
tegic balance of power in East Asia�
Questions such as the following help frame our approach to the North Korea 
crisis: “How will the standoff over North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons end? Will Kim Jong Un buckle 
under pressure and roll back his nuclear program, 
or will he press forward in completing an arsenal 
that can threaten the whole world? Will Donald 
Trump make good on his threats to take mili-
tary action against the North, or will he focus on 
NWC_Autumn2019Review.indb   53 8/23/19   9:18 AM
59
Naval War College: Autumn 2019 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 5 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
deterring Kim from ever using his nukes?”2 But these questions reflect our fear of 
nuclear weapons more than they identify the motivations behind North Korea’s 
military development�
The problem is heightened further by a deep-seated perception of the irratio-
nality and unpredictability of North Korean leaders� How quickly we forget that 
deception is at the heart of every good strategy� Even if there was doubt before, 
North Korea over the past several years has proved that it is in fact a rational ac-
tor� The North Korea crisis illustrates the complexity of one of the most impor-
tant geostrategic junctions of the world’s most powerful militaries, as well as the 
failure of the Western world to understand Asian strategic thought�
The first part of this article explores developments in North Korea’s military 
capabilities and strategic thought through a review of existing scholarship on 
military force structure, capabilities, and provocations� It concludes that North 
Korea’s strategic thought regarding asymmetric warfare has developed in five 
stages and suggests that the country is preparing itself to wage a possible hybrid 
war� The second part of the article examines the development of North Korea’s 
asymmetric strategies, exploring further the assumption that North Korea has 
been preparing for a hybrid war� The existing literature alludes to and assesses 
North Korea’s asymmetric approach but really does not engage the subject of its 
military strategy� The third part of the article is a deeper exploration of asymme-
try as practiced on the seas, which could be critical to a hybrid war on the Korean 
Peninsula� The article concludes with a call to scholars for further exploration 
into North Korea’s strategic thought and the asymmetric strategies it may pursue�
REASSESSING NORTH KOREA’S MILITARY CAPABILITIES
Scholars have tried to understand the transformation of North Korea’s forces, 
capabilities, and strategies�3 An asymmetric strategy is one that state and nonstate 
actors engage in to oppose an adversary of greater military power and capabilities 
and that targets key vulnerabilities or dependencies of that adversary to create a 
major psychological impact that affects initiatives, actions, or will�4 However, the 
scholarly estimates often are constrained by a lack of information and transpar-
ency related to North Korea and a vague understanding of the role North Korea 
plays within the geostrategic balance of power in East Asia�
Strategic thinking is about objectives, concepts, and capabilities and their ap-
plication to the art of war�5 A future war on the Korean Peninsula most likely 
would be a hybrid war, employing both conventional and unconventional meth-
ods and means� According to Frank G� Hoffman, in hybrid warfare different 
types of forces become blurred into the same force or are applied in the same 
battle space� He sees hybrid war as combining irregular and conventional force 
capabilities, integrated operationally and tactically�6 A traditional approach 
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defines a theater of war as a defined area in which military effort is conducted 
under one overall military strategy that covers all subareas, with the term theater 
of operations applying to military effort conducted under the umbrella of the 
overall strategy within a particular subarea� By contrast, in hybrid warfare the 
term must be theater of wars, with warfare spreading across multiple domains 
and following not one strategic outline but many, though driven by a common 
political objective and pursued by both conventional and asymmetric means� In 
that sense, a hybrid war is more a conglomerate of wars than an amalgamation 
of military operations�7 The following paragraphs review the literature on the 
transformation of North Korea’s military capabilities and further developments 
in its strategic thinking�
The transformation of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) began at the end of the 
1990s, with a focus on the North Korean Special Operation Forces (NKSOFs)�8 
According to the available literature, changes that occurred prior to the 1990s—
such as restructuring the army, changing the nature of training in general as well 
as that of the NKSOFs, and replacing regular infantry troops with light infantry 
troops along the demilitarized zone—highlight North Korea’s transition from 
emphasizing the waging of conventional warfare to the waging of asymmetric 
warfare and the increasing threat its forces represent in that mode�9 For some 
scholars, the NKSOFs are the most critical of the asymmetric threats that North 
Korea’s armed forces pose� In fact, the U�S� military sees special operation forces 
(SOFs) as being central to any asymmetric strategy that a weak opponent would 
employ against a superior military power� Bruce E� Bechtol Jr� projects that prior 
to and during an all-out war NKSOFs might be deployed to carry out asymmetric 
operations that would include sabotaging lines of communication and taking 
over command and control centers within South Korea�10
The Korean People’s Navy (KPN) and its development began to receive in-
creased scholarly attention around 2010� According to Bechtol, North Korea’s 
naval forces now pose an asymmetric threat because of their ability to carry out 
conventional actions in a provocative and asymmetric way�11 In his article “Main-
taining a Rogue Military: North Korea’s Military Capabilities and Strategy at the 
End of the Kim Jong-il Era,” Bechtol briefly discusses how increases in North 
Korean forces and advancements in their capabilities suggest plans to threaten 
South Korea via the seas in the future�12
It is important here to draw attention to the significance of the leadership 
transition period and the development of the KPN that followed, as Kim Jong-
un is believed to have been behind some provocative incidents at sea between 
2010 and 2012� Every past North Korean leader contributed something new 
in terms of the strategic development of the country’s military; Kim Jong-un’s 
contribution probably will be to oversee the final transition of its military forces 
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to hybrid warfare capabilities and to develop a maritime war strategy� The time 
frame for the development of naval forces in North Korea also is in line with 
China’s announcement at the Eighteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party in 2012 of its intention to continue building up a naval force�13 Bechtol also 
highlights the potential for North Korea to use the seas for a wide range of offen-
sive measures, everything from delivering a nuclear weapon to using a reflagged 
commercial vessel or trawler to conduct a small-scale, preemptive attack prior 
to the outbreak of all-out war�14 Use of such a vessel would allow the KPN and 
NKSOFs to bypass the forces of the United States and South Korea� In such ways 
has the overall development of the military capabilities of North Korea led to the 
restructuring of naval forces and the transformation of its armed forces toward 
asymmetry�
The transformation of North Korea’s military is reinforced by an examina-
tion of the growing asymmetric threat posed by capabilities such as short- and 
long-range artillery, missiles (of short, medium, intermediate, and long range), 
NKSOFs, and strategic weaponry (weapons of mass destruction, weapons for 
electromagnetic and electronic warfare, and cyberwarfare capabilities)�15 Andrew 
Scobell and John M� Sanford’s review of North Korea’s unconventional forces 
and capabilities—including nuclear, chemical, and biological weaponry; ballistic 
missiles; and medium- and short-range missiles and their use in offensive and 
defensive capacities—suggests that North Korea’s focus on strategic weaponry 
and their asymmetric uses is relatively new�16 Artillery and missile systems and 
nuclear capabilities were the focus of North Korea’s military development before 
2012, while electronic-warfare and cyber capabilities were the country’s focus 
between 2012 and 2017� During 2017, a new emphasis on the development of 
electromagnetic pulse weapons for asymmetric use emerged�17
These interim events, occurring between 2012 and 2017, reinforce earlier 
premises that North Korea by 2012 had completed the transformation of its con-
ventional armed forces and had begun the transformation of its other military 
capabilities� That transformation of the armed forces now can be considered 
complete, with the proviso that the United States assumes that most opponents 
“cannot field air forces adequate to counter U�S� air forces [nor] � � � challenge [the] 
U�S� air-to-air�”18 Most opponents, therefore, would use missiles and air-defense 
artillery to provide air defense� Some scholars believe that North Korea would 
counter enemy air forces by using “Scud missiles to deliver persistent chemical 
weapons to theater air bases�”19
Chronologically, these developments correspond to North Korea’s many and 
various military provocations� While such have occurred since the 1950s, Taehee 
Whang, Michael Lammbrau, and Hyung-min Joo provide a particular focus on 
incidents from 1999 to 2012, and Bechtol discusses incidents in 2002, 2003, 2008, 
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and 2010�20 A possible interpretation is that as North Korea judged its capabilities 
to have increased to closer to what was necessary to conduct a war involving the 
United States (and presumably to win it), its behavior became less circumspect, 
and therefore it began to commit more provocations, or more-serious ones, or 
both�21 North Korea may have considered that its improved capabilities enabled 
it more safely to provoke responses from the United States, thereby exposing and 
learning from those responses� This would be in line with Sun Tzu’s principle of 
“know your enemy”—especially the U�S� readiness and ability to engage directly 
in a more serious military conflict in the region� The perception of the danger 
such provocations represented allowed them to create a deterrence effect of their 
own� North Korea took advantage of this effect to shift its efforts among the vari-
ous stages in its nonlinear military development as it deemed most advantageous� 
The synchrony of military transformations with provocative incidents further 
strengthens the assumption that North Korea is developing a strategic approach 
to conducting a hybrid war that would combine conventional and asymmetric 
forces and capabilities�
Several inferences can be drawn regarding the development of North Korea’s 
strategic thought� First, the reorganization and transition of its military forces 
occurred over the course of three periods, namely of the KPA between 1997 and 
the early years of the twenty-first century, of the NKSOFs during those same 
early-century years, and of naval forces between 2010 and 2012� Each transition 
followed a change of strategic thought from conventional to asymmetric to guide 
both lines of thinking within the context of a future hybrid war� Second, the final 
stages of the transition to forces capable of engaging in an asymmetric war oc-
curred between 2010 and 2012� The changes in North Korea’s naval capabilities 
manifest this evolution� Third, the overall changes in North Korean military 
capabilities, the emphasis on strategic weapons, and the nature of North Korea’s 
provocations point to an asymmetric strategic approach� Nevertheless, the avail-
able evidence should be explored further to assess whether North Korea actually 
is using such an asymmetric approach to test and wargame possible approaches 
to conducting a future hybrid war, develop operational plans to execute it, and 
train its forces accordingly�
NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGIC THOUGHT
Sun Tzu averred that “all warfare is based on deception� Hence, when we are able 
to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; 
when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far 
away, we must make him believe we are near�”22 A successful strategy leads an 
opponent to see yet misperceive, while believing he sees and knows� North Ko-
rea’s strategy is asymmetric not only because of the way it combines and engages 
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military forces, but also because it has not developed its unconventional capabili-
ties in the conventional way� Since its first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has 
conducted its equivalent of the World War II Allies’ Operation FORTITUDE, with 
rubber nuclear warheads instead of rubber tanks�23 North Korea’s asymmetric 
approach has followed a nonlinear, back-and-forth progression�24
The U�S� Joint Strategy Review definition of 1999 (still one of the simplest, most 
concise, and effective) describes asymmetric military strategy as an approach that 
often employs innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons, or technologies and 
can be applied at all levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—and 
across the spectrum of military operations�25 “Asymmetric approaches are at-
tempts to circumvent or undermine U�S� strengths while exploiting U�S� weak-
nesses using methods that differ significantly from the United States’ expected 
method of operations� Asymmetric approaches generally seek a major psycho-
logical impact, such as shock or confusion that affects an opponent’s initiative, 
freedom of action, or will� Asymmetric methods require an appreciation of an 
opponent’s vulnerabilities�”26
With this definition in mind, it is necessary to overcome the negative aspects 
of modern strategic reliance on the logic of conventional military engagement 
and to understand the vulnerabilities—in this case of the United States—that 
North Korea is exploiting with its asymmetric approach� Because of its twin focus 
on development and application, North Korea’s asymmetric strategy appears as 
neither offensive nor defensive—exactly as it should be to exploit the opponent’s 
main vulnerability: rigid, nonreflective perception and understanding�
Long ago, Thucydides taught that war between maritime and continental pow-
ers would end in stalemate�27 According to Colin S� Gray, for a maritime power to 
win such a war it requires a “continental sword”—a continental ally� During the 
First World War, Britain’s continental sword was the French army, and in 1940 it 
was the Soviet Union�28 In East Asia, by contrast, America’s allies hardly can be 
classified as continental� Additionally, it is not feasible for the United States to 
expect that it could conduct a successful military engagement in East Asia today, 
given that contemporary North Korea (and China) are armed with much more 
than infantry rifles; thus, any analogy with the Korean War of the 1950s would 
be either obsolete or futile�
If Western powers are failing to recognize correctly the elements of Asian stra-
tegic thinking, they are repeating historical mistakes they made previously owing 
to the application of Western strategic concepts� During the Vietnam War, in the 
West the political center of gravity was public opinion influenced by daily media 
coverage, which the leaders of the North Vietnamese army exploited skillfully� 
On the other hand, the United States did a poor job of determining the enemy’s 
military center of gravity, in part because the North Vietnamese army was so 
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widely dispersed� Similarly, North Korea’s political-military leadership structure 
today is so pervasive and solidly entrenched that the leadership transition from 
Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un did not affect the stability of the regime� Perhaps 
North Korea’s strategic center of gravity—the hub of all its power—never has 
resided in North Korea per se, but in its closest ally, China�29
The remainder of this article will explore the asymmetric element in North 
Korea’s strategy, often falsely understood as irrational� If in the future we have 
occasion to see North Korea’s strategy unfold, we likely will discover that the 
problem was in our patchy understanding of North Korea’s leaders, and that their 
actions indeed will turn out to have been rational�
THE STAGES OF NORTH KOREA’S MILITARY DEVELOPMENT
The recent transformation of the military capabilities of North Korea and the 
current political initiatives can be placed into context by identifying five phases 
of development of the country’s military�
First Stage
The first stage of North Korean military development consisted of a steady linear 
increase in the numbers of armed forces personnel, continuing from the end of 
the Korean War to the present� According to the International Institute for Stra-
tegic Studies, in 1985 North Korea was ranked sixth in the world, with 838,000 
total armed forces personnel, and in 2015 fourth, with 1,379,000�30 This buildup 
was conceived as being defensive in nature, creating a massive protective shield 
provided by land forces� Status of this stage: accomplished�
Second Stage
The second stage saw the development of short- and medium-range ballistic 
missiles, along with nuclear capabilities� It began with the initiation of North 
Korea’s missile program in 1976 and lasted to the first display of North Korea’s 
intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Hwasong-10, at a military parade in 
2010�31 This missile’s range is only 2,500 kilometers (km), which covers only the 
zone of the first island chain� This stage also is interpreted as being defensive, as 
well as asymmetrical� Status of this stage: accomplished�
Third Stage
The third stage is the development of nuclear capabilities, along with intermediate- 
range ballistic missiles� It lasted from the intermediate-range ballistic missile 
Hwasong-10 test in 2016 to the intercontinental ballistic missile Hwasong-14 test 
in 2017�32 The characteristics and purpose of this stage were to be offensive and 
asymmetrical with the increased missile range, which fully covers the first island 
chain zone and theoretically the second island chain as well� Status of this stage: 
accomplished�
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Fourth Stage
The fourth stage is the expansion of naval capabilities, along with interconti-
nental ballistic missiles� It began with the upgrade of training facilities, weapons 
systems, and special-operations capabilities at the Munchon naval base in 2014� 
In the same year, commercial satellite imagery identified two new North Korean 
helicopter-carrying frigates, and the buildup continued throughout 2017 with 
tests of the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 missiles�33 The characteristics and pur-
pose of this stage are to be offensive and asymmetrical; the missiles’ ranges cover 
both island chain zones fully� Status of this stage: in progress�
Fifth Stage
The fifth stage is the expansion of the capabilities of the Korean People’s Army 
Air Force (KPAAF), along with the further development of naval weapons sys-
tems� Status of this stage: initiated� The 2018 summit between President Donald 
Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore, along with South 
Korean president Moon Jae-in’s revival of the Sunshine Policy, marked the begin-
ning of this fifth stage�34 In this stage, North Korea would have more time and 
resources and suffer less external political pressure, allowing it to focus on build-
ing up conventional military forces, primarily the KPN and the KPAAF�
The sequencing of these stages leads to the conclusion that North Korea’s 
top-down approach to military development has been and is asymmetric, coun-
terintuitive, and somewhat deceptive in its succession from advanced and non-
conventional to less advanced and conventional military technologies�
SOUTH KOREA’S DILEMMA
A dilemma related to South Korea (ROK) has arisen because of the complexity of 
North Korea’s asymmetric strategy, the true intentions of South Korea’s military 
strategy, and the efforts of the entire international community to understand the 
North Korea crisis� Consider that two of the ROK’s three navy fleets are located 
on that country’s west coast; consider the strength of the ROK air force; and con-
sider that the ROK has a large stock of tanks (2,872), some of which are the most 
advanced in the world� Then consider that most of North Korea’s missile-launch 
facilities are located on the country’s east coast, that the KPN’s East Sea Fleet is 
larger than its West Sea Fleet, and that most KPAAF air bases are located in the 
western part of the country�
If South Korea decides to attack North Korea unilaterally with its First Navy 
Fleet, it could expose its east coast to a land invasion� Moving the other two fleets 
would be unacceptable because doing so would expose the west coast to attack 
and the fleets to easy outflanking by the KPN’s West Sea Fleet� Even if the First 
Navy Fleet engaged in warfare jointly with the U�S� Navy, it would not make any 
difference� The situation likely would be aggravated further because China could 
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take part in the conflict, probably sealing the East Sea or even launching a mas-
sive naval response across the entire Asia-Pacific region� If the South Korean 
regime decided to ally with Japan against North Korea, South Korean society 
most likely would not accept such a step� Moon Jae-in’s victory in South Korea’s 
nineteenth presidential elections are seen as the “herald [of] a new dawn for the 
Sunshine Policy,” reflecting the attitude of a South Korean civil society in which 
“nearly 77 percent of South Koreans believe Seoul should restore dialogue with 
Pyongyang to help ‘resolve’ North Korea’s nuclear program�”35
Nuclear deterrence has both psychological and ethical contexts� If North Ko-
rea did not use its nuclear weapons first, any nuclear attack on it would be labeled 
as unethical and condemned by the entire international community� It is quite 
possible that North Korea will play both the “society” and the “deterrence” cards 
in the future�36
PREPARING FOR HYBRID WARFARE ON  
THE KOREAN PENINSULA
Frank G� Hoffman has written that the twenty-first century may be characterized 
by hybrid wars, but what exactly they are, the types of warfare they employ, and 
the actors who participate in them are contested�37 The U�S� military establish-
ment defines hybrid warfare as covert or deniable activities (including nonviolent 
subversion, covert violent actions, cyber warfare, information warfare, proxy 
warfare, and conventional warfare), which are supported by conventional or 
irregular forces, to influence the domestic politics of target countries�38 What 
makes them hybrid is the combination of operations and tactics used and the 
combination of regular and irregular forces performing them, with the combina-
tions among them carried out synergistically to attain operational ends�
Within the context of North Korea, the regular armed forces typically engage 
in conventional warfare activities, whereas the irregular paramilitary forces or 
subversive groups typically engage in unconventional or irregular activities� As 
mentioned previously, NKSOFs are part of the armed forces but would be charged 
with carrying out paramilitary activities such as infiltration, sabotage, and dis-
ruption� Other forces that would be factors in a hybrid war include networked 
actors spread across the globe, including some members of the global communist 
network that align with and often take part in propaganda and cyber operations 
in support of North Korea; North Koreans who reside abroad as foreign workers 
but remain sympathetic to the regime; and some North Korean defectors who feel 
disenfranchised and discriminated against by their host countries�
Within hybrid operations, irregular and unconventional operations are con-
ceptually distinct from each other� The target of irregular operations is the oppos-
ing state’s population, and the strategic aim is to foment unrest, or even to bring 
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about radical or revolutionary change, within the targeted society� In contrast, in 
unconventional hybrid operations the target is the existing power structure and 
the strategic aim is to capitalize on existing unrest to coerce, disrupt, neutralize, 
or remove that authority from power� North Korea’s state targets for such opera-
tions would be the United States and its partners in the Asia-Pacific region (South 
Korea and Japan) and beyond that any state or global nonstate actors who either 
support these states specifically or directly oppose North Korea�
In hybrid warfare, targeting is intended to obstruct an adversary’s ability 
to further or achieve its political ends (e�g�, South Korean and allied ability to 
conduct war or surgical strike, the positioning of the terminal high-altitude area-
defense system within South Korea, the imposition and maintenance of effective 
economic sanctions) and to mobilize others in support of its position and efforts� 
Other segments of the adversary’s domestic population would be targeted to at-
tempt to strip the regime of its political and economic support base and to create 
chaos in such a way that the social or economic fabric of society is disrupted� Pos-
sibilities include using high-powered microwave devices to shut down commu-
nications in key civilian areas and carrying out cyber attacks on critical national 
infrastructure that would result in loss of power and the shutdown of banking 
and financial systems� Additional actions might include attempting to make use 
of key strategic actors who either are hostile to the status quo or who support 
positions that serve to disrupt it (e�g�, actors calling for war or supporting a sur-
gical strike by playing on domestic tensions or political divisions and corruption 
scandals); using proxy actors (e�g�, by establishing links with and providing ei-
ther direct or indirect support to political opponents); using physical and virtual 
networks to mobilize support and disseminate information; and employing psy-
chological operations and perception-management techniques at the domestic, 
regional, and global levels to maintain favorable information-management flows, 
or even to attain ascendancy over the adversary�39
In conventional operations, the targets include opposing forces themselves 
and their military capabilities, so as to weaken those forces’ morale, degree of 
commitment, and will to continue� A goal is to exploit gaps in alliance relation-
ships and between military strategies and any other weaknesses in the opposing 
force structure�
North Korea likely would employ both types of hybrid operations, and, as 
Hoffman pointed out in a quotation cited earlier, they can be blurred together 
with conventional capabilities into the same force, or they can be combined in 
strategic ways to offset South Korean and American advantages and overcome 
North Korea’s own military disadvantages� As the existing literature highlights, 
what makes hybrid warfare such a threat is the unpredictability it introduces in 
the use of strategies, operations, and tactics by weaker states and nonstate actors, 
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as well as the inability of larger or militarily superior states to learn and reor-
ganize as quickly on the battlefield� Therefore, understanding the asymmetric 
dimensions of hybrid military strategy is critical for twenty-first-century warfare 
planning�
Scholars have alluded to North Korea’s pursuit of an asymmetric warfare 
strategy and have discussed extensively the threat that asymmetric capabilities 
pose, but they have not made strategy itself a central focus� This, as Bruce Ben-
nett highlights, is because the lack of regime transparency makes it so difficult 
to know exactly what types of weapons are being developed and what strategy 
and concept of operations are being put in place�40 Nonetheless, it is reasonable 
to assume that any strategy North Korea would employ would be asymmetric, 
as that would be the only way it could gain a strategic advantage over its more 
powerful adversaries�
The psychological component noted earlier in this section is what separates 
hybrid warfare from asymmetric warfare� Asymmetric strategic objectives are 
primarily psychological, not military or political; the aim is to win and keep the 
hearts and minds of supporters and sympathizers�41 Success for an asymmetric 
approach will be determined not by one strategy but rather by the synergy cre-
ated from the deployment of an array of strategies, operations, and tactics in a 
manner that maintains the element of surprise and has the greatest psychologi-
cal impact� Failure is more likely when the weaker state cannot retain its asym-
metric approach employing the variety of tactics that constitute hybrid warfare 
because it is forced to focus on conventional operations� If its opponent can turn 
the conflict into a full-scale conventional war, the stronger party gains the upper 
hand�42 The next section explores North Korea’s asymmetric strategy in relation 
to its capabilities�
NORTH KOREA’S ASYMMETRIC STRATEGY
The asymmetric military strategy is not linear but layered; it does not advance 
along the directional line of action, but rather disperses effort to different theaters 
of asymmetric military operations (TAMOs)� This requires combining the efforts 
of the different service branches into an effective and operationally autonomous 
military whole�43 In addition to adopting its asymmetric strategy, North Korea 
has transformed and developed its forces into an asymmetric military� The linear 
approach to transforming and developing a military normally involves a bottom-
up approach� For example, both the Napoleonic corps system and the German 
panzer division system practiced bottom-up agglomeration of smaller units into 
bigger and more complex ones� In contrast, North Korea has approached the 
transformation of its military in a top-down, nonlinear fashion�
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At the time of Kim Jong-un’s takeover of the reins of government in December 
2011, the country experienced economic hardship and troop morale dropped, 
but there was little impact on the integrity of the KPA or on its modernization 
efforts�44 Bechtol stresses the need for North Korea to adjust its strategy for the 
sake of North Korean military competitiveness in the future� In doing so, he 
raises important questions: (1) “Has the very necessary adjustment in strategy 
been made that will allow the North Korean military to go ‘toe to toe’ with the 
ROK-US alliance in combat?” (2) “What comprises the asymmetric threat? It also 
leads one to ask, if there have been serious constraints on North Korean military 
acquisition, what advances has it made?”45
Bechtol suggests that the answer to these questions is the asymmetric ap-
proach� However, his treatment fails to define asymmetric military strategy in 
general and to explain the North Korean version� According to Lieutenant Gen-
eral Wallace “Chip” Gregson, USA, “North Korea has adapted to the U�S�-ROK 
alliance’s conventional military superiority by developing tactics and weapons 
systems that equip them with offensive capabilities that avoid confronting the 
greatest military strengths of the alliance, in an attempt to compete on what it 
likely perceives as a more favorable playing field�”46 That more favorable playing 
field is exactly what has changed since 2012� Some South Korean officials con-
sider North Korea’s asymmetric forces to represent a serious threat to the South 
Korean military, as stated in a 2010 government report: “[A]n additional attack 
by the North using its asymmetric strength is the most serious threat as of now�”47
Even though some may have recognized the threat, few have attempted to 
grasp the full context of North Korea’s asymmetric strategy� North Korea has 
conducted a top-down, asymmetric transformation of its military through five 
stages of military development to prepare itself to conduct an asymmetric, non-
traditional offensive founded on disruption, sabotage, and interstate insurgency, 
with the prospect of conducting a long-term hybrid war in East Asia� Yet, in order 
to understand this asymmetric military strategy better, it is necessary to clarify 
it in relation to different political objectives (offensive/defensive), and different 
types of actors (state/nonstate)�
An asymmetric military strategy deployed as a means of achieving a defensive 
political objective is not offensive� But nor yet is it defensive; while it aims at cre-
ating deterrence and security dilemmas, it does not enhance defense in any way� 
Being deceptive is a double-edged sword: if the deception is exposed, its imple-
mentation can be affected and the political objective compromised�
An asymmetric military strategy deployed as a means of achieving an of-
fensive political objective is clearly offensive� The asymmetry is reflected in the 
nontraditional organization of the military forces and the nontraditional conduct 
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of military operations� Guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, and insurgency all 
can fall under the umbrella of an asymmetric military strategy� If it is nonstate 
actors who employ the asymmetric military strategy, the political objective, by 
definition, would be considered offensive� When traditional actors (i�e�, states) 
use an asymmetric strategy, such use can be deceptive, and accordingly a means 
of achieving a defensive political objective�
North Korea’s ballistic-missile program is seen as being driven by the regime’s 
desire to enhance deterrence and defense and to increase the country’s ability to 
conduct limited attacks against South Korea�48 However, contrary to this view, a 
military technology that increases speed and agility, such as missiles, favors the 
offense� There is no rational purpose for a missile attack if it is not part of a larger 
military operation that aims to eliminate the opponents’ offensive and disable 
their defensive capabilities�49
Daniel A� Pinkston emphasizes that “North Korea’s ultimate strategic goal is 
to unify Korea on DPRK terms and maintain one-party rule under the Korean 
Workers’ Party�” The regime is a dictatorship that uses coercive diplomacy and 
asymmetric strategies to achieve its political objectives� Before 2013, these objec-
tives tended to be limited to “survival, sovereignty, and relevance�”50 But the lead-
ership changes in North Korea along with the country’s military advancements 
indicate an expanded scope of objectives�
While there may be uncertainty about North Korea’s political objectives, 
there is no doubt about the nature of its military strategy� Whether it is openly 
or deceptively offensive, it is certainly asymmetric� North Korea’s asymmetric 
provocations and limited military engagements suggest that it is preparing for a 
possible hybrid war� The key to any such future hybrid war in East Asia and the 
Asia-Pacific will be the seas� Therefore, it is important to explore the types of of-
fensive maritime strategies that might be employed�
ASYMMETRY ON THE SEAS
States tend to focus on the prospects for traditional, symmetric wars and how to 
fight them, rather than on asymmetric wars� At the time of their creation, some of 
the military concepts and tactics that are most well-known today were either ne-
glected or misperceived� In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Na-
poleon successfully used the military corps formation and the principle of “march 
divided, fight united” to wage war against multiple opponents simultaneously� In 
the mid-to-late nineteenth century, Prussia defeated Austria and France and uni-
fied the German states by employing jaeger (rifle-armed infantry) units and new 
mission-type tactics known as auftragstaktik� In the mid-twentieth century, Nazi 
Germany invaded most of Western Europe and was quite successful in the opening 
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stages of Operation BARBAROSSA against the Soviet Union using the panzer divi-
sion as a new combined-arms formation and blitzkrieg (lightning war) tactics�
There is a small body of literature dedicated to asymmetrical maritime war�51 
It focuses primarily on terrorism and piracy at sea by nonstate actors; the legal 
classification of incidents at sea and the gaps in international law; historical and 
contemporary international legal distinctions between, or the status of, belliger-
ency and insurgency; and historical and contemporary use of naval mine warfare 
and the international legal instruments covering its use by state and nonstate 
actors�52 Importantly, none of the existing literature looks at asymmetric mari-
time war in relation to North Korea� The seas are vital to any future hybrid war, 
which means they must be central to North Korea’s battle plans� Given the limited 
amount of information and lack of scholarly focus on North Korea’s naval capa-
bilities, only an incomplete exploration of the subject is possible, yet performing 
it is necessary�
Kil-joo Ban has written about the future role of the ROK navy, focusing on 
the development of its naval strategies� He argues that the ROK navy should em-
phasize preparing for asymmetric naval warfare and sea insurgency, given that 
navies increasingly play roles in carrying out operations aimed at combatting 
nontraditional security threats (e�g�, insurgents, terrorists, pirates)� He also takes 
into account the nature of the ROK’s alliance with the United States and the op-
portunities available for the ROK navy to deploy overseas through that alliance�53 
However, his analysis does not contemplate North Korea practicing naval insur-
gency operations within the context of interstate war�
A sea insurgency “refers to the type of violence used to overcome power gaps 
at sea in an attempt to allow the weak actors to attain their goals from global 
insurgency�”54 This definition of weak actors and the literature in this area mostly 
refer to nonstate actors rather than state actors; they do not even contemplate 
state actors that are known for preparing for and engaging in asymmetric warfare 
strategies, operations, and tactics, such as North Korea� Yet in the lead-up to and 
during any future war on the Korean Peninsula, sea insurgency operations would 
be most advantageous for North Korea�
Drawing on the existing literature that focuses on traditional naval tactics em-
ployed by states, plus the literature on the operations conducted and tactics used 
by nonstate actors such as Al Qaeda and the Sea Tigers, it is possible to gain an 
understanding of the type of asymmetric maritime objectives North Korea might 
set and the strategies and tactics it might employ leading up to and during a war� 
For example, Paul A� Povlock’s examination of the Sea Tigers case covers the 
range of operations in which insurgents can engage and state responses to them�55
North Korea has been preparing for asymmetric warfare in general since it 
reorganized its military; its maritime warfare strategy is not likely to be anything 
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other than asymmetric� In the discussion that follows, we must consider mari-
time asymmetric warfare operations in two contexts: during the lead-up to war 
and during war itself� These different contexts affect the planning of operations 
and the strategies and tactics to be applied�
Tactics employable as part of sea insurgency operations include the sabotage 
of vessels and sea cables; mine warfare; use of improvised explosive devices; cyber 
attacks (to target, disrupt, and take over command and control systems); Global 
Positioning System jamming (to facilitate deviation from navigation patterns, en-
able sabotage or hijacking operations, or encourage collisions between both com-
mercial and military vessels); and suicide attacks (to damage vessels, demoralize 
military personnel, and sap societal morale)�56 A combination of these tactics 
would be employed to further different strategies�
One strategy for sea insurgency operations consists of mobilizing state units 
abroad and nonstate actors to carry out media, disinformation, and propaganda 
campaigns in support of North Korea and its operations� This might include 
deflecting domestic, regional, and global attention from the development of mili-
tary programs in general or the transportation of SOFs in particular�
Sea insurgency operations would be conducted both prior to and during war� 
Those carried out prior to war would seek to further defensive political objectives 
by weakening opposing forces, including their morale� They also would facilitate 
the transition into asymmetric military operations in pursuit of offensive political 
objectives� Oscillating between operations in pursuit of defensive and offensive 
objectives keeps opponents off balance and makes it harder for counterinsurgen-
cy strategists to understand the logic of the sea insurgency operation as it unfolds 
and harder for them to predict the strategies and tactics they will encounter�
Any assessment of North Korea’s asymmetric and maritime military strategy 
conducted strictly from this traditional perspective would be inadequate owing 
to the country’s unique geostrategic location� Sabotage and sea insurgency in 
pursuit of defensive political objectives do not require direct engagement within 
the theaters of asymmetric military operations—but invasion does�
The standard approach to analyzing North Korea’s military strategy is insufficient 
because North Korea intentionally has created a security dilemma� Supposedly, 
while North Korea’s general approach is unpredictable and its actions generally 
offensive, its policy objectives are limited to achieving survival, sovereignty, and 
relevance� But too many in the international and scholarly communities see the 
ongoing modernization of North Korea’s military capabilities only in the context 
of a threat to the ROK-U�S� alliance, rarely reflecting on North Korea’s asymmet-
ric approach within a wider geopolitical framework�
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North Korea’s asymmetric strategy cannot be labeled simply as nontraditional. 
It is not linear but layered. It does not enhance the directional line of action; 
rather, it disperses it. North Korea has followed this asymmetric approach in its 
expansion of its military capabilities, keyed to its unique geostrategic location 
and its geopolitical positioning.
The existing literature highlights North Korea’s asymmetric approach to con-
flict but does not explore the development of its strategic thought, the nature of 
its asymmetric strategy, why such a strategy is necessary, and how it might be 
used in a future war. There has been no exploration of North Korea’s strategic 
thought, owing to a lack of information, especially access to military documents. 
Nonetheless, we can derive some inkling of it through contemplation of how the 
country has developed its military capabilities and force structure. This article 
has sought to lay a foundation for a new field of inquiry; however, additional 
studies need to be conducted to tease out potential strategies further. War will be-
come only more complex in the future. In some previous cases, a failure to think 
outside the box has contributed to the failure of past strategies, yet any strategist 
will state proudly that the ability to do so is the hallmark of strategic thinking.
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NEAR-TERM APPLICATIONS OF  
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Implementation Opportunities from Modern Business Practices
Christian H. Heller
 Secretary of Defense James N� Mattis made headlines in early 2018 after stating that artificial intelligence (AI) may change the “fundamental nature of war,” a 
groundbreaking premise that could alter the principles of warfare and centuries 
of military thinking�1 War has been and is meant to be a human endeavor to 
achieve human ends� AI poses the challenge—or opportunity—of altering that 
premise� The common picture of AI in warfare raises images of self-directed 
drones in the sky attacking targets of opportunity at their own discretion; armies 
of intelligent android warriors in the fashion of I, Robot; or an all-powerful su-
percomputer dominating humankind, reminiscent of the Terminator and Matrix 
franchises� While these images from science fiction portray a possible distant fu-
ture, just as H� G� Wells did with The War of the Worlds, the practical applications 
of AI involve intricate and redundant tasks that augment human involvement and 
increase humankind’s own abilities and productivity� Rather than replace human 
participation in war and national security activities, AI supports human beings to 
make us better at defending the country�
This AI-augmented world is no longer a futur-
istic discussion� Spurred on by private business 
and the innovations of Silicon Valley, the world 
outside the Pentagon is developing new and better 
uses for AI at exponential rates� The Department 
of the Navy (DoN) needs to harness the progress 
of private development in the field of AI, not as an 
optional benefit or high-speed capability, but as 
an institutional imperative to maintain superiority 
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over our nation’s enemies� The numerous near-term applications of AI can be 
implemented today to lay the groundwork for the future of maritime forces and 
institutions� The first place to implement new technology is in the support func-
tions and noncombat specialties of the Navy and Marine Corps� Current business 
practices can be implemented within the DoN to reduce costs, increase efficien-
cies, generate new capabilities, and reduce manpower requirements in noncom-
bat roles, which would increase the number of sailors and Marines available for 
deployments and operations�
This article begins with a brief review of the status of AI research and de-
velopment (R&D), existing capabilities, and areas in which private industry is 
pursuing new opportunities� Second, it will examine the current policy of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) toward AI implementation� Next, the article will 
propose nine applications from current business uses of AI wherein the technol-
ogy could benefit the Navy and Marine Corps� It concludes by demonstrating 
that integrating AI into the DoN may be a large task, but it is not impossible� By 
relying on previous examples, the Navy and Marine Corps can institutionalize 
AI technologies and ensure our ability to respond adequately to the full range of 
military operations in the future�
Marine Corps lieutenant colonel Earl Hancock “Pete” Ellis’s work on amphibi-
ous warfare—one of the most important maritime developments of the twentieth 
century—only led to success in World War II because of the years of preparation, 
refinement, and experimentation that the Navy and Marine Corps committed to 
it prior to Pearl Harbor� The same concept holds true today with AI� The ground-
work for operations with AI can—and must—be laid today, or the naval forces of 
the nation will be left unprepared for future missions�
DEFINITIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
The definition of artificial intelligence has changed many times since the first 
conference on AI at Dartmouth College in 1956, at which researchers joined 
together to theorize about the combination of robotics, neural networks, and 
programming�2 One current definition describes AI as “an entity (or collective 
set of cooperative entities), able to receive inputs from the environment, inter-
pret and learn from such inputs, and exhibit related and flexible behaviors and 
actions that help the entity achieve a particular goal or objective over a period of 
time�”3 Another states that AI is the ability to “teach computers to parse data in a 
contextual manner to provide requested information�”4 The many definitions of 
AI continue to evolve to define more-specialized subcategories of the field, but 
each is useful for providing guidelines and goals for researchers�
AI is a self-teaching machine� Rather than a program with set inputs and 
outputs that runs consistently, AI teaches itself and changes as its environment 
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changes� Cellular phone assistants are examples of simple AI that still require 
human input� For instance, Apple’s Siri application can perform many activities 
and searches through preprogrammed procedures� However, it requires human 
input in the form of software updates, patches, and reprogramming as the world 
changes around it� In contrast, more complex AI learns these changes for itself, 
similar to how the human brain works� For example, if you were to wake up in a 
room you have never seen in a country you have never been to, your first instinct 
would be to ask questions, look around, and explore� AI is designed to learn 
from unused, unsorted, or new information in the same way� As Army lieutenant 
colonel Patrick Sullivan states, AI is the “ability of computers to learn from data, 
as opposed to being explicitly programmed�”5 AI involves far more than simple 
mathematics and programming, and thus, researchers require knowledge in areas 
such as logic, philosophy, and physics to create a self-learning device�
Structures and Types of AI
An AI system has four layers, which interact with each other to mimic human 
intelligence� AI itself can be imagined as the topmost layer, which absorbs, stores, 
and processes information to make decisions� One layer below, the AI relies on 
machine learning, which allows it to “learn and act without the need for human 
input�” The third level down is deep learning, which contains the AI’s ability to 
process images, speech, and language� Finally, the bedrock of the AI system is the 
neural network, which processes data� The most opportunities for new research 
exist in this neural-network layer� While the human brain has over one hundred 
billion neurons, the most advanced AI available today only has about one billion 
neuron equivalents�6
Artificial intelligence is divided into two major categories� General AI attempts 
to mimic the human brain in completely autonomous thought, while narrow 
AI is the creation of smart computers to solve complex problems�7 General AI 
does not exist yet, but substantial and increasing progress in the field of narrow 
AI provides enormous opportunity for the eventual creation of general AI� AI, 
as many understand and use it today, is narrow AI� For example, narrow AI is 
used on most commercial passenger planes� On Boeing 777s, pilots only spend 
about seven minutes out of every flight manually flying the plane, while Airbus 
pilots manually fly about three and a half minutes of every flight�8 IBM’s Deep 
Blue and Watson projects are both advanced versions of narrow AI that have 
received much attention over the past years� Amazon’s Alexa and Apple’s Siri are 
both examples of narrow AI beginning to make regular, continuous changes to 
people’s lives� Importantly, when examining the feasibility of the Navy and Ma-
rine Corps using AI, one must remember that an iPhone or Amazon user need 
not know anything about computer programming, networking, or search logics 
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to use these functions� The operating system is designed to function with inputs 
from the average user�
These advances in narrow AI serve as an important bridge to the development 
of general AI� Advanced progress in narrow AI can be used with human-in-the-
loop (HITL) systems for “expanded human potential�”9 Indeed, while AI systems 
have beaten world-class chess players on numerous occasions, the greatest success 
is achieved when an AI is paired with a human�10 In an HITL system, human deci-
sions and operations are advanced through integration with AI, such as in flight-
simulation trainers� An HITL system requires a human user working with the AI 
and making decisions on the basis of AI recommendations� The system empowers 
human interaction with the AI, and the platform can be designed to defer some 
or all decision-making to human operators� In fact, many argue that combining 
humans and AI creates optimal decision-making outcomes�11 Unmanned aerial 
vehicles and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms 
operate with these designs�12 DoD believes that both HITL and human-on-the-
loop systems—in which a human becomes involved to override the system when 
necessary—will play a role in future military applications of AI�13
Important developments in artificial intelligence are taking place within ma-
chine learning and deep learning, two different programming processes with 
different intents� Machine learning is the process by which a program can search 
through large amounts of data, learn from it, and apply it to make and recom-
mend informed decisions� The concept can be applied to any scenario in which 
the AI is able to carry out a certain function with a given data set, and the AI 
becomes better at that function over time� Machine learning already is used in 
programs such as music-streaming services and data security� Deep learning, by 
contrast, is machine learning that can learn new functions and refine its existing 
functions without human interference� Deep learning is demonstrated best by the 
following example of a flashlight: “[The flashlight] could be programmed to turn 
on when it recognizes the audible cue of someone saying the word ‘dark�’ Eventu-
ally, it could pick up any phrase containing that word� Now if the flashlight had 
a deep learning model, it could maybe figure out that it should turn on with the 
cues ‘I can’t see’ or ‘the light switch won’t work�’”14
Both deep learning and machine learning require large data sets to be effec-
tive� As explained by the layers concept earlier, AI by itself does nothing� The 
ongoing “big data revolution” creates more information in one day than ever has 
existed in the history of humankind and creates a situation in which humans are 
physically unable to parse through it to reach the best conclusions� Large, orga-
nized data sets combined with appropriate AI tools have the potential to refine 
and alter warfare and war-fighting institutions to the benefit of the wager—in this 
case, the Navy and Marine Corps�
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Public Use Leads to DoN Application
The best examples of artificial intelligence that can apply to the DoN are those 
that members of the public already are using effectively� Simple AI programs are 
all around us� Google Maps uses AI to program the most-efficient routes for driv-
ers� Chatbots such as Siri, Alexa, and Microsoft’s Cortana are AI applications that 
have advanced considerably over recent years and continue to learn and refine 
their output to support the personalized needs of their users even better� AI can 
act as an “intelligent salesman,” providing personalized sales recommendations 
to customers—also known as smart advertising� Organizations such as ride-
sharing company Uber Technologies use dynamic pricing—accurately pricing 
a commodity or service between supply and demand�15 More advanced AI tools 
that can benefit the DoN are being created every day� For example, AI engines 
now are able to create fake video with realistic images and sounds� One example 
of this was researchers at the University of Washington using AI to create a re-
alistic but fabricated video of former president Barack Obama giving a speech�16
A more ambitious example by one of the most well-known AI systems pro-
vides insight into the pace of AI development� IBM’s Watson has the capability 
to provide “personality insights” derived from various means of communication� 
Using linguistic analysis, Watson can determine personality characteristics from 
media channels such as e-mail, text messaging, and Twitter� Business uses the ser-
vice to determine an individual’s likely attraction to various products or services, 
but the Navy and Marine Corps could use it to gain insight into an individual’s 
actions and thoughts relevant to warfare� Watson categorizes a person on the ba-
sis of what IBM calls the big five personality traits (each of which has six different 
specific facets), twelve different individual needs, and the values that specific in-
dividual might hold�17 The system is remarkably accurate� During an experiment 
in which a famous individual’s speeches and statements were played for Watson, 
the AI accurately provided personality profiles� For example, Martin Luther King 
Jr� was characterized as empathetic, self-controlled, difficult to embarrass, desir-
ing prestige, attracted to helping others, and unconcerned about traditions�18
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
DoD has made strides in the right direction with AI and other emerging tech-
nologies� AI is the topic of many discussions, roundtables, panels, and research 
proposals� In June 2016, the Defense Science Board (DSB), a technology advi-
sory committee for the Secretary of Defense, published its report on the state 
of autonomy as a field and its future potential� The report recognized the rapid 
advancement of the technology and its “high-value capabilities�” It recommended 
that DoD accelerate its adoption of autonomous systems, while also expanding 
the types of technologies that DoD elements have available for missions� Most 
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military uses for unmanned systems today involve remote human operation 
rather than true AI employment� Expanding the role of AI can magnify the ben-
efits of the system� Not only does the integration of greater AI autonomy reduce 
casualty rates of U�S� personnel, but such systems can adopt riskier tactics; target 
with greater accuracy; and operate with greater endurance, range, and speed 
while retaining a greater level of flexibility and mobility� For perspective on how 
widespread these applications could be, DoD’s eleven thousand unmanned air-
craft currently make up 40 percent of the total number of U�S� military aircraft�19
The DSB’s report highlights six different mission parameters to consider when 
determining the applicability of AI� These parameters are speed of decision-
making, heterogeneity and volume of data, quality of data links, complexity of the 
action, danger of the mission, and required persistence and endurance� AI can be 
a critical component in missions with high or complex levels of these parameters, 
such as cyber operations; missile defense; data analysis; ISR data integration; 
contested communication or operations; unmanned vehicle operations, includ-
ing unmanned undersea operations; air operations center activities; multimission 
operations; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack cleanup�20
DoD’s budget gives some impression of where initial inroads into AI research 
are heading� For 2019, the Air Force allocated $87 million to experiment with AI 
for wargames and field training, while the Army allocated $6�5 million for train-
ing purposes, to include simulations and virtual reality� The Navy set aside $6�5 
million for similar training purposes, in addition to experimentation for combat 
purposes� The Navy, through its rapid prototype development program, is using 
$49 million to apply AI to combat systems, such as new submarine combat assets� 
The Marine Corps has allocated $7�1 million for an unmanned warning system 
to provide commanders with increased situational awareness�21 The Army plans 
to field new unmanned combat systems by late 2019� The system, dubbed the 
next-generation combat vehicle, will be assigned to operational units in 2021� 
The intent is to replace both the M1 Abrams tank and the M2 Bradley infantry 
fighting vehicle with the new system eventually�22
Regardless of research and new systems, DoD policy mandates strict human 
oversight of any autonomous or semiautonomous weapons systems� Weapons 
systems “shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise ap-
propriate levels of human judgment over the use of force�”23 As new hardware 
is developed and combined with AI, tight restrictions on the use of force are 
appropriate� However, as development of previous systems, such as the MV-22 
Osprey, was plagued with difficulties and setbacks, so too will AI encounter train-
ing challenges—and potential fatalities�24 These weapons systems are still years 
away from regular use in the DoN� Research should continue, as their impact on 
future warfare will be vital� But there are numerous examples of AI from industry 
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that can be implemented today because they are not connected to armaments, 
and therefore do not face the same complex ethical and policy questions as lethal 
autonomous assets�
NEAR-TERM AI APPLICATIONS FOR THE NAVY  
AND MARINE CORPS
By examining current business uses of AI, we can discern many prospects for im-
plementing it to support the Navy and Marine Corps� Future autonomous weap-
ons systems and combat technologies aside, the near-term applications of AI can 
make the Navy and Marine Corps more responsive, flexible, and deadly� Since 
narrow AI—which exists throughout industry, as mentioned in the previous 
sections—is simply the composition of “machine-learning solutions that target 
a specific task,” the technology can be applied to a range of functions, especially 
in routine noncombat processes�25 These near-term AI applications can reduce 
costs, free up manpower to support new units, and lay the requisite groundwork 
for the full-scale adoption of complex AI systems in the next decade� Currently 
functioning AI systems can be used to support administration, personal produc-
tivity, planning, logistics, crisis response, training, intelligence, force protection, 
and force structure� This section will examine each of these possibilities by ap-
plying current private industry practices to DoN functions�
Administration
Administration is one of the primary support functions within the Navy and 
Marine Corps that can be revolutionized through AI� Numerous companies 
already use AI to assist with information-input management, which involves 
processing “incoming mail, e-mails, invoices, spreadsheets, presentations, PDFs, 
and other documents�” The system benefits from the digitization of information 
in the modern age� AI can help with the preprocessing of information (i�e�, who 
needs this information and how does it reach them) as well as the maintenance, 
categorization, and later use of it� One example is an insurance provider in Ger-
many that uses IBM’s Watson to identify topics from e-mails and letters and route 
them to the correct internal departments within the organization� Global logis-
tics companies are using AI to assist with internal functions such as accounting, 
human resources, and information technology� AI can work with robotic, rules-
based processes, such as filling in forms and accessing data, to be a force multi-
plier for administrative work� Accounting and professional services firm Ernst & 
Young estimates that 65 percent of human resources rules-based processes can be 
automated using a combination of AI and robotics�26 Because both the Navy and 
Marine Corps are inundated with documents and correspondence, AI can have 
a direct impact on their efficiency�
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The use of AI to provide customer support and feedback is prevalent in 
private business� Fast-food restaurant chain Taco Bell has a virtual customer 
representative usable via online collaboration tool Slack, and HP’s Print Bot AI 
is available through social media platform Facebook Messenger�27 Even more 
impressive, Print Bot was developed in only three weeks�28 Disney released a 
Miss Piggy chatbot prior to the release of its updated Muppets television show to 
spark interest and garner reviews�29 Companies such as Cogito combine AI and 
behavioral science to provide real-time guidance for customer representatives to 
help foster better interactions and relationships�30 For the services, such guidance 
could streamline administrative interactions, especially for deployed forces or 
among different commands� Digital representatives from Navy or Marine Corps 
headquarters or a deployed unit’s parent command could be seconds away with 
answers and insight� The technology also has the potential to provide better 
communication with partners, support bilateral and multilateral operations, and 
foster more-effective mission outcomes�
The automation of human tasks by AI systems expands beyond user interac-
tion� The development of computer vision technology holds promise for areas 
such as administration, but also intelligence (discussed later in this article)� AI-
based computer vision can learn from documents, images, and videos to record 
patterns and adapt output measures�31 AI is already capable of generating written 
reports for news agencies� News outlets such as the Associated Press (AP), Fox, 
and Yahoo use platforms from Automated Insights to write stories about earnings 
reports and sports recaps�32 Its main AI-writing platform, called Wordsmith, is 
a natural-language-generation platform that turns data into written comprehen-
sive text� The program allowed the AP to publish twelve times more stories in 
a specific topic area with fewer errors and greater efficiency�33 The computing 
and technology company NVIDIA uses Wordsmith to streamline its reporting 
procedures and turn data into usable forms� The information is used to create in-
stantaneous, comprehensive reports that team leaders can use to drive decision-
making�34 As a final example, social media giant Facebook built DeepText in 
2016 to read and understand human communication in text form� The program 
reached “near-human accuracy” at the pace of thousands of Facebook posts every 
second and can be used in twenty different languages�35
AI data-analysis capabilities can free administrative sections from performing 
certain work and reduce manning requirements, while still accomplishing the 
same tasks� Since AI can learn to standardize documents, accomplish repeated 
tasks, and analyze data much faster than humans can, AI is suited to support 
perfectly the administration functions of the DoN� The list of possibilities for 
DoN implementation is almost endless: processing command check-ins and 
checkouts, facilitating awards write-ups and processing, executing search and 
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creation of policies and orders, authorizing travel, routing lists, disseminating 
white papers, and many more� Units teach new administrative clerks to accom-
plish these relatively routine tasks, but an AI mechanism can learn and perfect 
them in a shorter period�
One potentially overlooked administrative area of AI influence is energy us-
age� DoD spent over $15 billion on energy in 2015�36 Even minimal reductions 
in facilities’ consumption (such as air-conditioning and electricity) can have 
monumental cost savings� In one example, the Marine Corps Resident Energy 
Conservation Program implemented a network of centrally tracked energy usage 
monitors to reduce residential unit energy consumption by 12–15 percent and 
save $4 million�37 AI-controlled large-scale heating and cooling systems on DoN 
installations could save tens of millions of dollars annually� In private residences, 
the Nest Learning Thermostat program is an example of AI drastically reducing 
energy costs for consumers by reducing heating bills by up to 12 percent and 
cooling bills by 15 percent�38 
Personal Productivity
Increases in the daily personal productivity of DoN personnel can reduce man-
hour requirements and generate institutional efficiency at the individual level� 
Existing AI platforms already can organize, write, and disseminate correspon-
dence for their users�39 Advances in speech recognition also hold enormous 
promise for personal productivity� Speech-recognition capabilities can be used 
for authentication, instructions, planning, production, and coordination�40 
Hours spent creating and editing documents, approving forms, passing docu-
ments through checklists, and sharing information vertically and horizontally 
could be reduced each day� These additional free hours could allow for greater 
productivity at the individual level and greater opportunity for responsibility at 
the unit level� At the most positive extreme, never again would a Marine or sailor 
be refused the opportunity to attend a training school or advanced instructional 
course because his or her presence at work was indispensable� The AI, which had 
been tracking that individual’s work for months, would be able to slide into his 
or her place for the duration of the absence�
E-mail, the lifeblood of communication in the modern military, could ben-
efit from the implementation of AI� Google’s machine-learning capabilities for 
e-mail already can sort incoming and outgoing message traffic into different 
categories by subject and importance�41 Google’s Allo technology went a step 
further by suggesting responses for the user, on the basis of previous conversa-
tions and preferences� Allo tied into Google Assistant, which can provide local 
suggestions, Internet search results, travel directions, and answers to questions 
that appear naturally in the user’s conversation� Google Assistant also can learn 
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from the user’s preferences and needs to assist with tasks such as purchasing 
airline tickets�42
These information-processing AI systems can be tailored for specific indus-
tries� AI platforms are used in the health-care industry to process doctors’ notes, 
reports, and patient files and compare those inputs to research studies and clini-
cal databases to diagnose patients and propose treatment paths�43 If such systems 
are capable of diagnosing and providing treatment for kidney failure and cancer, 
the same systems can be used for managing schedules, operations, training plans, 
and unit development� Digital personal assistants also could be used within and 
among commands to better exchange information, schedule meetings, plan agen-
das, and coordinate efforts�
Planning
The first unofficial rule of planning in the military is to ask the question: “What 
did they do last time?” Many leaders at all levels of command express frustration 
over lack of coordination between departments, inadequate duty turnover, and 
loss of long-term knowledge when vital personnel retire or redeploy� AI poses 
a solution in the form of a robust search function� Google has nearly perfected 
search techniques using a process called RankBrain� The AI remembers what 
other users asked for before and the eventual end locations of their searches� It 
then applies that knowledge to the next search having similar inputs�44 When 
tasked with a new planning assignment—whether it be for range training, an 
exercise, or a full operation—it is likely that similar activities have been planned 
previously� AI presents an opportunity to harness years of institutional knowl-
edge from parts of the Navy or Marine Corps that the searcher never may have 
known existed, all by saying, “I’m planning something like X-Y-Z involving A-
B-C� Has this been done before?” Not only can the AI return useful options for 
aiding the planners, but it also can compile them automatically into a convenient 
format for easy mental ingestion� Leadership principles across the services call for 
the one-third–two-thirds rule of planning: one-third of the time for the leader, 
two-thirds of the time for the subordinate units� AI could transform this into a 
one-tenth–nine-tenths rule�
AI systems, in conjunction with humans, can support risk management and 
financial planning� Data analytics company FICO uses AI to assess individuals’ 
credit scores and determine the level of risk they represent� FICO has used such 
systems for over twenty-five years for credit decisions, fraud prevention, and cy-
ber security�45 Wealthfront, an automated financial management and investment 
service, manages billions of dollars using AI�46 BlackRock, one of the world’s larg-
est investing firms, uses artificial intelligence for “heavy cognitive lifting � � � to 
tease out patterns that might remain obscure to human eyes and brains�”47 Such 
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capabilities could save millions of dollars from the DoN budget by determin-
ing inefficiencies, identifying discrepancies, managing accounts, and providing 
more-exact financial estimates for mission planning�
The general area of suppliers and contracts provides opportunities for ad-
ditional cost savings� Private companies are using AI to assist with conducting 
negotiations and drawing up contracts� SAP CoPilot, an AI with a chatbot-style 
interface, supports a business as a digital assistant to interpret documents and 
act on behalf of the user� The system then can provide the user with information 
and options in a simple manner� The platform has the potential “to help users 
make informed decisions based on complex data analysis that’s done in real-
time�”48 Deloitte, one of the world’s largest tax accounting and consulting firms, 
partnered with Kira Systems to develop an AI that can analyze thousands of tax 
documents�49 The software then structures the information in a usable form that 
identifies the most important clauses and segments�50
The most arduous step of military planning—orders development—could be 
streamlined with AI� Writing hundred-page documents with a nearly limitless 
number of annexes, appendices, and tabs has plagued staff officers since at least 
the Byzantine Empire in the tenth century�51 In only three weeks, Booz Allen 
Hamilton (BAH) developed its prototype Tabletop Commander program, which 
can process an entire operations order and convert it into a “visually pleasing, 
realistic” interface for the recipient to use�52 The service could be especially help-
ful for amphibious ready groups (ARGs) and Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) 
operating in constantly changing environments�
Logistics
Transportation, logistics, and supply capabilities stand to benefit most immedi-
ately from advances in AI� Google Maps provides the most basic example of the 
harnessed power of AI by using location and transportation data from thousands 
of smartphones to plan optimal transport routes� Uber also uses such programs to 
determine the most-exact arrival times, travel times, and pickup locations� Com-
mercial and logistics aircraft harness AI for use in mechanical processes such as 
autopilot and route planning, to mitigate disruptions�53 Tesco, a Britain-based 
multinational grocery store, uses AI to manage its own logistics chain and help 
its customers� After the company’s creation of a massive “data lake,” an AI system 
now routes drivers, manages stock levels, and controls customer-integration 
applications� The system can track frequently purchased items and usage of those 
items and plan restock times, so as to maintain uninterrupted flows of products 
for both retail stores and their customers�54 Ocado, the world’s largest online-only 
grocery store, uses similar technology to manage its own stocks as well as the 
systems for several large online retail businesses�55
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In the logistics industry, courier and parcel company DHL Express and IBM 
collaborated on a project exploring the current and future uses of AI� AI and 
logistics are natural partners since “the network-based nature of the industry 
provides a natural framework for implementing and scaling AI,” which helps 
amplify “the human components of highly organized global supply chains�” 
Some companies, such as Leverton, use AI to process and classify thousands of 
contracts, clauses, policies, and signatures, allowing documents with hundreds 
of pages to be completed in a fraction of the time necessary for human processes� 
DHL uses forecasting AI to analyze fifty-eight parameters and assist with proac-
tively mitigating air freight travel delays� DHL has used an intelligent-routing AI 
called SmartTruck for over a decade to feed real-time travel information to its 
drivers� Furthermore, the company uses AI to manage its supply chain, ensure 
continuity, and minimize problems arising from poor labor practices and mate-
rial shortages�56
Managing infrastructure is easier with AI� Engie, a French electrical company, 
uses AI-driven image processing, along with a drone fleet, to monitor infra-
structure throughout its regions�57 The company uses this technology to focus 
on high-value assets, such as gas and wind turbines, to monitor their status and 
predict maintenance cycles, which results in better efficiency and profitability�58 
The DoN could use these capabilities for monitoring vehicles, fleets, buildings, 
bases, and operational areas�
Maintenance and supply networks can benefit from the implementation of AI 
regulation systems to support human decision-making� General Electric (GE) 
uses smart sensors networked with AI throughout its equipment to detect issues 
and minimize downtime�59 In the span of fifteen years, GE has progressed from 
monitoring equipment for failure using gauges and human intuition to using ad-
vanced AI that can predict failures in advance� GE harnessed the ability of online 
training programs to expand data-analytics training to members of its workforce 
of three hundred thousand�60 The restaurant facilities management company 
ServiceChannel uses AI to monitor real-time inputs from its 1,500 facilities and 
one hundred thousand team members to determine the status of equipment, 
repairs, and ongoing operator functions�61 Data points from over seventy million 
maintenance transactions compose the core inputs into the company’s “decision 
engine,” which helps managers make choices regarding pricing and assets�62 Sie-
mens monitors systems with its MindSphere, which tracks tool and drivetrain 
status and predicts when preventive maintenance will need to be completed�63 
These systems could reform military supply and maintenance structures monu-
mentally, for both ground and aviation assets, especially at a time when aircraft 
maintenance issues continue to make monthly headlines�64 For direct aircraft 
applicability, GE and Infosys already use AI-powered applications on a platform 
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called Predix to predict when landing gear on commercial planes will need repair 
and refitting�65
Travel-booking website Expedia incorporates different programs and databas-
es into a single, centralized channel, which provides insight into additional uses 
of machine learning� Expedia’s platform hindrance was an “unbounded computer 
science problem” because of the constant change in the inputs to its central sys-
tem from other sites� Expedia uses an algorithm that has been tracked against 
human actions and purchases to predict optimal outcomes, and has perfected 
itself over years� One of the main challenges it faced was how to process inputs in 
different languages for its multinational business� For example, if a user in Spain 
is searching Expedia in Spanish for flights in Japan, how does the internal AI 
system search travel platforms in Japanese? The system’s ability to overcome these 
difficulties illuminates potential in the Navy for interfacing with global supply 
and logistics systems as well as with partners and allies for overseas operations� 
Just as Expedia handles continuous changes in the inputs to its system, so could 
DoN logistics-planning and global tracking systems benefit from constant evalu-
ation of hundreds of isolated, changing conditions�66
Crisis Response
AI systems already are helping organizations respond to humanitarian disasters 
and emergencies� According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration, fifteen events caused over $22 billion in damage within the United 
States alone in 2017�67 Even nominal increases in disaster response efficiency or 
accuracy can result in immense economic and human benefits� AI systems are 
used to collect data in time sequences to track changes in disaster-stricken areas 
for generating damage claims and publishing images for media outlets and first 
responders to use�68 Artificial Intelligence for Digital Response (AIDR) won the 
2015 Open Source Software System Challenge for its application of AI to emer-
gencies and humanitarian crises�69
The AIDR platform uses AI to sort through and categorize thousands of social 
media messages per minute into different categories for action, such as medical 
needs or sheltering�70 AIDR then can help disaster-relief managers direct their 
efforts to the areas most desperately in need of aid, as well as to apply the correct 
types of aid (e�g�, food supplies, medical assistance, heavy lift via helicopters) to 
the areas where they are required� AIDR was used in Nepal during 2015 to cat-
egorize requirements on the basis of urgent needs, infrastructure damage, and 
resource-deployment needs� Similar applications of AI were used in Chile during 
the 2015 earthquake near the city of Illapel� AI triggered evacuation warnings and 
disaster alerts to move thousands of citizens away from the affected areas� Other 
AI-driven systems hold promise for crisis response and military application in 
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general� 1CONCERN is a mapping tool used to create a “common and compre-
hensive picture during emergency operations,” and to date it has analyzed almost 
eleven million structures and covered over thirty-nine million people�71
Often, in times of disaster when public services and infrastructure fail, social 
media platforms are the most accurate and most answerable form of information 
for on-the-ground aid workers� Social media can assist experts in conducting 
initial damage estimates, determining which populated areas were hardest hit, 
and helping rescuers locate victims� The ability of AI to sort through thousands 
of videos, pictures, and posts helps response teams map out disaster sites, pro-
vide early warnings of new disasters, and verify reports in real time�72 In military 
terms, the combination of AI, social media, and drones could create a “common 
and complete picture for emergency operations centers,” thus aiding and amplify-
ing a commander’s command-and-control capabilities�73
Training
Military training evaluations are notorious for their lack of reality� Existing 
AI capabilities for the creation of data—photographs, videos, written text, and 
three-dimensional displays—can magnify the efforts of existing small opposing 
forces (OPFOR) and simulated enemy forces often called Red Cell sections�74 
Training events involving communication, such as calls for fire, close air support, 
casualty evacuation requests, and execution checklists, can be made randomized, 
realistic, and challenging� Realistic and immersive decision-making exercises, 
information-processing evolutions, and instructional methods can be created 
and refined whenever needed� An OPFOR AI learns when students begin to ex-
hibit predictable patterns and where continuous mistakes are made, and simulta-
neously refines the training evolution to address those problems�
WalkMe, a software training platform, uses AI to develop customized learn-
ing plans for users to take advantage of their talents and learning styles�75 The AI 
system guides the learner through the new software and adapts the speed and 
depth of instruction to the learner’s abilities� WalkMe AI uses predictive analyt-
ics, which employs hundreds of different measurements collected in real time, 
to determine the chances that a user will continue a program or stop�76 Such 
programs could be used to enhance professional education and training such as 
distance and resident professional military education programs and military oc-
cupational specialty (MOS) training� The system also could be used for general 
force readiness to encourage Marines and sailors to focus on fitness training and 
health programs while away from work�
Video game developers have been leaders in AI research for years as they have 
made more-realistic, more-exciting challenges� Series such as Call of Duty and 
Far Cry contain advanced enemy AIs that can make decisions on how to interact 
with their environment and employ tactics with the best chance of success�77 
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Consultants from BAH predict that AI and data science will create a new wave of 
immersive training opportunities for the military� The company’s eight hundred 
data scientists, including some hired from firms such as Nintendo and Disney, 
are working on different training projects� Two examples of these projects are to 
turn dense operational and training manuals into easily accessible forms and to 
create digital C-130 gunship trainers from thousands of real pictures�78
At the 2017 conference of the National Training and Simulation Association 
(NTSA) in Florida, AI industry experts and military officials discussed applica-
tions of AI for military training� NTSA president and rear admiral James Robb 
(USN, Ret�) discussed one potential option: the use of big data and AI to collect 
data from exercises and process it to “replay, improve performance, and give 
feedback to trainees�” Tony Cerri, a director at U�S� Army Training and Doctrine 
Command, proposed that the combination of AI and big data for simulation 
could be “an unbeatable advantage for not only the nation but our DoD and 
where we’re trying to go�”79 Because the battlefields and combat scenarios of the 
future will be increasingly complex and difficult to navigate, the potential to use 
AI for crafting “realistic, intelligent entities in immersive simulations” can pro-
vide the advantage the Navy and Marine Corps need, especially for operations in 
the contested littorals where future battles will be fought�80
Intelligence
Intelligence-collection systems already are overwhelming institutional capacity 
for sorting and analysis� Future intelligence operations will provide even more 
data points from which it will be progressively difficult to “discern the truth�” The 
current U�S� Intelligence Community collects more data in one day than its entire 
workforce ever could analyze� Military deception (i�e�, lying) will become easier 
for both allies and adversaries�81 Locating an enemy’s critical assets and high-
payoff targets will become increasingly problematic with each passing year� In the 
realm of intelligence collection, much research and work already have focused on 
new “swarm” techniques to eliminate an adversary’s ability to hide�82 In response, 
Paul Scharre from the Center for a New American Security explains that “ultra-
cheap 3D-printed mini-drones could allow the United States to field billions—yes, 
billions—of tiny, insect-like drones�” AI, combined with new collection platforms, 
can streamline intelligence operations� Bruce Schneier from Harvard University 
contrasts emerging collection capabilities to those of the “exceptionally paranoid” 
East German secret police� While one out of every 166 citizens of East Germany 
was a spy, corporations today can use digital surveillance to track billions of 
people with minimal staff�83 Organizations such as Facebook and Google, as well 
as global marketers and political consultants, already employ such techniques�
AI assistance to intelligence also can be applied to tracking and targeting� 
Private institutions such as the Zoological Society of London (ZSL) are using 
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these capabilities� ZSL uses a Google Cloud machine-learning program to track 
animals using cameras and image analysis� The cameras and AI use the motion of 
both animals and humans to identify threats from poachers� ZSL analysts previ-
ously had to sort and document all information manually, activities now done by 
AI� The AI exploits approximately 1�5 million different images and also is adapt-
ing its system to document conservation details in categories such as geographic 
regions and environmental impacts�84
AI has led to growth in imagery analysis� The consulting firm Accenture 
awarded online social network Pinterest its 2017 Technology Vision award for 
its use of AI� Pinterest uses AI to run its image-recommendation system, which 
discovers items similar to what the user is trying to find� In 2017, Pinterest in-
troduced Pinterest Lens, which uses photos that users take of objects both online 
and in the real world and then helps them “identify, buy or create” such items� 
Pinterest Lens is a bold step that attempts to bridge the divide between the digital 
and physical worlds�85 Such technology could be applicable in both data collec-
tion and analysis for the Navy and Marine Corps� For instance, a collection ele-
ment could photograph an object from a distance and both the team in the field 
and the staff in the rear could benefit from an instantaneous match to the hostile 
platform and its capabilities�
Just as AIs can be programmed to learn from tax documents and contractual 
agreements to sort out details, the same AIs can be programmed to sort through 
operations orders, databases, mission briefs, status-of-forces agreements, DoD 
policies, planning doctrine, and historical records to generate ideas and propose 
courses of action for commanders� Intelligence preparation of the battlefield can 
be nearly instantaneous� While military operations never duplicate themselves, 
they often remain similar� Maritime intelligence, an ever-complex and unbound-
ed realm, still displays patterns� For example, ships move through prescheduled 
cycles of maintenance, training, and operations� On-site monitoring of how these 
cycles apply to adversarial nations requires maintaining a high force presence in 
contested areas, but AI engines with large-scale data sources can guide the ap-
plication of scarce DoN assets for efficiency and cost while still meeting the ISR 
needs of the fleet�86
Force Protection
AI-centered computer-vision technology could be used for security and base 
access� Providing base security constitutes a major use of manpower on naval 
installations� AI could augment gate-security guards by providing approval or 
denial for both vehicles and individuals� The system could assess the risk appli-
cable to new persons requesting access, determine access approvals, and increase 
security measures on an installation as needed, depending on internal and ex-
ternal threats� Photo and speech recognition can provide an additional security 
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layer when deciding on access�87 One 2015 estimate stated that digital assistants 
for businesses would be able to know individual customers by both voice and face 
by the end of 2018�88 Security applications likely will follow in stride�
The Transportation Security Administration is implementing AI to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of screening methods in U�S� airports significant-
ly� The Dynamic Aviation Risk Management Solution will be used to customize 
security levels for individuals, as determined by their “risk categorization” and 
flight patterns� The long-term goal is a “tunnel” that registers and screens indi-
viduals as they walk through en route to their gates�89 A similar system could 
streamline base and facility security to a level requiring little, if any, human 
involvement�
Mobile and roaming robotic collection platforms can harness AI for force pro-
tection� Roomba, the basic room-cleaning vacuum robot, uses a combination of 
AI and sensors that are “capable of scanning the room size, identifying obstacles, 
and remembering the most efficient routes and methods�” This AI capability 
could be used for roaming bases and rear security areas to free up manpower 
for offensive operations or other needs of the commander� AI security programs 
could combine roaming AI-instructed sensors with home security–style camera 
systems such as BuddyGuard and predictive incident-analysis software such as 
Deep Sentinel to provide comprehensive force-protection measures for naval 
forces, both in garrison and when deployed in operating environments�90
Force Structure
AI has numerous applications for force structure and personnel management 
within the DoN� For recruiting and force preservation, AI could provide early 
warning to units and commanders about at-risk personnel� Fama is an AI-based 
company that screens public personas on social media platforms to detect violent 
or racist tendencies� An estimated 43 percent of private employers already screen 
potential candidates’ and employees’ social media accounts for such traits�91 
In the Navy and Marine Corps, this kind of system could be used for force- 
preservation, recruiting, and transition programs� The system also could be used 
for intelligence purposes, to identify key nodes and leaders of networks�
Artificial intelligence is reworking human resources and staffing structures in 
the civilian world; military organizations could see a similar major benefit from 
this type of AI� IBM is working to create a new AI platform that answers new 
employees’ most important questions and streamlines the onboarding process 
so that new employees are more productive� Such a tool would provide immense 
benefits to sailors and Marines who change responsibilities and are assigned new 
duties as often as every few months� AI also is being used internally to “track, 
analyze, manage, and protect” top talent within firms�92 Enhancing the inter-
nal experience within an organization can reduce turnover, retain institutional 
NWC_Autumn2019Review.indb   89 8/23/19   9:18 AM
95
Naval War College: Autumn 2019 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 9 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
knowledge, and create a more content workforce� Both the Navy and Marine 
Corps could benefit from a better employee experience to increase reenlistment 
rates, especially in critical MOSs and difficult billets�
Military recruiting stands to benefit as well� Personal advertisement target-
ing, such as that conducted by digital marketing firms, can focus a recruiter’s 
efforts to minimize wasted time�93 AI recruiters in the business community are 
being applied to correlate employees with their best-suited positions, providing 
the right benefits, work locations, and development opportunities�94 Navy and 
Marine Corps recruiting is a manpower-intensive affair; Navy Recruiting Com-
mand involves more than six thousand personnel who are taken away from for-
ward positions in the fleet to perform these important duties�95 AI not only could 
decrease the number of personnel necessary but also could reduce costs and 
help recruiters to be more efficient by targeting strategically chosen candidates� 
Dynamic-pricing tools can work for both recruiters and career planners�96 If one 
candidate needs a bonus of only five thousand dollars to enlist while another 
needs twenty thousand dollars, AI can adapt those amounts to save money and 
target the right recruits� If money is not a factor, AI can help recruiters identify a 
candidate’s motivations and appeal to those incentives�
IMPLEMENTATION
Successful implementation of AI into the Navy and Marine Corps cannot be 
outsourced fully� AI systems and the databases they use are inherently specific to 
the institutions that incorporate them� AI development leaders and the technol-
ogy community favor collaboration and open-source platforms, but develop-
ment from within minimizes vulnerabilities that may appear in the systems� This 
developmental process must pursue two mutually beneficial paths: in informa-
tion and technology, and regarding personnel� AI only can reach its maximum 
effectiveness when the right people are paired with the right data� The more data 
available for the system to learn, the faster and more efficient the system will be� 
For successful implementation and growth, the DoN needs military specialists 
with knowledge of AI, human-AI collaboration, AI-database interworking, AI 
ethics and policy, and specific subcategories of AI, such as machine learning and 
deep learning�
Database compilation is a long-term process that should begin today; how-
ever, many tools and processes are available now and can be replicated� Various 
organizations specialize in providing AI support to new and existing busi-
nesses by applying specialized expertise to the customer’s needs� For example, 
Techcode’s Global AI+ Accelerator offers consulting services to start-ups and 
established businesses� The company’s general manager explains that advances 
in AI are disrupting core organizational coordination and control processes such 
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as scheduling, resource allocation, and reporting�97 Microsoft offers AI tools for 
developers and information professionals to harness the power of their data� 
Microsoft Azure lets businesses such as Geico, Heineken, and Adobe empower 
their already-existing applications and data services with the benefits of AI� 
The benefit of a prepackaged system such as Azure is its dependability through 
Microsoft, on which the DoN already relies for other applications� The platform 
is designed specifically to support various operating systems, programming lan-
guages, and databases, and it helps businesses to build custom applications for 
their specific needs�98
Implementing this change in an organization of the size and complexity of the 
DoN is not impossible� The utility of Azure and its process have been verified� 
The global shipping firm Maersk adopted Azure for five of its data centers, which 
led to performance improvement and risk reduction� Previously, Maersk had 
stored its massive amounts of data in five locations on three continents, each of 
which had minimal capacity for growth� Performance lagged and employee pro-
ductivity was reduced severely� The outdated system also suffered from security 
concerns� The firm set a twelve-month timeline for relocating its data centers and 
their 14�4 million files, which amounted to an “impossible mission that nobody 
had done before�”99 But the actual process took only six months and alleviated the 
company’s dependence on vulnerable, unreliable, failing hardware�
Amazon also rebuilt itself around artificial intelligence beginning in 2014� 
Amazon already used simple AI in areas such as its shipping schedules and 
warehouse management, but recent advances in computer vision, speech, and 
language processing allowed it completely to revamp twenty years of institutional 
structure in a way that “require[d] skills that [Amazon’s] team didn’t possess, 
tools that hadn’t been created, and algorithms that no one had thought of yet�” 
To design its flagship AI product, Alexa, Amazon worked backward with few 
restrictions� Blueprints included features that did not exist at the time but would 
be created along the way�100 Similarly, with internal expertise, external guidance, 
willpower from leadership, and a plan of action, AI systems could become in-
grained throughout the DoN within a few years�
IBM’s Watson provides a top-tier AI system with targeted personnel support 
and guidance� IBM helps its customers identify the areas where Watson will be 
most beneficial, then provides specialist support to guide the process along the 
way� The primary drawbacks to this approach are the time and scale required� 
Fortunately, the DoN is not dependent on profit margins for its success, and 
the Navy and Marine Corps are already natural trailblazers in their industries� 
While the institution certainly faces unique challenges, the process is feasible 
and the challenge worth tackling� An article in the Harvard Business Review pro-
poses gradually implementing AI with small projects and “low hanging fruit�”101 
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Companies pick a specific program in which the value is the greatest� This ap-
proach could work for the services by initially applying the system to a specific 
command that would benefit the most, such as an ARG/MEU team, a supply 
depot, a maintenance facility, or a logistics center� To avoid complications with 
classifications and multiple systems, AI’s initial targets should avoid intelligence 
units until the organization overcomes early implementation problems�
Finally, internal expertise from within the DoN for implementation of these 
programs will be necessary, since commercial applications are not tailored for 
military needs yet� The Army’s science and technology community has discov-
ered this situation in its research� Army researchers found that their needs for AI, 
such as autonomous convoys in rough environments, manned-unmanned teams 
for ISR targeting, and intelligence analysis, are not yet “of significant interest” 
to private companies�102 Ultimately, these business applications provide not a 
specific solution but rather inspiration and a roadmap that the DoN can use to 
implement AI strategically throughout its departments� 
COSTS AND TRADE-OFFS
Research and development within the Pentagon is often a zero-sum game: if one 
project benefits, another is hindered� Advances for AI will suffer a similar fate, 
and the DoN will need to make necessary trade-offs to compensate as it advances� 
Estimating the lifetime cost for a possible capability still in its infancy—almost 
certainly inaccurately—would lead to the termination of any accountant in-
volved� Regardless, comparing current investments in AI research with DoD 
budgets, similar defense contracts, and previous platform procurements can 
serve as a minimal starting point in building a frame of reference�
In 2017, the U�S� government invested over $7 billion in AI, big data, and cloud 
storage and computing�103 Roughly $2�4 billion of the sum went to AI and its larg-
est segments: learning and intelligence, advanced computing, and AI systems�104 
For reference, the president requested $3�2 billion for the Marine Corps alone in 
fiscal year 2019 (FY19) and $194�1 billion for the entire DoN, both increases from 
the previous fiscal year� The total DoN budget can be narrowed further to exam-
ine the $18�6 billion requested for research, development, test, and evaluation 
fund (RDT&E) allocations, which includes $750 million for advanced technology 
development, $891 million for applied research, and $4�3 billion for advanced 
component development and prototypes�105 If, at a minimum, the Navy procured 
25 percent of DoD’s total AI investments, it could imply that only 3�2 percent of 
the DoN’s RDT&E funds went toward AI and associated technologies�106 Without 
increases in funding, other naval research projects would need to be trimmed 
(or sacrificed) to allocate money to AI� The tricky balancing act is ensuring that 
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cuts are made without impacting the actual weapons and assets that AI would 
enhance�
The fiscal uncertainties of congressional budgets lead to funding challenges 
for AI and other new R&D technologies� For instance, while the FY19 budget 
request included large percentage increases for each service, no new major sys-
tems received allotments for acquisition� The Pentagon’s request focused on the 
continued production and refinement of existing capabilities because of the fear 
that budget increases will not remain high and consistent for years to come�107 
Instead of starting new projects that can be defunded at any time, decision mak-
ers erred toward consistency and meeting current mission requirements—an 
understandable and sensible position� Unfortunately, a focus on current systems 
means a failure to allocate sufficient efforts toward capabilities for conducting 
future conflict�
Previous and existing defense contracts also provide insight into the costs of 
new technologies� The Army’s Logistics Support Activity signed a thirty-three-
month, $135 million contract with IBM in 2017 to support equipment readiness 
with predictive analytics from its Watson platform�108 The Army also signed a 
$62 million deal with IBM to build, manage, and operate a “private Army cloud 
data” system�109 Palantir and Raytheon made national headlines with the award 
of a ten-year, $876 million contract for an Army intelligence platform, DCGS-A 
Increment 1�110 In 2018, BAH signed with the Navy a five-year, $92 million 
contract ($18�4 million per year) for “cybersecurity, technical, and program 
management�”111 Standing out among these contracts is BAH’s enormous ten-
year, $17�5 billion ($1�75 billion per year) contract with the Defense Informa-
tion Systems Agency to provide a “globally accessible enterprise information 
infrastructure�”112
If AI technology in its broadest form is applied to military capabilities, perhaps 
the best estimation of cost is that of the military platforms and the assets with 
which Washington projects power� Upgrades to the M1A1 battle tank since 2005 
have cost U�S� taxpayers over $4 billion ($438 million per year) through 2018�113 
The DoN is paying $4�3 billion for its next aircraft carrier, USS John F. Kennedy�114 
The Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps combined signed a $1�4 billion sustain-
ment contract for the F-35 in 2018�115 None of these sums includes the initial 
research, design, testing, and implementation costs of new capabilities, but they 
still emphasize the sustained, multibillion-dollar investments required to field 
unsurpassed American military technology�
Finally, the greatest cost of AI development may be measurable not in dollars 
spent or the other projects DoN cancels, but rather in the way AI could reshape 
the world in which the Navy and Marine Corps operate� AI experiments have 
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demonstrated their worst possible results by teaching themselves both racism 
and sexism in separate cases�116 AI also could make it easier for governments and 
organizations to enforce prejudicial and discriminatory policies on a suprana-
tional scale�
AI can be a great force for human development, or it can be a medium through 
which to act out the worst instincts of humankind� The DoN surely will encoun-
ter and respond to both possibilities� On a global historical scale, past periods 
of industrial revolution and technological advance created stark changes to the 
balance of power and altered international competition� The development of AI 
likely will lead to a similar international outcome in which winners reap benefits� 
The Center for a New American Security breaks down the “key elements of na-
tional power” for the world of AI: owning large amounts of useful data, having 
a large AI-capable human talent pool, harnessing computing resources, creating 
organizations aligned to take advantage of AI, enlisting public-private coopera-
tion, and being willing to act on AI and its potential� The United States, China, 
and Russia stand ahead of the pack in terms of these elements, but other technol-
ogy leaders, such as Israel, Singapore, and South Korea, are not far behind�117 If 
these nations achieve usable AI integration for economies and militaries, the rest 
of the world may be left behind for decades�
The economic boom from countries that harness AI will increase the gap 
further� The mutual relationships between economic and military power will 
be “the clearest national security consequence” of the development of AI�118 
Economic gaps will grow wider as AI becomes mainstream for private business� 
PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that the economic boon from AI will be $3�7 
trillion for the United States and $7 trillion for China, while only $0�9 trillion 
for Southeast Asia, $0�7 trillion for southern Europe, and $0�5 trillion for Latin 
America�119 A lack of economic growth in areas where the Navy and Marine 
Corps already operate, exercise, and work to develop host-nation capacity may 
mean that Washington should prepare a long-term plan for multidecade partner-
ships in these unstable regions�
The presence of artificial intelligence in the war zone is close at hand, and the 
decades of U�S� technological superiority are coming to an end�120 This shift 
should be embraced� China aims to have an AI industry worth $150 billion by 
2030� A single technology center in Beijing’s suburb received $2�1 billion of in-
vestment�121 In comparison, total Pentagon spending on advanced technology 
in 2017 was $7�4 billion, only a portion of which went to AI�122 Investments in 
R&D are important, but implementation should begin sooner rather than later� 
While Russian spending on AI remains comparatively low, President Vladimir 
V� Putin has recognized the field’s importance for the future of world affairs, 
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stating: “Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of 
the world�”123 The failure of the United States to invest in this technology— 
specifically within its expeditionary maritime forces—could mean a dramatic 
shift in world power�
Autonomous war-fighting machines are still years away, as are the operational 
applications of swarm techniques, autonomous wingmen for pilots, and general 
AI�124 However, the adoption of AI in the model of current business practices 
offers the Navy and Marine Corps three main benefits� First, if the DoN begins 
collecting and compiling data now, it will have larger databases from which AI 
can learn, and larger databases usually result in more-effective AI systems� This 
process will be time-consuming—the sooner we can begin, the better� Second, 
fewer DoN personnel will be restricted to the noncombat sector if support func-
tions are transferred to AI� This development frees up manpower for use in new 
specialties, additional combat units, and forward deployments around the world� 
Finally, the sooner the DoN can expose average Marines and sailors to AI, the 
more familiar and comfortable they will become with the technologies� In the fu-
ture, when the full capabilities of AI are harnessed and implemented throughout 
the services, the fighting force will be ready to embrace them� As noted earlier, 
the use of Siri does not require any understanding of computer programming or 
speech-recognition techniques� It does, however, require the use of an iPhone and 
its associated applications� A flattening of the AI learning curve means maritime 
forces will suffer fewer disruptions to their operations and can maintain require-
ments more effectively over the coming years� The business sector’s AI applica-
tions provide the best starting points from which the Department of the Navy can 
accomplish this integration�
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n the decade between 1913 and 1923, the U�S� Navy leveraged deliberate experi-
mentation in the Atlantic Fleet, theoretical analysis at the Naval War College, and 
practical experience in World War I to explore potential options for coordinat-
ing a modern fleet in battle� These efforts allowed effective doctrinal concepts 
to emerge from the bottom up, from the experiences of more-junior officers, 
and they triggered the development of the U�S� Navy’s first coherent tactical 
doctrine, issued in the Atlantic Fleet’s Destroyer Instructions of 1921 and the U�S� 
Navy’s War Instructions of 1923� These manuals—and the implicit assumptions 
embedded within them—mark a watershed moment in the U�S� Navy’s approach 
to combat� They provided the foundation for doctrinal development in the in-
terwar period (1919–39) and influenced USN tactical concepts through the end 
of World War II� The emphasis placed on bottom-up doctrinal development 
was one reason the U�S� Navy was so effective at identifying and harnessing new 
techniques during this period�
This article examines the processes that led to 
those manuals� It explores the work of the Naval 
War College and explains how it enhanced the ef-
fectiveness of the fleet� It also analyzes the Atlantic 
Fleet’s tactical exercises, detailing how they refined 
the thinking of senior commanders and fostered 
experimentation by more-junior officers� Fur-
thermore, it discusses the U�S� Navy’s experience 
in World War I, the valuable lessons learned, and 
how these lessons were documented effectively in 
the immediate postwar period�
I
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The development and refinement of the U�S� Navy’s tactical doctrine from 
1913 to 1923 are a clear example of effective organizational learning� Before the 
start of World War I, the U�S� Navy possessed a modern battle fleet but had very 
little experience or knowledge of how to handle it in battle� Through experimen-
tation, analysis, and practical experience, officers developed an integrated set of 
concepts for coordinating their actions and functioning as a cohesive unit� These 
ideas became the foundation of the U�S� Navy’s tactical doctrine and served the 
U�S� Navy effectively for decades�1
DOCTRINE DEFINED
Before this article analyzes the Navy’s doctrinal development, it is important to 
define the concept of doctrine explicitly� Generally speaking, doctrine is the set 
of implicit and explicit assumptions that govern the behavior of a military force� 
Doctrine guides decisions in the absence of precise instructions� In this sense, it 
is similar to culture, ethos, and mind-set, but is much more specific� Doctrine is 
the collection of habits and behaviors that influence decision-making in combat�
The most important goals of doctrine are to ensure coordinated action in 
battle and to enhance the ability of ships and sailors to act toward the same end, 
even in circumstances in which the ability to communicate instructions is limited 
or impossible� Effective doctrine increases fighting power and helps overcome 
the friction of combat� As a 1938 manual explained, the Navy clearly understood 
doctrine this way: “The purpose of a written battle doctrine is to promote effec-
tive coordinated action in battle through mutual understanding� In the absence 
of instructions the doctrine should serve as a guide to sound decisions and ap-
propriate actions in battle� The written doctrine should, therefore, set forth those 
methods and principles of action that have been tested and found to produce the 
most advantageous results�”2
Ineffective doctrines, in contrast, inhibit coordinated action� They tend to suf-
fer from one of two extremes: either they stifle initiative by providing guidance 
that is too rigid and too exhaustive, or they limit coordination by failing to foster 
aligned decision-making� Effective doctrines are challenging to develop because 
they must strike a balance; they must create alignment while simultaneously 
avoiding rigid instructions that inhibit individual initiative�
This was the essence of the Navy’s struggle� Was it possible to create a frame-
work that allowed sufficient room for individual initiative while concurrently 
ensuring alignment of decentralized decision-making? In the years before World 
War I, American naval officers explored the options for coordinating a large, 
distributed battle fleet in combat� Their solution was a learning system that led 
to a sophisticated approach to doctrinal development�
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ANALYSIS AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
At the dawn of the twentieth century, naval tactics focused on coordinating the 
movements of a fleet in battle� Coordinated movement was critical; without it, 
ships fought as individuals and not as a cohesive whole� A formation fighting 
as individual ships was far less effective than a formation that maneuvered and 
fought together� However, an inability to experiment effectively at sea with large-
scale, coordinated, tactical maneuvers hampered the Navy’s development of ef-
fective approaches for coordinating the movements of large formations� At that 
time, the Navy was organized into numerous squadrons and distributed around 
the globe� The ships of those squadrons often were sent on independent missions, 
making tactical exercises with more than a handful of ships a near impossibility�3
Victory over Spain in 1898 made the United States a world power� As the fleet 
increased in size and capability, it was expected to be able to project naval power 
into the Caribbean and across the Pacific to protect American interests� In 1898, 
the Navy had just four modern battleships in commission; by 1905, there were 
twelve, with twelve more under construction� These ships had to be prepared to 
operate as a fleet and to fight and win a naval battle against a sophisticated op-
ponent, such as Germany (the focus of War Plan BLACK) or Japan (the enemy of 
War Plan ORANGE)� Yet without the ability to practice fleet operations, American 
naval officers had no clear sense of how best to ensure coordinated action in a 
modern naval battle�4
The rapid pace of technological change compounded the problem� Advances 
in fire control increased the effective range of ships’ guns, turbine engines and oil 
fuel made ships faster, face-hardened armor and new armor schemes made them 
more survivable, and advances in the design of shells and torpedoes made them 
more deadly� Radio technology allowed fleets to coordinate their movements 
over much greater distances in almost real time� New, specialized platforms—
scout cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft—augmented the more tradi-
tional battleships and armored cruisers� Modern fleets would move faster, strike 
harder, and operate over a much greater area than ever before� Naval combat was 
being revolutionized�
To determine how best to command and coordinate such a fleet in battle, the 
Navy experimented with a variety of mechanisms� Initially, because there was 
no large body of ships at sea, simulations at the Naval War College were used 
to test hypotheses, model new techniques, and provide tactical experience for 
officers� A crucial step was the introduction of strategic and tactical problems� 
Captain Henry C� Taylor, USN, who became President of the Naval War College 
in November 1893, worked with William McCarty Little, a retired lieutenant on 
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the College’s staff, to develop adversarial problems that encouraged the develop-
ment of new tactical approaches and improved the Navy’s ability to assess them�5
Ronald Spector described their approach as follows: “Through these methods 
the graduates of the Naval War College became accustomed to making quick 
decisions to cope with rapidly changing situations� The war problems, although 
somewhat unrealistic in nature, were nonetheless invaluable in giving the of-
ficer students the ‘feel’ of war situations and in teaching them the techniques of 
command�”6 The primary purpose of the problems was to further the education 
of officers, but they had a secondary effect� By exposing officers to simulated 
combat conditions, the problems uncovered new techniques that increased the 
Navy’s ability to coordinate forces in battle� Two specific techniques were essen-
tial to future developments�
The Conference Method
The first was the introduction of the conference method� Conferences were used 
first to evaluate potential solutions to strategic and tactical problems� Once the 
assigned solutions were complete, a conference was called� During the confer-
ence, officers openly critiqued each solution and discussed the best approaches� 
Eventually, the conference method became the standard technique for sharing 
information and collectively making sense of a complex situation�7 Conferences 
then were used to explore options at the start of a problem, before a specific 
solution had been devised� Prior to committing to a course of action, members 
of each opposing side would gather together in a conference and use their collec-
tive knowledge and experience to identify opportunities, courses of action, and 
potential solutions� Although a clearly established hierarchy would command the 
simulated forces during the execution of the problem, a flatter, more collabora-
tive, team-based structure became the norm for developing plans�8
The growing use of the conference method was a direct result of the col-
laborative nature of the Navy’s wargaming process� Unlike those in most other 
services, the Navy’s games employed active competition� Teams of opposing of-
ficers played different sides and actively tried to outmaneuver and outwit each 
other� This approach provided valuable practice and revealed the importance 
of creativity, or what the College’s most famous President, Rear Admiral Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, USN, called the “art of command�” For Mahan and his succes-
sors, artful execution of naval command required contextual interpretation of 
the underlying principles of naval warfare�9 As Rear Admiral Bradley A� Fiske, 
USN, summarized in his influential work, The Navy as a Fighting Machine: “In 
any human art and science—say medicine, music, or navigation—it is the art and 
not the science by which one gets results� � � � [T]he science is merely the foun-
dation on which the art reposes, and � � � it is by the practice of the art and not 
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the knowledge of the science that skill is gained�”10 The collaborative approach 
introduced by the conference method helped ensure that attendees of the Naval 
War College became more experienced in that art�
Estimate of the Situation
The second critical technique was the estimate of the situation� Introduced in 
1910, the estimate was a structured approach to problem solving that provided a 
common frame for conceptualizing and discussing approaches to wartime—or 
simulated wartime—conditions� It guided the work of officers who came together 
in a conference to develop plans and solve a problem� In a 1912 lecture on the 
subject, Commander Frank H� Schofield, USN, defined the estimate this way: 
“It is a method of applying knowledge and judgment to concrete situations� It 
is a natural method, one used unconsciously in every day life� A situation arises 
requiring action� We decide what the situation requires� We think of what diffi-
culties have to be overcome, what ways we have of overcoming them, and finally 
how we will go about the task�”11
The estimate had four basic components: the mission, an assessment of enemy 
forces, an evaluation of own forces, and finally the decision� The mission was the 
starting point; it usually was derived from instructions or orders from a superior� 
At the Naval War College, it was the foundation of the problem� Officers became 
practiced at reviewing their instructions thoroughly to produce a clear, and 
common, view of the mission� Schofield continued: “Experience has shown that 
the statement of a problem to men whose strategic and tactical ideas have not 
been coordinated by training will result in marked diversity in the statements of 
the mission. . . . We are working for unity of action� If the statement of the same 
problem to all can provoke the same statement of mission from each, then we 
have taken a sure and necessary step toward unity of action” (emphasis original)�12
Although Schofield did not use the term doctrine in his lecture, he clearly was 
aiming for the results that an effective doctrine would produce� The process of 
producing the estimate was intended to create a common conceptual frame, so 
that all officers would derive similar missions from the same problem statement� 
This was an important step for fostering alignment and cooperation toward a 
common goal� Collaboration in conference helped ensure that outcome�
Once the mission was identified, officers explored how the enemy could pre-
vent its accomplishment� In the enemy forces step, they examined the strength of 
enemy forces, their disposition, and their probable intentions� The most impor-
tant aspect of this step was assessing the situation from the enemy’s perspective 
to reduce the possibility of surprise� Schofield described the appropriate mind-
set as follows: “The effort should be � � � to arrive at the enemy’s point of view, to 
think as he would think of us, to consider all the plans that he would consider, 
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and to estimate which of those plans would be most injurious to us� � � � One must 
endeavor never to be caught in a situation that has not been foreseen and consid-
ered as a possibility� It is only by a thorough and pains taking [sic] consideration 
of the enemy’s probable intentions that surprise can be avoided�”13
Once the enemy’s most dangerous course of action had been considered, the 
next step was to examine the options available to one’s own forces. Officers were 
expected to analyze all avenues that could achieve the mission� One of these 
would be chosen, and that would become the decision—the foundation of orders 
for subordinates. Schofield emphasized that it was important to make the deci-
sion conclusive and resolute, so that it would inspire concerted action� However, 
he emphasized also that the decision should not project a plan too far into the 
future; a balance had to be struck so that the force could adjust and exploit un-
anticipated opportunities�14
Creating a Command Framework
Through the conference method and the estimate of the situation, the Naval War 
College created an initial conceptual framework for command in war� Although 
these specific approaches fell short of a doctrine, they did expose naval officers 
to a common methodology for structuring plans and orders, instill the value of 
working through strategic and tactical problems collaboratively, and uncover the 
challenges involved in the art of command� Practice using the conference method 
and the estimate of the situation also impressed on officers the importance of fos-
tering aligned, decentralized decision-making� This would be essential in actual 
combat with a large, modern battle fleet� Experimentation in the Atlantic Fleet 
would build on this foundation and lead to the Navy’s first deliberate experiments 
with creating a doctrine�
EXPERIMENTATION IN THE ATLANTIC FLEET
The inability of American naval officers to gain experience coordinating a large 
fleet at sea ended with the establishment of the Atlantic Fleet in April 1907� 
Formed by President Theodore Roosevelt and commanded initially by Admiral 
Robley D� Evans, USN, the Atlantic Fleet was employed as a platform for deliber-
ate experimentation in the ten years before the American entry into World War I�
Although many officers had become familiar with strategic and tactical prob-
lems at the Naval War College prior to the creation of the Atlantic Fleet, there 
had been no way to engage in similar exercises at sea� Once the Atlantic Fleet 
returned from its voyage around the world (often called the cruise of the Great 
White Fleet) in February 1909, contested exercises at sea began� The initial ver-
sions of Instructions for Battle Plan Exercises were published in 1910� In 1913, 
the Atlantic Fleet’s commander, Rear Admiral Charles J� Badger, USN, issued the 
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more sophisticated “Rules for Battle Maneuvers”; this marked the beginning of 
a new paradigm�
Badger’s 1913 “Rules” emphasized that the game board and fleet exercises 
complemented each other� The board was best at demonstrating tactical con-
cepts; exercises with the fleet provided practical experience� This mirrored the 
concepts of Bradley Fiske, a rear admiral serving as Secretary of the Navy George 
von Lengerke Meyer’s aide for operations� It is likely that Fiske influenced Bad-
ger’s “Rules�”15 This specified the following objectives for fleet exercises:
 a) To acquire familiarity with the aspect of a modern sea battle ground
 b) To give experience in handling squadrons, divisions, and ships
 c) To afford practice in quickly recognizing conditions and changes of conditions 
and in the appreciation of tactical principles
 d) To afford experience in noting and appreciating the actual physical features of 
wind, spray, smoke, sun, etc�, and their influence
 e) To afford opportunity for gunnery training and particularly for the exercise of 
range finder, plotting, and fire control parties under battle conditions
 f) To exercise signal and radio parties16
While simulations and wargames could explore the theory of naval combat, 
exercises at sea were essential for developing the practical experience required 
to command the fleet effectively in battle� Accordingly, the exercises focused on 
coordinating the movements of the entire fleet: “When all ships work together � � � 
when each knows that his neighbor knows what he is doing, because they have 
all been given sound practical methods, then much of the difficulty of handling 
formations will disappear, and a few simple signals, by flags or by radio, or by 
both will suffice to handle naval forces� This will require the thorough constant 
practice, which will produce satisfaction and confidence born of efficiency�”17
To help run the exercises and ensure the rules were applied appropriately, each 
ship appointed an umpire� Umpires kept track of the action and scored the appro-
priate damage� Dice were used to assess the impact of gun and torpedo fire� Lights 
and flag signals designated targets� The accuracy of the exercise and therefore its 
value as a learning tool depended on the performance of the umpires� Badger’s 
“Rules” noted that “careless or inaccurate scoring may vitiate the results of an 
otherwise excellently conducted maneuver�”18
Larger-scale maneuvers were held on an annual basis, in either the Atlantic or 
the Caribbean� The most sophisticated of these foreshadowed the more-famous 
fleet problems of the interwar period� Strategic Maneuver 3, conducted August 
20–31, 1916, was a good example� It simulated an effort by a European power to 
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seize a base on the East Coast of the United States� These kinds of exercises, in 
which one fleet aggressively challenged the Monroe Doctrine, were common-
place� They helped the Navy improve fleet tactics and provided valuable experi-
ence in coordinating the movements of dispersed forces over a large area� One of 
the most important lessons learned in these exercises was that the Navy lacked 
effective scouting vessels; destroyers were pressed into the role, but the small 
ships often had difficulty maintaining speed in the heavy Atlantic seas�
Some exercises investigated specific topics; fast wing tactics were some of the 
most common� The Navy lacked battle cruisers, a new ship type that the Royal 
Navy (RN) introduced with its Invincible class, and the Americans were curious 
to understand how they could be used� Battle cruisers combined the firepower of 
a battleship with high speed, but sacrificed protective armor� The Navy explored 
how these ships might operate—and how best to fight against them—by using 
substitute vessels; they generally were positioned as a fast wing ahead of the battle 
fleet� These maneuvers repeatedly illustrated the importance of concentrated 
firepower; the fast ships often found themselves isolated from the support of their 
main body� Opponents that remained together and fought as an integrated unit 
generally overwhelmed them�19
However, that was not always the case� Tactical Problem 33-13 of July 25, 1913, 
pitted the fleet’s destroyers, representing a force of high-speed battleships, against 
the fleet’s battleships� The destroyers split into three divisions, and although they 
did not remain concentrated, they coordinated their maneuvers so as to come 
into action almost simultaneously� The battleships also split into three divisions, 
but one of the flank divisions failed to keep the destroyers on the beam and 
was judged to have been damaged seriously� The commentary on the problem 
considered it “interesting and instructive as a tactical exercise” because it “pre-
sented several features which had not been previously brought out during fleet 
maneuvers�”20 Much of this may have been because of the new techniques that the 
commander of the destroyers was employing with his subordinates�
That commander was Captain William S� Sims, USN, who had come to the 
Atlantic Fleet’s Torpedo Flotilla earlier that month� He was responsible for the 
fleet’s destroyers, and prior to assuming command of the flotilla Sims had at-
tended the Naval War College� While there, he met Lieutenant Commander 
Dudley W� Knox, USN, who had been agitating for the development of a uniform 
doctrine of command� Knox’s March 1913 prizewinning essay on the subject 
emphasized that the existing approach of issuing lengthy orders was insufficient 
to “produce the unity of effort—the concert of action—demanded by modern 
conditions in a large fleet�” Instead, it killed initiative and engendered a spirit of 
“blind obedience�”21
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Sims appreciated this perspective and brought Knox with him to the Atlantic 
Fleet as his aide� Other talented officers joined them� Commander William V� 
Pratt, USN, another acquaintance from Sims’s time at the Naval War College, 
served as Sims’s chief of staff� Lieutenant John V� Babcock, USN, served as their 
operations officer� Together, these four officers turned the flotilla into a labora-
tory for the development of tactical doctrine� Sims explained his concept in a let-
ter: “The torpedo fleet could be made an enormous game board—an exceedingly 
valuable school for trying out all kinds of maneuvers at small expense� There is 
a lot to be learned� None of us knows much about it yet� But one thing is sure, 
and that is that it can only be learned by study combined with actual maneuvers 
with the Fleet�”22
Sims recognized that his command had limited practical experience� His 
young destroyer commanders were knowledgeable, talented, and prepared to be 
aggressive, but they lacked a uniform approach to tactical situations� Their ac-
tions were not cohesive, and they were unable to work together to turn their small 
ships’ powerful torpedoes into potent weapons� Doctrine became the means by 
which Sims fostered collaboration and brought cohesion to his force, increasing 
their offensive potential�
To create a flotilla doctrine, Sims inaugurated the use of the conference method for 
staff study and work with the destroyermen� � � � [Sims] recognized that the Navy’s 
hierarchical system would not permit his subordinates to disagree with him very 
vigorously or advance their own ideas unless he changed the ground rules� Thus he 
called for setting aside rank in conference—ideas would be studied on their merits 
irrespective of origin� Dissent and argument became the rule of the conference until 
consensus occurred; then all were expected to give complete loyalty to the operating 
plan and the guiding doctrine�23
Sims leveraged his experience with the conference method and the estimate of 
the situation at the Naval War College and brought these ideas to the flotilla� They 
enabled him to draw on the skills and abilities of his subordinates and develop 
effective plans collaboratively� They discussed upcoming exercises and experi-
mented with options during tabletop wargames aboard Sims’s flagship� This led 
to greater cohesion in maneuvers and exercises; it also increased familiarity and 
trust within the flotilla� Sims’s subordinates learned how to act as a unit� Regular 
conferences, repeated practice, and constant refinement led to the development 
of a common doctrine�24 This foundation helped the destroyer commanders out-
maneuver their opponents repeatedly in tactical exercises�
Destroyer torpedoes were powerful weapons, but their range was limited� De-
stroyers had to close with larger, more-powerful ships to attack effectively, and it 
was much easier to do so under the cover of darkness� Coordinated night attacks 
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were very difficult, but with practice, Sims’s captains became extremely adept at 
them�25 Their well-coordinated night torpedo attacks illustrated that battleship 
formations were vulnerable, even when screened by other ships�26 Sims reported 
on one such attack in March 1915: “During recent exercises, the flotilla attacked 
the double screened battleship fleet with actual torpedoes� Eighteen torpedoes 
were fired, and 11 and probably 13 hits were made� Six or seven battleships, in-
cluding three dreadnaughts [sic] were struck from one to three times� � � � [T]he 
problem � � � was a question of protecting a fleet by having its main body screened 
against the attack of torpedo destroyers�”27
This remarkable result—sinking or disabling at least six battleships—was 
made possible by the Torpedo Flotilla’s new doctrine� Sims was making the most 
of his small ships and the aggressive spirit of his captains� A general plan, framed 
by the estimate of the situation, provided high-level coordination� The habits and 
routines developed through repeated exercises aligned decision-making at the 
tactical level and eliminated the need for detailed orders� This approach allowed 
Sims to maximize the individual initiative of his captains while focusing them on 
a common goal�
In his comments on Tactical Problem 35-13, held in July 1913, Sims described 
one of the methods he used to develop doctrine: “Previous to the maneuver, two 
forenoons were spent by the Flotilla Commander and all destroyer captains in 
playing the problem on the maneuver board on the [flagship] Dixie, and it is be-
lieved that this training was of great benefit to the officers concerned in actually 
executing the problem on the water�”28 These kinds of exercises helped officers 
develop a shared sense of how to approach specific situations, but they were not 
intended to provide rote solutions� Sims’s goal was to align decision-making� Re-
peated exercises on the game board and at sea were coupled with frequent confer-
ences to share lessons and discuss alternatives, leading to constant improvements 
and refinements�
One of the most important aspects of the flotilla’s doctrine was the stress it 
placed on aggressive action� According to Thomas Hughes, “under Sims, de-
stroyer men adopted an aggressive ethic based on speed, agility, and daring�”29 By 
emphasizing individual initiative, the officers of the flotilla maximized their po-
tential for aggressive action; it became the essence of their doctrine and was very 
influential� Many of the Navy’s future leaders, including Ernest J� King, Harold 
Stark, Rufus Zogbaum Jr�, Aubrey Fitch, Harris Laning, George Cook, John New-
ton, William Halsey, Franck T� Evans, and Frank Jack Fletcher, were immersed in 
Sims’s laboratory and influenced by the flotilla’s tactics and doctrine; they would 
take these ideas with them as they moved on to greater responsibilities�
In the summer of 1914, Sims returned to the Naval War College to give a lec-
ture that described how the “principles and methods developed � � � at the college 
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have been applied in the administration of the Flotilla and in the development of 
its tactics�” Sims emphasized the benefits of the conference method� There was, in 
his words, “no possible excuse for not utilizing � � � all the knowledge, experience, 
energy, and brains that the organization contains�” The conferences drew out this 
knowledge, leading to more-effective solutions� They also fostered a “team spirit 
and a team loyalty” that created greater alignment throughout the organization�30 
In his lecture, Sims highlighted the development of the flotilla’s new night search-
and-attack doctrine, which was refined and analyzed in a series of exercises and 
numerous conferences before it was truly effective�
By 1915, enough experience had been gained with the flotilla’s doctrine to 
codify it� The General Service Instructions for the flotilla, issued in 1915, de-
scribed its mission, organization, and doctrine as developed under Sims�31 The 
increasing sophistication of the flotilla’s approach, and its well-considered doc-
trine, provided a mechanism for coordinating distributed action in battle and led 
to an increasing emphasis on the potential for destroyers to contribute to major 
fleet engagements� This was reflected in the Atlantic Fleet’s 1916 “Battle Instruc-
tions,” in which destroyers were recognized as a core offensive weapon of the 
fleet—a testament to the effectiveness of the flotilla’s doctrine�32
The 1916 “Battle Instructions” was issued by Rear Admiral Frank Friday 
Fletcher, USN (uncle of the destroyer captain Frank Jack Fletcher), in May� It 
reflected his experience as Atlantic Fleet commander over the previous sixteen 
months� In the “Instructions,” Fletcher emphasized the importance of concen-
trated firepower� This had been a standard element of the Navy’s approach for 
years, but Fletcher’s take on it was different�33 He emphasized concentrating all 
the weapons of the entire fleet, not only the gunfire of its battleships� This was a 
new paradigm, one that would remain at the core of the Navy’s tactical approach 
through the end of World War II�34 It was the success of the flotilla’s doctrine that 
led to an emphasis on using all arms to destroy the enemy in battle�
Fletcher’s “Instructions” also introduced a new, more flexible approach to 
command� He assumed that the conditions of battle would be fundamentally 
uncertain� Although detailed plans could be developed, the assumptions embed-
ded in them would not survive for long� Therefore, Fletcher expected to foster 
collaboration among his subordinates by issuing a high-level battle plan� The 
plan would not provide detailed instructions; instead, it would give sufficient 
background to explain his intentions� Commanders were expected to remain 
flexible and adjust depending on specific circumstances� Fletcher expected them 
to exploit emerging opportunities� 
A plan of battle will specify the role to be played by each subdivision of the fleet in 
the situation which the plan is intended to cover; it will fix the direction � � � from 
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which the enemy is to be attacked; the speed of the force; � � � the direction in which 
the enemy is to be turned or the turn that is to be denied; whether the attack is to be 
pressed home to short range or kept at long range; whether a quick decision is to be 
sought for or containing tactics adopted; whether destroyers are to attack the enemy, 
deny him a certain area, or remain in reserve as a means of giving a coup de grace�35
Fletcher’s approach dovetailed perfectly with that of Sims� Both men relied 
on the concept of a high-level plan to provide context for their subordinates� 
But rather than prescribing specific actions, they embraced the more flexible ap-
proach fostered by the estimate of the situation, which stressed communicating 
intentions and general concepts so that subordinates could use their own initia-
tive to further progress toward the desired outcome�
Doctrine complemented this approach� In 1914, Commander Pratt took a 
break from his work with the flotilla and lectured at the Naval War College�36 
Together with Lieutenant Commander Harry E� Yarnell, USN, Pratt refined the 
theory behind the flotilla’s methods and brought it to a broader pool of officers� 
Yarnell continued this work, providing a fledgling definition of doctrine to the 
College’s class of 1915: “A doctrine is simply a code of rules upon which we act 
spontaneously and without order, for the accomplishment of the mission� To be 
of value the doctrine must be based on correct principles and methods of con-
ducting war� Then it must be instilled by study and actual fleet training into the 
minds of officers until it becomes almost a reflex action�”37
Among a small pool of officers, this concept was becoming the preferred 
mechanism for ensuring coordinated action without the need for precise orders 
or firm control� Yarnell, Sims, Pratt, Knox, and others believed that doctrine was 
the key to unity of action in a modern, diverse, and distributed battle fleet� As 
Yarnell described: “From skill and doctrine flows the initiative of the subordinate� 
Give the subordinate a proper understanding of the mission and proper train-
ing, and he may be relied upon to act correctly in an emergency when orders or 
instructions from higher authority are not available�”38 Knox’s conception was 
similar; he argued that “doctrine gives birth to harmonized methods, rules, and 
actions” and that doctrine “is necessary before concerted action � � � is possible; it 
is an indispensable element of command, and an essential prelude to great suc-
cess in war�”39
This emerging concept of doctrine integrated well with Fletcher’s new ap-
proach to battle plans� Fletcher expected his plans to provide context and explain 
his objectives; he would leave his subordinate commanders free to act on their 
own initiative in furtherance of them� This method allowed those officers to 
adjust to changing circumstances� If a common doctrine was available to guide 
them, they would have a shared context for decision-making, ensuring greater 
alignment in the confusion of battle� Like Yarnell, Captain Albert P� Niblack, 
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USN, argued in favor of such an approach� “Once the action is joined the sub-
ordinates are dependent upon their own initiative, because signaling in battle is 
difficult, and hence arises the necessity for battle doctrine� In the rapidly changing 
phases of battle � � � decisions must be made and must be executed without the loss 
of the time necessary to signal to higher authority� � � � Thus arises the principle of 
the initiative of the subordinate, growing out of battle doctrine, the plan of battle, 
and indoctrination” (emphasis original)�40
If the work of the Torpedo Flotilla was not convincing enough, there were 
numerous historical examples—by now a staple of Naval War College analyses—
that could be used to justify the development of a common doctrine�
A tentative doctrine has been established in the Torpedo Flotilla, and a very able 
officer of high rank has pronounced it the greatest single achievement he has seen in 
thirty years’ service� � � � We cannot recall to mind too often the splendid examples of 
doctrine supplied by the life of Nelson, or the victories that resulted in 1870 through 
the doctrine of German commanders to enter eagerly into battle, to support each 
other, to deny defeat and to grasp victory through concert of action and unity of  
mission—the destruction of the enemy�41
However, this concept was new, and its importance was not recognized widely� 
Most officers still viewed tactics as a discipline involving precise maneuvering 
rather than a shared contextual understanding� It would be years before the fledg-
ling doctrine developed by Sims’s flotilla became the Navy’s dominant approach 
to coordinated action in combat�42
EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR I
Participation in World War I provided the Navy with valuable experience while at 
the same time invalidating many existing assumptions about naval warfare� Un-
expectedly, the most pressing enemy was not the German battle line but the tena-
cious U-boats; when the United States entered the war, the Navy was ill equipped 
to deal with this threat� However, the nascent destroyer doctrine developed in the 
Atlantic Fleet proved a valuable guide� Experience partnering with Great Britain’s 
Royal Navy also provided a unique learning opportunity, exposing American of-
ficers to a wealth of wartime lessons�
Battleship Division 9 of Rear Admiral Hugh Rodman, USN—consisting of 
New York, Delaware, Florida, and Wyoming—arrived at Scapa Flow, the RN base 
in the Orkney Islands, north of Scotland, on December 7, 1917�43 The ships be-
came the 6th Battle Squadron of the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet� Operations with 
the Grand Fleet provided valuable experience for Rodman and eventually the en-
tire Navy through exposure to “British signals, radio codes, maneuvering orders, 
fire control methods, and battle instructions�”44
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In battle, the Grand Fleet coordinated its movements through a sophisticated 
set of instructions and plans� To keep the battleships concentrated, they cruised 
in a compact formation of parallel columns� In battle they deployed, generally 
by turning ninety degrees and forming a single line, perpendicular to the bear-
ing of the enemy—a formation similar to those the Navy had been using since 
the creation of the Atlantic Fleet� The Grand Fleet’s light forces—destroyers and 
cruisers—would arrange themselves on the flanks of the battle line, slightly closer 
to the enemy� From these positions, they could protect the flanks from enemy at-
tack and also be ready to close the enemy line and attack with torpedoes� These 
formations were clear and well suited to an action between battle fleets� The Navy 
adopted similar battle formations after the war, arranging its ships to maximize 
concentrated firepower against the enemy battle line�45
However, the Navy’s officers viewed the Grand Fleet’s large set of instructions 
less favorably� This was particularly true when viewed against the outcome of 
the war’s largest naval battle, the Battle of Jutland, fought in May 1916� Almost 
as soon as the battle was over, American officers began to examine it in the hope 
of drawing out effective lessons� Lieutenant Holloway H� Frost, USN, was one of 
them� He entered the Naval War College in 1916 and, in cooperation with Yarnell 
and Niblack, conducted a wargame to re-create the battle in September 1916� 
Sims and Knox traveled to Newport to join them and learn from the exercise� In 
November, Frost produced an official College report on the battle�46
Frost’s greatest criticism, as it developed in later years, was that the Grand 
Fleet’s guiding orders and principles emphasized the avoidance of risk and the 
preservation of the fleet� Decisive action would be sought only if a positive out-
come could be guaranteed�47 Captain Harris Laning, USN, who learned about the 
importance of doctrine under Sims in the Torpedo Flotilla and later taught tactics 
at the Naval War College, stressed that the Grand Fleet’s commander, Admiral 
John R� Jellicoe, RN, adopted a defensive posture and that he was “unwilling to 
pay � � � for the victory which � � � lay in his grasp,” despite placing his force “in one 
of the most powerful positions ever obtained�”48
Frost, Laning, and other American officers who examined Jutland highlighted 
the fact that RN officers failed to act with the necessary initiative� They missed 
opportunities to damage the enemy; failed accurately to report sightings to 
higher authority; and embraced a risk-averse attitude that, with a few notable 
exceptions, seemed to dominate Jellicoe’s fleet�49 Part of the reason was believed 
to be the Grand Fleet’s detailed instructions, which were blamed for restricting 
the initiative of subordinates� Laning explained it this way: “The British failed to 
gain decisive victory � � � because their higher commanders � � � had not prepared 
themselves and their subordinates to win�”50
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It is important to note, however, that there are alternative explanations for the 
outcome at Jutland; David G� Morgan-Owen’s recent study of British war plan-
ning, for example, argues that the Royal Navy became focused on defense of the 
British Isles, limiting opportunities to use the Grand Fleet offensively�51 Regard-
less, the U�S� Navy resolved to take a very different approach and stressed the 
importance of capitalizing on opportunities by deliberately developing methods 
that promoted subordinate commanders’ aggressive action�
Sims’s doctrine provided a sound basis for this� Before the American entry into 
the war, he commanded battleship Nevada and was promoted to rear admiral� He 
became President of the Naval War College in January 1917 but was ordered to 
London at the end of March� His mission was to liaise with officers of the Royal 
Navy and prepare for the American entry into the war� When that occurred in 
April, Sims was made commander of American naval forces in Europe, and in 
May he received a temporary promotion to vice admiral� It was an ideal opportu-
nity to spread his approach to doctrine, and he wasted no time�
Sims and his staff—which included Knox, Yarnell, Schofield, and Babcock—
issued a doctrine to his European command that stressed two critical compo-
nents derived from his experiences in the Atlantic Fleet and time at the College� 
The first was the use of a mission and general plan� These focused the attention 
of subordinates on critical objectives and promoted mutual understanding, both 
of which were essential for fostering individual initiative�
It is manifestly impossible for the Commander of the operation to give detailed 
instructions in advance that will cover all emergencies; it is equally impossible for the 
Commander of an operation to give these instructions on the spot to meet adequately 
a local situation suddenly developed� Hence the importance of having the immediate 
Mission and General Plan clearly understood in advance, and the necessity for leav-
ing as wide an area of discretion to subordinates as possible�52 
That discretion was the second critical component� Sims stressed the need 
for individual initiative to overcome uncertainty in battle: “No officer should 
fail to exercise his initiative and judgment in support of the General Plan 
when confronted by unexpected conditions�” Sims expected this doctrine to 
be “a bond of mutual understanding governing the application of principles to 
circumstances�”53 The creative energies of subordinates would translate the mis-
sion and general plan into desired outcomes through coordinated action�
It worked� Sims collaborated with his subordinates and the British to develop 
effective doctrines for hunting U-boats, combating German raiders, and escort-
ing convoys� These were augmented by an emphasis on the kind of wargames 
and shipboard exercises he had employed in the Atlantic Fleet�54 Through these 
mechanisms, many more officers—particularly destroyer captains—became 
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familiar with Sims’s approach to doctrinal development� The success of these 
methods in war validated them, and they served as a basis for future development 
in the early interwar period�
DOCTRINE DELIBERATELY CREATED
In 1919, after the war ended, Sims returned to the Naval War College� It had 
been closed during the war, and his first task was to reestablish it� He wanted it 
to become a more influential institution and to allow a broader pool of officers 
to benefit from its methods� He asked Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels to 
increase class sizes, augment the staff, and assign higher-ranking officers to head 
the major departments� Daniels was a firm believer in education, and he readily 
agreed to make the necessary changes�55
By the end of 1921, about half the admirals within the fleet and their chiefs of 
staff were graduates of the College, a testament to Sims’s efforts and a reflection 
of the growing influence of the institution�56 Sims made sure that these officers 
were exposed to the doctrinal approaches that the Atlantic Fleet had pioneered 
before the war by selecting now-captain Dudley Knox as his chief of staff� During 
their tenure, Sims and Knox continued to emphasize the use of wargames and the 
conference method that had been a staple of the College for years: “The applica-
tory system of Captain [William McCarty] Little, built upon the use of the game 
board to illustrate problems of strategy and tactics, continued as the basic method 
of instruction�”57 Collaborative learning and problem solving continued, as John 
M� Lillard explains: “War College leadership, faculty, and students all contributed 
toward creating a climate that encouraged experimentation and learning in a 
group setting�”58
The efforts of Sims and Knox were aided by some very specific recommenda-
tions made by a board that Knox chaired in 1919� The Knox-Pye-King Board—
staffed by Knox, Captain Ernest J� King, USN, and Commander William S� Pye, 
USN—examined the current state of officer instruction and argued for a junior 
Naval War College course that would ensure “the whole body of commanding 
officers and of unit commanders and their staffs have common conceptions of � � � 
practical methods which are requisite for thorough cooperation and coordina-
tion” to make “unity of command” a reality in battle�59 The board felt that officers 
needed greater familiarity with “the advanced elements of the profession, includ-
ing training in the application of the doctrine and principles of naval warfare” 
before they would be ready to command at sea�60
Two different commands explored how best to accomplish this goal� The 
first was that of Rear Admiral Charles Plunkett, USN� He was a graduate of the 
Naval War College and familiar with its methods� He assumed command of the 
Atlantic Fleet’s destroyers in 1919 and, like Sims before him, emphasized tactical 
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experimentation� Plunkett helped foster the creation of a learning system with 
the help of his chief of staff, Captain Laning� Laning understood well the impor-
tance of doctrine from his time in the Torpedo Flotilla� Together they promoted a 
new, more formal approach to doctrinal development that harnessed the lessons 
of war and enhanced cooperation�
Plunkett and Laning created a “school of doctrine” at Charleston, South Caro-
lina, to investigate how best to coordinate their ships in battle� Captain Yarnell 
led many of the efforts of this school and continued to promote the concept of 
doctrine actively� For instance, he often gave lectures and led committees respon-
sible for the development of standing orders and attack procedures�61 In addition, 
Yarnell maintained an ongoing correspondence with Sims, allowing him to incor-
porate the latest thinking from the Naval War College into his work�
The second command that explored how best to develop doctrine was in 
the Pacific Fleet� Captain Pratt, another veteran of Sims’s Torpedo Flotilla, as-
sumed command of the Pacific Fleet’s Destroyer Force in November 1920 and 
introduced an approach that paralleled the one in the Atlantic Fleet� Pratt and 
his subordinates—including other former members of the Torpedo Flotilla such 
as William Halsey—continued to promote an aggressive doctrine well suited to 
destroyers� Pratt established a “destroyer staff college” at San Diego to allow for 
regular experimentation and indoctrination�62
The Atlantic Fleet’s school and Pratt’s college regularly exchanged lessons and 
collaborated�63 The name “staff college” more aptly described their work, so the 
school at Charleston changed its name and became the Atlantic Fleet’s Destroyer 
Staff College� Commander William Victor Tomb, USN, commented on its work 
in 1921� “My first impression � � � upon observing the work done at the Staff 
College was one of amazement that such excellent tactical maneuvers could be 
carried on by the Officers of the Destroyer Force of whom only the Force Com-
mander and the Director of the maneuvers were War College graduates�”64 The 
three colleges—at Charleston, San Diego, and Newport—deliberately worked on 
improving and refining the Navy’s destroyer doctrine�
The destroyer staff colleges also familiarized a broader pool of officers with 
the latest techniques and improved their skills� It was part of a conscious effort 
to ease the transition back to a peacetime footing� Laning and others were wor-
ried that the lessons of war would be lost if tactical thinking stagnated: “The 
more we can fight off this effect [stagnation] by work and study along the lines 
of our profession, and by an endeavor to embody in our ‘War Instructions’ the 
best ideas as developed in past wars, in study, and research, that much easier will 
be our task when the next war comes� The work at this Staff College is one effort 
towards that end�”65
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Soon, enough experience had been gained to issue a new tactical manual� It 
would blend lessons learned during the war with experimentation in tabletop 
problems, fleet exercises, and the latest thinking in both colleges� Captain C� R� 
Train, USN, was responsible for the committee that produced the manual, and by 
September it had completed its work, as noted in the “History of the Destroyer 
Staff College”:
The final result of the year’s work as planned by Captain Laning was to be a manual 
of Destroyer Doctrine covering all phases of destroyer activities in war� Although 
considerable work was done this mission was not finally accomplished until Septem-
ber of this year [1921] when a committee of officers headed by Captain C� R� Train 
completed the compilation of “Destroyer War Instructions” embodying the work of 
the Staff College at Charleston, the Destroyer Staff College at San Diego, and other 
available destroyer practice as developed in the World War� � � � This manual � � � will 
be � � � tested out on the game board and by actual squadron maneuvers at sea�66
Under Plunkett and Pratt—with encouragement by Sims—the Navy’s de-
stroyer forces were a hotbed of doctrinal experimentation and development� The 
resulting manual, the Atlantic Fleet’s 1921 “Destroyer Instructions,” represented 
a new paradigm� It was the first fleet manual developed through a deliberately 
created system of learning� The system seamlessly blended problem solving 
and experimentation ashore—in the destroyer staff colleges and the Naval War 
College—with exercises at sea� The introduction to the manual reinforced this 
point, noting that the “Instructions” was “based upon the best obtainable ex-
perience of our Service preceding and during the recent war, supplemented by 
considerable subsequent game board and practical experience and trial�”67 It was 
a comprehensive manual designed to provide guidance to the fleet’s destroyers 
while still preserving scope for independent action by individual ship and squad-
ron commanders� Future doctrinal publications would follow a similar paradigm, 
as the work of the fleet became more closely integrated with that of the Naval 
War College�
Plunkett and Pratt developed a more sophisticated approach than other 
commands, but their basic concept became the Navy’s standard model for doc-
trinal development in the early interwar period� The War Instructions of 1923 
codified this model; with its publication, doctrine became a core aspect of the 
Navy’s tactical development� The War Instructions stressed that indoctrination 
was essential but also emphasized that doctrinal development would be driven 
by individual commands and not handed down from the fleet level� Doctrine 
would emerge from the bottom up; it would not be imposed top down� Individual 
commands were responsible for developing their own doctrines to reflect the 
specific strengths and limitations of their forces� This flexible approach allowed 
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the Navy to remain open to new ideas and encouraged the creativity of low-level 
commanders�
However, the flexible approach also meant that a coherent doctrine for the 
entire fleet was lacking� Some officers urged the development of a more common 
and centralized approach� Captain Knox was particularly critical in a lecture he 
gave at the Naval War College in 1924� Knox called doctrine a “basis for harmo-
nious decisions” and stressed that it was the only effective way to coordinate the 
actions of distributed forces in battle� “No plan, however well it may be expressed, 
can possibly be co-ordinately executed by a large force of vessels of several types 
operating against a strong and efficient enemy, unless the squadron, division, and 
ship commanders have the same conceptions of war as their commander-in-chief 
and are well indoctrinated�”68
The War Instructions sought to achieve this end but deliberately avoided a 
comprehensive approach� In part, this was a reaction to the Navy’s experience 
in World War I and the negative impression created by the Grand Fleet’s exten-
sive and detailed orders� The comprehensive instructions were believed to have 
inhibited the initiative of subordinate commanders� As James J� Tritten explains: 
“These fighting instructions [the Grand Fleet Battle Orders] attempted to provide 
guidance for all eventualities and offered the unit commander very little oppor-
tunity for his own initiative� They were issued several times during the war by 
[Admiral John R�] Jellicoe and by his successor, Admiral Sir David Beatty�”69 John 
Brooks also has commented on the influence of these orders and the “limited 
scope” they provided subordinates�70
To encourage individual initiative and foster contextually driven decision-
making, the Navy deliberately refrained from publishing a fleet-wide tactical 
doctrine� Instead, specific manuals, such as the Atlantic Fleet’s “Destroyer 
Instructions,” provided detailed guidance while preserving the initiative of in-
dividual commanders� This did not mean that doctrine was unimportant� On 
the contrary, the War Instructions stressed its value, emphasizing that victory 
in battle would be aided by “[i]ndoctrination of the forces, so that there may be 
mutual understanding of the intentions and plans of the commander in chief and 
so that there may be coordination in the means and methods employed in carry-
ing out the tasks assigned and of the necessary procedure when without orders�”71
This is what Knox wanted to see� However, the War Instructions left the details 
of that doctrine unspecified� This omission allowed it to be flexible and change 
depending on circumstances� By leaving doctrinal development in the hands of 
individual commanders, the Navy could experiment more effectively (and more 
rapidly) with different techniques� The approach also ensured that those doc-
trines that were developed remained contextually sensitive�
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There were two important ramifications of the Navy’s approach� First, it 
meant that in an era of rapid technological change, the Navy avoided prematurely 
converging on any specific doctrine� It left its options open, so that as new con-
cepts and approaches emerged, doctrines could be modified rapidly to account 
for them�72 The interwar fleet problems and other tactical exercises provided a 
framework for these changes; they were part of a feedback cycle that refined the 
Navy’s doctrinal concepts in light of experience� Second, the Navy encouraged 
flexibility and individual initiative within its officer corps� Because doctrinal 
development was in their hands, lower-level commanders were encouraged to 
take responsibility and not wait for higher authorities to make the decisions� This 
fostered the commanders’ creativity and problem-solving skills, encouraging 
them to derive solutions for their own specific circumstances� It proved to be an 
extremely effective approach�
In the decade between 1913 and 1923, the Navy addressed the challenge of co-
ordinating a modern, distributed battle fleet by introducing a new, more flexible 
paradigm for commanding forces in battle� That approach combined flexible 
battle plans that framed the mission with tactical doctrines that enabled coor-
dinated action without the need for detailed instructions� In this way, the Navy 
solved the problem of ensuring alignment while also fostering creativity and 
individual initiative�
That outcome was the result of an effective process of organizational learning� 
It started with new paradigms introduced at the Naval War College: wargames, 
the conference method, and the estimate of the situation� Sims and his col-
leagues harnessed these effectively in the Atlantic Fleet� They leveraged tabletop 
wargames to explore different approaches to combat, they used the conference 
method to make sense of the results and identify lessons, and they employed the 
disciplined methodology of the estimate of the situation to understand their mis-
sion and formulate plans� Together, the officers of the Torpedo Flotilla discovered 
that repeated practice created familiarity—with their equipment, their ships, and 
each other—and that certain practices were more effective than others�
The officers developed specific routines that leveraged their strengths� These 
strengths included an emphasis on aggressive action, the use of a general plan (to 
describe desired outcomes and frame opportunities), and a reliance on individual 
initiative� These concepts appeared to be validated in World War I and therefore 
became core elements of the Navy’s doctrine, providing a foundation at the start 
of the interwar period that was refined and enhanced in the decades before World 
War II� By the time of that conflict, these core elements of the Navy’s doctrine had 
channeled and focused the Navy’s approach to combat, leading to an emphasis on 
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the use of surface gunfire and aerial attack so as to, in the words of modern naval 
tactician Wayne Hughes, “attack effectively first�”73
More important than those fundamental elements, however, was the habitual 
routine of exploring, developing, and refining tactical practices to create doc-
trine� The approach was developed initially by Sims, then expanded by Plunkett, 
Pratt, and Laning after World War I; it emphasized developing doctrine from 
the bottom up� This was a deliberate choice, and it was codified in the War 
Instructions of 1923� It allowed the Navy to explore new doctrinal approaches 
and concepts routinely� As this process was refined during the interwar period, 
lower-level commanders continued to experiment with new doctrines for their 
forces� Rapid experimentation proved critical in the early years of World War II, 
when Japanese capabilities proved to be greater than anticipated� Lessons from 
the fighting in 1942 aided victory in the battles of 1943 and 1944, when American 
officers explored new approaches in an effort to secure a potential advantage� 
That process had its roots in the work the Navy did to develop its initial doctrine 
in the decade between 1913 and 1923�74
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THE ROYAL NAVY AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
LEARNING
The Western Approaches Tactical Unit and the Battle of the Atlantic
Geoffrey Sloan
Our Atlantic trade is suffering very severe losses from U-boat and air 
attacks in the Western Approaches. Our merchant shipping is causing 
grave and increasing anxiety. Anti-invasion trade protection require-
ments in the North Sea and narrow waters and our many commitments 
overseas at the present time do not allow us to increase the numbers of 
naval escorts allocated to Atlantic trade. Increased protection can only 
be given by operating our naval and air forces from bases in Eire nearer 
to the area of enemy attack. 
CHIEFS OF STAFF, MEMORANDUM, “NECESSITY FOR BASE FACILITIES IN EIRE,” MARCH 8, 1941
The highest type of naval officer is that wherein great professional 
knowledge is added to force of character. The danger within the Navy 
itself is lest insufficient importance should be attached to the results of 
study, and lest the value of what is called the practical character should 
be placed higher than it deserves. It is true that no student will ever 
become a victorious leader unless he is also a practical seaman and 
has the power of influencing men; but it is also true that no seaman, 
however practical, will be fit to rise beyond a certain rank unless he has 
thought out the problems of his calling as a student and has omitted no 
opportunity of acquiring the knowledge that makes up the science of his 
profession. 
MEMORANDUM DEALING WITH THE ENTRY, TRAINING, AND EMPLOYMENT OF OFFICERS AND 
MEN OF THE ROYAL NAVY AND OF THE ROYAL MARINES, 1902
 These epigraphs illustrate two things: first, the geostrategic challenge the Royal Navy faced between the fall of France in June 1940 and the D-day landings 
of June 1944; second, the importance of fusing professional education, leader-
ship skills, and the practical ability of the seaman�1 The factors in the latter point 
can be attributed to Admiral John A� “Jacky” Fisher, RN, the reforming First Sea 
Lord of the early twentieth century�2 Why was this synthesis important? Fisher 
believed it would increase the operational effectiveness of naval officers, and in 
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that early part of World War II, the Battle of the Atlantic might have been lost if 
naval officers did not become sufficiently effective�
This article will explore two related questions� First, can a theory of organi-
zational learning be applied to explain the improved effectiveness of one tactical 
organization during the Second World War? That improvement can be char-
acterized specifically as the development of an antisubmarine tactical doctrine 
between 1942 and 1945 and the acquisition of new knowledge in the operational 
context of the Battle of the Atlantic� Second, was a new organization, the Western 
Approaches Tactical Unit (WATU)—despite being a product of a bureaucratic, 
centrally controlled, hierarchical Admiralty—able to collect, transfer, and inte-
grate knowledge to achieve three objectives: challenge existing norms, objectives, 
and policies that pertained to trade defense; facilitate doctrinal innovation to 
counter the tactics of German U-boats used to attack convoys; and teach and 
disseminate doctrine to naval officers appointed to escorts in the North Atlantic 
and officers from the Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force (RAF)?
The article will render a judgment regarding the extent to which WATU’s 
activities enhanced the effectiveness of trade defense� Did it resolve what Max 
Visser has called “the ‘learning paradox’ and � � � combine conditions of hierarchy 
and discipline with adaptability and flexibility”?3 Finally, does this analysis rep-
resent a historically specific case, or are there lessons for other navies to learn in 
the twenty-first century?
In addressing these questions, it is important to acknowledge that a body of 
research into these topics exists already� How do military organizations fail, in-
novate, and learn? The literature covers all three categories�4 With respect to the 
first category, Eliot Cohen and John Gooch developed what they have called a 
“taxonomy of misfortune�” They claim that “there are three kinds of failure: a 
failure to learn, a failure to anticipate, and a failure to adapt� Each has its own 
characteristics and consequences�”5 In terms of the second category, Williamson 
Murray and Allan Millett have argued that there are three patterns of innovation: 
technology, organizational politics, and civil-military collaboration� How they 
combine to facilitate innovation is more complex; it is “a combination of astute 
political support and guidance usually exercised by a few politicians, attention of 
civilian and military technologists to the most promising innovations, and cre-
ation of staffs and organizations that can turn ideas into experimental exercises�”6
Fighting organizations can produce distinct attitudes to learning that can 
persist over long periods� Robert Foley and Sergio Catignani have examined the 
British army’s approach to learning in both the First World War and the recent 
campaign in Afghanistan�7 Aimée Fox-Godden has summarized their conclu-
sions in the following way: “Both highlight the army’s reliance on informal learn-
ing methods owing to an organizational culture that centres on pragmatism and 
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dislike of formal doctrine� Although they acknowledge the army’s utilization of 
formal learning systems, both argue that learning and knowledge sharing take 
place through predominantly informal, individualized methods�”8
These areas of research can be applied to the WATU case to help analyze the 
organizational learning that took place and its effectiveness� WATU has received 
scant treatment in the literature on the Battle of the Atlantic� Cohen and Gooch 
do not mention it by name, but they recognized it as being of coequal importance 
with operational intelligence� “The British anti-submarine effort, clearly the most 
successful of any of the participants in World War II, succeeded in large part be-
cause of their ability to master these two requirements of ASW [antisubmarine 
warfare]: efficient collection, collation, and communication of intelligence and 
development of appropriate doctrine�”9
THEORIES OF INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING
A theory of learning can be useful for understanding how the process takes 
place within an organization, but scholars and experts disagree regarding these 
theories� Some claim that knowledge capable of changing the performance of an 
organization can be formulated, captured, and translated into a set of codified in-
structions, which then can be disseminated within the organization�10 In contrast 
to this claim is the idea of knowledge as a “multifaceted, dynamic, provisional and 
socially situated activity where context and interpretative frames are essential�”11 
This second theory has much to recommend it, as it acknowledges that a chang-
ing social context can affect attempts to interpret and learn about a new, challeng-
ing situation�12 There is also a theory that lies between these two poles: the theory 
of absorptive capacity� This states that the “ability to evaluate and utilize outside 
knowledge is largely a function of the level of prior related knowledge[,] � � � 
[which] confers an ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate 
it, and apply it�”13
Chris Argyris and Donald Schon call into question all three of these interpre-
tations of learning: as a set of codified instructions, a socially situated activity, or 
a theory of absorptive capacity� They object that each of these theories claims to 
understand and account for a complex reality, yet “no single perspective gives a 
workable basis either for diagnosing the impediments to organizational learning 
or for designing interventions which would increase the organizational capacity 
for learning�”14
Argyris and Schon developed two theories on how organizations learn� The 
first is called single-loop learning� The analogy is to a thermostat; it “learns when 
it is too hot or too cold and turns the heat on or off� The thermostat can perform 
this task because it can receive information (the temperature of the room) and 
take corrective action�” The second theory is called double-loop learning� This 
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occurs when an individual or organization receives information and takes action, 
but the outcome is not the desired result� Developing remedial action requires 
assessing the core features of the organization, which leads to errors being “de-
tected and corrected in ways that involve the modification of an organization’s 
underlying norms, policies, and objectives�”15
A crucial difference between these two types of learning is the ease with which 
organizations can perform them� Single-loop learning is an achievable task for 
most organizations; double-loop learning, by contrast, presents a complex chal-
lenge� With respect to the former, as long as the objectives and the context remain 
the same, the process of detection and correction will continue successfully� 
However, a context that changes or objectives that no longer are achievable can 
lead to questioning of the organization’s underpinning norms or assumptions� At 
this point, problems can arise inside an organization; barriers to organizational 
learning can emerge� “Individuals and organizations tend to deal with threat in 
ways that will increase defensiveness and reduce the probability of learning to 
learn�”16 Argyris and Schon contend that not all change has a positive effect on an 
organization� It can result in regression, stagnation, deception, and manipulation�
Institutional learning depends in part on the culture of an organization and 
the extent to which it facilitates an openness to both inquiry and new ideas�17 
Fighting organizations often have a unique culture that persists over a long 
period—and that can both impair learning and enhance it� The German army 
provides a good example of both impaired and enhanced learning� “[T]he mili-
tary culture that supported the Prusso-German approach to war had taken over a 
century to evolve� � � � German commanders had had to learn to devolve creative 
freedom and authority upon their juniors—an unprecedented and largely coun-
terintuitive step�”18
Argysis and Schon made a number of claims that differentiate double-loop 
learning from single-loop learning� First, it is relatively hard for an organization 
to create this kind of learning system; second, it cannot be evolved from single-
loop learning; finally, it is best suited to a complex environment in which there are 
many interacting variables� But when implemented successfully, it can have long-
term benefits� “Double-loop actions—the master programs—control the long-
range effectiveness, and hence, the ultimate destiny of the system�”19 The challenge 
that WATU faced certainly qualified as just such a complex environment�
THE QUADRANTS OF FIGHTING POWER: A MEANS OF ANALYSIS
Traditionally, fighting power has been interpreted using three elements: the 
moral, the physical, and the conceptual� A traditional instrument for facilitating 
navigation is the quadrant, which has a graduated ninety-degree arc� Fusing the 
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quadrant’s arc with the elements of fighting power provides a new, hybrid way to 
assess the effectiveness of WATU’s role in the improvement of ASW tactics� The 
quadrants used here with respect to the Battle of the Atlantic are four variables: 
new assumptions about tactics, changes in weapons technology and their subse-
quent application, developments in doctrine, and the adoption of an appropriate 
command philosophy� When all, or at least a majority of, these elements were 
present, WATU was facilitating a process of institutional learning�
The quadrants help illuminate two other issues� First, to what extent did senior 
officers, in a hierarchical organization, pursue their own agenda and succeed in 
shaping the manner in which the rest of their command interpreted experiential 
evidence? Second, to what degree do these quadrants help us understand the re-
lationship between the tactical battle and operational effectiveness in the North 
Atlantic and the fulfillment of Britain’s strategic objectives?
THE CONTEXT: GEOSTRATEGIC DEFICITS AND  
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY
The Royal Navy’s campaign in the North Atlantic was one of the most important 
it fought during the Second World War� This section is not intended to give a nar-
rative account of this campaign but to focus on particular aspects of the Battle of 
the Atlantic�20 What defined the campaign was the need to parry and defeat the 
disruptive technology of Germany’s U-boats�21 Three geostrategic deficits had 
emerged by July 1940, which compounded this challenge�
Sea Control and Sea Denial
The first deficit was the Royal Navy’s inability by July 1940 to enforce sea control 
and sea denial in the Western Approaches� This was a consequence of a decision 
made in the late 1930s� In April 1938, an agreement between the British and Irish 
governments brought to an end a long-standing trade and financial dispute that 
had been instigated by Eamon de Valera, the Irish prime minister� Part of that 
agreement, at the insistence of the British prime minster, Neville Chamberlain, 
was the relinquishment of what were called defended reserved ports� These had re-
mained under British control even after the secession of the south of Ireland from 
the United Kingdom in 1922�22 These naval ports were located in Lough Swilly in 
Donegal, Berehaven in Bantry Bay, and Haulbowline Island near Cork�23 Despite 
strategic arguments by Winston Churchill in the House of Commons against this 
decision, the handover date was set for December 31, 1938—eight months before 
the outbreak of the Second World War�24
With those ports unavailable, a set of geopolitical assumptions emerged that 
were not validated by subsequent events� Admiral Ernle Chatfield, RN, the First 
Sea Lord in 1938, stated in his autobiography that the loss of these ports in Eire 
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had no geostrategic consequences, an assertion that would be proved wrong by 
later events�25 The ability to enforce sea control and sea denial in the Western Ap-
proaches was contingent on the following: “With a French ally with an efficient 
navy, and a neutral, but friendly Norway, the Admiralty believed they could hold 
the position� Actually, their judgement in the envisaged circumstances proved 
right; the situation was held satisfactorily until the fall of Norway and the collapse 
of France�”26 But those losses did occur, and by June 1940 Britain found itself—
for the first time since the Williamite wars of 1689–97—without access to naval 
bases along the southwest coast of Ireland� Captain Stephen W� Roskill, RN, gave 
an incisive judgment about the consequences of this handover� “Had we enjoyed 
the use of the Eire bases, many Allied ships and seamen’s lives would have been 
saved, and perhaps the Atlantic battle won earlier�”27
During the First World War it was the introduction of convoys in 1917 that 
had defeated Germany’s antiaccess/area-denial strategy�28 These convoys were 
organized by a joint British and American command from Admiralty House 
in Queenstown near Cork—one of the ports that was no longer available in the 
Second World War�29
Convoy Routes
The second geostrategic deficit was another consequence of Chamberlain’s 1938 
decision� The Admiralty was forced to abandon—after the fall of France in June 
1940—the Western Approaches as a convoy route� Instead, all convoys for the rest 
of the war would go “north about Ireland�” The difficulty in sustaining this new 
convoy route was compounded by a lack of naval escorts and radar equipment 
(both air and seaborne) to cover this area�30
The German U-boat command appreciated what was happening and made its 
dispositions accordingly�31 The result was that between July and October 1940, 
a total of 282 ships were sunk off the northwest approaches of Ireland� This rep-
resented a total of 1,489,795 tons of merchant shipping� A German navy report 
described the effects of these vulnerabilities� “There were at times surprisingly 
high sinking figures in successive short operations near the North Channel� The 
U-boats pursued homeward-bound ships close in to the coast and attacked con-
voys whose escorts could not deal even with single U-boat attacks�”32
The operational issue was the absence of a basing structure to support the 
convoy route Britain had been forced to adopt� Londonderry came into use as a 
base starting in October 1940, but only for refueling� This operational deficit re-
mained unchanged until March 1941, when the Chief of Naval Operations of the 
U�S� Navy approved the construction, in secret, of two naval bases in Northern 
Ireland, one in Londonderry and a flying boat base on Lough Erne�33 Construc-
tion began in June 1941—six months before the U�S� entry into the war� These 
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two bases became operational in February 1942� They created a new geostrategic 
context that increased both the accessibility and the mobility of the Allied navies�
An additional problem was the scarcity of naval escorts available for convoy 
duties and the operational range of those in service� In the critical months be-
tween July and October 1940, only one or two escorts accompanied each convoy� 
Furthermore, their range was limited to 200–50 miles west of Ireland, owing to 
the absence of naval facilities in neutral Eire� U-boats could operate to the west 
of the escorts’ operational range in the Atlantic� It was not until June 1941 that 
the Royal Navy initiated the use of end-to-end naval escorts for transatlantic 
convoys� By that date U-boats had sunk a total of 812 merchant ships�
U-boat Bases in Western France
The third geostrategic deficit was a consequence of the surrender of the French 
government in June 1940� Germany began to construct a string of new U-boat 
bases down the western seaboard of France, from Brest to Bordeaux� Out of the 
small force of fifty-seven German U-boats, forty-nine were operational, and the 
new bases provided a critical advantage, increasing the geographical scope of the 
boats’ operations�
The geostrategic significance of the absence of Allied bases in Eire became 
acute� As early as 1909 Sir Halford Mackinder had commented that Britain never 
“had to face enemies simultaneously eastward and southward,” except during 
the Napoleonic Wars�34 Now the relative accessibility of the Western Approaches 
from the western seaboard of France resulted in the reoccurrence of this scenario�
Other Challenges
In countering the disruptive technology of the submarine, the Royal Navy failed 
to remember a lesson of the First World War� “The British basically forgot that 
convoys alone had played the crucial role in blunting the U-boat offensive in 
1917�”35 It was access to southern Irish ports and bases that made the forma-
tion and routing of convoys effective� Second, the Royal Navy made a series of 
assumptions in the 1930s about the nature of the threat it would face and how 
it would counter that threat� Heavy reliance was placed on asdic (a submarine 
location device named after its progenitor, the Anti-Submarine Detection Inves-
tigation Committee), a primitive form of sonar that was believed widely to be a 
technological solution for any future threat�36
These assumptions were expressed by a representative of the First Lord of the 
Admiralty at the first meeting of the Shipping Defence Advisory Committee in 
March 1937, two and a half years before Britain entered the Second World War�37 
He stated that the United Kingdom faced three forms of attack: the airplane, 
the surface warship, and the submarine� Some claimed that the threat that the 
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submarine represented could be countered by technology alone� “[T]he subma-
rine menace � � � will never be, in my opinion and in the opinion of the navy, what 
it was before� We have means of countering a submarine which are very effective 
and which will normally reduce our losses from that weapon� It will never to my 
mind be a fatal menace that it was in the last war� We have taken effective steps 
to prevent that�”38
However, the combination of the operational limitations of asdic and the 
geostrategic deficits noted above presented the Admiralty with a toxic problem�39 
The Allies could contemplate projecting power onto the European continent and 
defeating the Third Reich only if there could be a buildup in Britain of men and 
matériel� This could be done only once the U-boat threat had been defeated so 
that convoys could carry the men and matériel safely to the United Kingdom� In 
addition, Britain needed to import a critical tonnage of food and materials if it 
were to continue to feed its population and sustain itself in the war� The North 
Atlantic was the vital theater for this movement of goods� The operational chal-
lenge was to ensure the safe and timely arrival of the convoys at British ports, 
especially prior to the entry of the United States into the war�
By the end of 1940, both sides recognized that the war could be won and lost in 
the North Atlantic� German admiral Karl Dönitz, head of the submarine arm of 
the Kriegsmarine, had calculated in 1942 that if Germany could inflict a monthly 
loss of seven hundred thousand tons of Allied shipping, Germany would win 
the war in Europe� This was an overestimate; more likely, six hundred thousand 
tons would have done the trick� The latter figure constitutes the Admiralty’s 
calculation of the minimum that had to be sustained if the Allied cause were to 
continue�40
In addition to the inadequacy of asdic and the loss of southern Irish naval 
bases, there were some additional institutional impediments� One of the most 
debilitating was the persistence, and indeed the resilience, of an inappropriate 
command philosophy, as described by Captain Donald Macintyre, RN� “The 
first few months were disappointing� Contact with the enemy was rare, mainly 
because of mistaken tactics employed by our command ashore� We were sent on 
one wild goose-chase after another to the positions of the latest sinkings, only 
to find—as expected—that the guilty U-boat had fled the scene and was hidden 
in the deepfield�”41 Pitted against them was a U-boat service whose ability to in-
novate was impressive� “Innovative tactics from August 1940 onward produced 
impressive results� Attacking on the surface and at night and in packs struck 
terror into the hearts of mariners and sank shipping as fast as the torpedo tubes 
could be reloaded�”42 The ability of the U-boats to apply this new doctrine and 
the Admiralty’s unwillingness to allow the on-scene RN commander to use his 
judgment produced a real handicap, as this excess of control was contrary to 
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a devolved command philosophy that went back to the Elizabethan navy� The 
development of shore-to-ship wireless communication at the beginning of the 
twentieth century eroded this command philosophy, and the reluctance of com-
mands ashore to devolve responsibility to commanders at sea persisted into 1941� 
Macintyre referred to a trip in February of that year: “Throughout the trip the 
escorts were subjected to all those interferences by the staff ashore about which 
we sea-captains had for so long felt bitter� The senior officer was unable to use 
his own judgement; the ships under his command were sent off on vain chases 
by orders from ashore�”43
CHALLENGING ASSUMPTIONS  
AND NEW ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING
The fall of France and the heavy losses off the northwest coast of Ireland prompt-
ed some institutional changes in the Royal Navy� In February 1941, Western Ap-
proaches Command was moved from Plymouth to Liverpool, where a combined 
area headquarters was set up� It was to remain there for the rest of the war�
The change of location did not resolve the problems the Royal Navy faced with 
respect to ASW� This was reflected in Admiralty personnel appointments� The 
biographer of Captain Frederick Walker, RN, provides insight into this:
It seemed that by design or accident all the misfits of the navy had congregated at 
Liverpool� Among his brother officers were many of his own kind—“passed overs”—
who at some stage or other had become red-tape rebels� But the vast majority were 
officers of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, week-end sailors churned out by the 
recruiting machine often with inadequate training� The Royal Naval Reserve, those 
independent merchant men who would become sore boils in big ship wardrooms, 
somehow fitted in here by providing their expert seamanship to balance the igno-
rance of the willing, but the lamentably “green,” RNVR�44
Given these disparate levels of experience, the need to disseminate and apply 
tactical doctrine consistently was vital� On the plus side, Western Approaches 
Command made a decision to form escort groups in February 1941, which would 
“work-up and train together and remain as self contained groups� The object was 
to protect convoys with efficient teams rather than with groups thrown haphaz-
ardly together�”45
The irony was that when the war started the Royal Navy had in place an autho-
rized doctrine for convoying�46 However, the doctrine assumed the main threat 
would come from German surface ships, and the use of the disruptive U-boat 
technology threw the Admiralty off balance�
[S]ixty-one percent of the ships sunk in convoy were the victims of night U-boat 
attack which came as a complete surprise to the British� But had the lessons of 
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World War One been studied, when the Germans had employed the same tactics, 
and indeed, had we read a book Donitz himself wrote between the wars in which he 
recounted his experiences of night attack on Allied convoys and advocated the use 
of these tactics in any future conflict, we might have been better prepared� He also 
publicly advocated the operation of U-Boats in wolf-packs and for which we were 
also unprepared�47
It also has been argued that Wilhelm Marschall pioneered this tactic and the Ger-
man navy developed it using torpedo boats during the 1920s, when the service 
was forbidden to have submarines under the Versailles settlement�48
These challenges were compounded by the fact that the Royal Navy had yet to 
address successfully the premier Clausewitzian question� What kind of conflict, 
at a tactical level, did it face in the Atlantic? “Professor Patrick Blackett, Direc-
tor of Naval Operational Research, highlighted the problem when he calculated 
some 60 percent of shipping losses could have been avoided, at least in part, if the 
less efficient groups had been raised to the standard of the more effective ones�”49
The creation of WATU in January 1942 meant that there now existed an in-
stitution that could collect, transfer, and integrate knowledge that would lead to 
three things: challenging existing norms, objectives, and policies that pertained 
to trade defense; facilitating adaptation and countering the tactics German U-
boats used to attack convoys; and teaching doctrine efficiently and disseminating 
it� The unit, which represented the Admiralty’s response to the shortcomings of 
trade defense in the North Atlantic, was located on the top floor of Derby House 
in Liverpool� It was set up in response to one of the recommendations of the 
Battle of the Atlantic Committee that Winston Churchill (British prime minister 
since May 1940) had set up to coordinate issues and address the problems that 
convoys and naval escorts faced� The officer appointed to command this new 
unit was Captain Gilbert Roberts, RN; the commander in chief of Western Ap-
proaches Command at this time was Admiral Sir Percy Noble� WATU’s initial 
aims were twofold: first, to end the incoherent tactics that had permeated trade 
defense since the start of the war; and second, to enable improvements in organi-
zational practices and norms to be devised and disseminated�
The importance of a systematic approach was articulated in 1915 by one of 
the most original thinkers in the U�S� Navy, Captain Dudley Knox� “The big 
questions of policy should first be settled as well as those of command, strategy, 
tactics, logistics, and matériel� Then from such basic decisions minor doctrines 
may be reasoned to flow logically and consistently�”50 WATU was pivotal to the 
learning process that would take place� It also attracted curiosity at the highest 
level: “Churchill was extremely anxious about the Atlantic situation� Many ques-
tions worried him: ‘Was the Asdic any good? Is the depth charge inefficient? 
What do the escorts do when their convoy is attacked?’”51
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Signals intelligence—or the lack of it—had an important impact on merchant 
shipping losses� “February 1942 saw a new variation of the Enigma system initi-
ated by the German navy for its U-boats that Bletchley Park was unable to deci-
pher for nearly eighteen months�52 The Allies were suddenly blinded to U-boat 
movements at the worst possible time� With the United States in the war, there 
were fresh targets for greatly reinforced U-boat wolf packs in the North Atlantic 
and off the coasts of South America and Africa� British and Allied losses in 1942 
were 56 percent higher than in 1941�”53 It is important to remember that U-boat 
control also was reading Allied signal traffic�
CHALLENGING NORMS, OBJECTIVES, AND POLICIES
The initial operational question that WATU addressed was as follows: How did 
the German U-boats operate tactically when attacking the convoys? The chal-
lenge for the British was to formulate, disseminate, and apply a tactical doctrine 
with an appropriate command philosophy that would lessen the losses of mer-
chant shipping and enable the defenders to destroy more U-boats�
Roberts’s First Attempt
Captain Roberts initially focused on collecting an experiential source of knowl-
edge� He made it his practice to talk to escort commanders as they came into 
Liverpool, Greenock, and Londonderry� There was one pivotal question: “When 
you are with a convoy at night and a ship is torpedoed, what do you do? They all 
talked about ‘going to action stations,’ ‘increasing speed,’ and so on but really the 
answer was nothing�”54
In addressing this problem, Roberts was aided by an important precedent 
that already existed within the Royal Navy: the prerogative of naval officers, 
from the rank of captain upward, to formulate and disseminate their own tacti-
cal doctrine—a practice Nelson had used successfully when preparing for the 
Battle of Trafalgar� Naval historians refer to his tactical doctrine as the Trafalgar 
Memorandum� Its historical antecedents go back to the seventeenth century� “In 
the Royal Navy, the existence of a formal doctrine can be traced back to the origi-
nal Fighting Instructions, first issued to the fleet over three hundred years ago in 
1672, and to a Code of Tactical Signals promulgated during the Commonwealth 
in 1653� Admirals Howe, Kempenfelt, and Popham subsequently improved tac-
tical doctrine with the issue of the Signal Book in 1799 and Popham’s Marine 
Vocabulary in 1800�”55
In the early years of the Battle of the Atlantic, escort group commanders put 
this tactical doctrine into practice� However, the quality of the doctrines and the 
extent of their dissemination were not consistent; there was a spectrum from the 
incomprehensible to the innovative�56 One of the best examples of the latter, prior 
to the inception of WATU, was that of Captain Frederick Walker, RN� While in 
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command of the 36th Escort Group beginning in October 1941, he disseminated 
the 36th Escort Group Operational Instructions to a total of nine ships in his 
group� These instructions demonstrated fluency among the operational objec-
tives, a tactical antisubmarine doctrine, and a command philosophy of devolved 
control� 
 1� The object of the Group while on escort duty is to ensure the safe and timely 
arrival of the convoy concerned� It is not possible, with the ships available, to dis-
pose of the Group in such a way as to protect the convoy completely from enemy 
attacks—these must be accepted and doubtless some losses� The only practicable 
course of action is to ensure that any enemy craft, either surface or air, which at-
tack are destroyed�
 2� The particular aim of the Group therefore is to be taken as the destruction of any 
enemy which attacks the convoy� U-boats are the chief menace to our convoys� I 
cannot emphasise too strongly that a U-boat sighted or otherwise detected is imme-
diately to be attacked continuously without further orders, with guns, depth charges, 
and/or ram until she has been destroyed or until further orders are received�
 3� I wish to impress on all officers that although I shall naturally take charge of 
the majority of operations, I consider it essential for themselves to act instantly 
without waiting for orders in situations of which I may be unaware or imperfectly 
informed�
 4� It should seldom, if ever, be necessary to conclude a signalled report with the 
words: “Request instructions�” Action should be “proposed” or “intended” by the 
men on the spot—and the senior officer can always say if he doesn’t like it�
 5� No officer will ever be blamed by me for getting on with the job in hand�57
Walker’s rendition of mission command orders and a statement of the com-
mander’s intent, while a classic, was not enough on its own to solve the problem 
of countering the tactical doctrine the U-boats were applying, in particular their 
proclivity to attack at night and on the surface� However, the process of insti-
tutional learning was helped by the willingness of escort group commanders, 
such as Walker, to share operational experience with Roberts’s new organization� 
In addition Walker devised a tactical response that coordinated the reaction of 
escorts to a U-boat contact: “On the order ‘Buttercup’ by radio, all escorts would 
turn outward, increase to full speed, fire star shell for twenty minutes, and then 
return to station� Walker had in fact sunk two U-Boats by this tactic whilst escort-
ing convoy HG 76 [home from Gibraltar]�”58
Changing Course
These contributions, while valuable, were still insufficient� The initial problem 
of the U-boats’ tactical operation was broken into two subquestions: From what 
range did the U-boats fire their torpedoes, and how did they approach a convoy? 
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Roberts challenged a key assumption escort commanders had been making: that 
the U-boats fired their torpedoes from outside the ring of naval escorts� In mak-
ing this challenge, he relied on two pieces of empirical data� First, the range of a 
German torpedo was 5,400 yards (3�6 miles)� Second, naval escorts operated up 
to five thousand yards (3�3 miles) out from a convoy�
Roberts made a new assumption that, to ensure a successful hit, the firing 
distance would be half the maximum range� This led to the second subquestion: 
If U-boats were attacking targets from within the convoy columns, how did they 
approach the convoy? There were four possibilities� (1) The U-boat dropped in 
from ahead on the surface, (2) it dived and surfaced in the middle of the convoy, 
(3) it pushed in from the convoy’s flanks, (4) it infiltrated a convoy from astern�
The last option was, as far as U-boat commanders were concerned, the safest 
approach, and Roberts concluded that it was the most likely� Submerged, a U-
boat could attain a speed of twelve knots, compared with a convoy speed of seven 
knots; thus the speed of infiltration from astern was five knots� Having success-
fully infiltrated from astern, the U-boat could fire its torpedoes on the surface 
from inside the convoy� This dovetailed with the operational experience of com-
manders such as Captain Walker� “The U-Boat was astern of the convoy, steer-
ing the same course, and the time was after midnight� Walker’s ‘stock’ turning 
outward after a torpedoing and firing star shell out had caught and killed another 
U-Boat, not the culprit of the attack but an infiltrator coming to join the fray�”59 
Walker’s “‘turn out’ doctrine” provided the departure point for new assumptions 
on the basis of which tactical doctrine would be constructed�
The process that yielded the correct answer to the question of the position 
from which the U-boats attacked represented a critical questioning of established 
norms; WATU had identified the fallacious nature of the existing assumptions� 
This demonstrated a willingness to question the beliefs of even experienced 
escort commanders such as Walker� “This [was] against all our ideas[;] Walker’s 
escorts imagined that the U-boat must be a mile or so outside the perimeter of 
the convoy ships�”60
Roberts’s staff consisted mostly of WRNS officers and ratings, who demon-
strated these new ideas on the recently constructed tactical floor to Admiral 
Noble�61 To his credit, Noble did not hesitate in communicating to the prime 
minister when doctrinal errors had been identified� “When Admiral Sir Percy 
Noble was briefed by Roberts on his analysis he frankly admitted the error of 
the existing anti-U-boat doctrine� He had a message sent to Churchill saying, 
‘the first investigations showed a cardinal error in anti-U-boat tactics, and that a 
new, immediate and corrected counter-attack would be signalled to the Fleet in 
24 hours�’”62
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WATU: Putting Doctrine into Practice
The next challenge was to facilitate adoption of the doctrine and counter the tac-
tics German U-boats used to attack convoys—infiltrating convoys from astern� 
The new knowledge was integrated into a doctrinal solution� “On a torpedoing 
within the convoy, on one word of command, the escorts, all except the one lead-
ing the convoy, would turn at full speed and line up abreast at the rear of the con-
voy, a couple of miles astern, and begin an Asdic sweep� The escorts’ speed would 
be reduced to that of the convoy and, like a giant ‘trawl’ behind a fishing vessel, 
‘sweep’ everything in front into the ‘trawl’ and they would have the U-boat�”63 
This tactical doctrine was called a “raspberry” and was the first of multiple “fruit” 
doctrines that WATU eventually formulated and disseminated�64
The new doctrine can be understood best through the prism of double-loop 
learning because it led to questioning the Royal Navy’s assumptions about how 
best to protect convoys from the disruptive technology of German submarines� 
Another way to understand the new doctrine is to see it as a manifestation of the 
quadrants of fighting power (new assumptions about tactics, changes in weapons 
technology and applications, developments in doctrine, and new command phi-
losophy), which were being integrated owing to WATU’s actions�
The Admiralty—a hierarchical and centrally controlled bureaucratic 
organization—now had, in WATU, an institution that could start to resolve the 
learning paradox and collect and integrate knowledge from diverse sources to 
formulate and disseminate a tactical doctrine that would be operationally ef-
fective� “The doctrine in the ‘Atlantic Convoy Instructions’ was synthesized by 
Roberts from reports of proceedings, direct feedback from escort group com-
manders, tactical games at WATU, and investigations by unit staff� The advantage 
over the ad hoc individualistic training provided by some group commanders 
was that WATU could both analyse and fuse the experiences and lessons of many 
convoy operations�”65
Atlantic Convoy Instructions, issued under the authority of the Admiralty, 
had two variants: North and South Atlantic� The resultant instructions formed 
the doctrinal riposte to the U-boat threat, and they brought operational direc-
tion together with tactical instruction� They began with general reminders� “The 
safe and timely arrival of the convoy at its destination is the primary object of the 
escort� Evasion attains the primary object and should therefore be the first course 
of action considered� At the same time, it must be borne in mind that if enemy 
forces are reported or encountered, the escort shares with all other fighting units 
the duty of destroying enemy ships�”66
This was fused with a devolved command philosophy� “The senior officer of 
the escort group is in the best position to judge the most suitable disposition 
for the escorts and the correct action to take in various circumstances�”67 The 
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application of the new doctrine was left to the discretion of senior commanders 
at sea� “Senior Officers of Escort Groups have complete freedom to exercise their 
initiative under all circumstances, and it is not desired that they should be rigidly 
bound to comply with any of the diagrams of operations orders laid down in ACIs 
[Atlantic Convoy Instructions]�”68
The doctrines that WATU formulated and disseminated were first applied in 
engagements against U-boats in 1942� Convoy SC104 provides a good illustration 
of the doctrines’ tactical impact� It sailed from New York on October 3, 1942, and 
was under attack from October 11 onward� Between 10:15 PM on October 13 and 
2:30 AM on October 14, six ships in this convoy were torpedoed� The response 
was in keeping with the tactical doctrine WATU had disseminated and was 
guided by the new, correct understanding of the direction of U-boat attack: “As 
all the escorts had now returned, operation ‘Raspberry’ was carried out, and at 
0318 HMS Fame obtained an asdic contact four miles astern of the Convoy� After 
an attack with a five charge pattern the U-boat surfaced and escaped downwind; 
Fame was unable to catch up due to the rough weather�”69
The naval escorts of SC104 continued to be successful in applying this tactical 
doctrine in subsequent attacks� “At 1407/16 Fame, about two miles ahead of the 
fourth column, scored a notable asdic success, her first pattern, fired on a con-
tact obtained at 2,000 yds, brought the U-Boat to the surface� Fame opened fire 
and went into ram� U353 was struck a glancing blow and a further pattern was 
dropped when it was abreast the stern� The crew hastily abandoned ship and the 
U-Boat then sank�”70 This report needs to be seen in the context of 120 merchant 
ship sinkings during that month, and a total of 1,322 for the year� However, this 
month saw the beginning of a downward trend: by December, losses had fallen 
to seventy-six; by October 1943, thirty-one�71
WATU also disseminated a tactical doctrine detailing how a naval escort 
should respond on sighting a torpedo track�
 1� RUN UP TRACK, sweeping by ASDIC�
 2� Hoist warning signal� At night if “Snowflake” illumination by the convoy will assist 
the sighting ship to locate the U-Boat without endangering the convoy, fire two 
white rockets�
 3� REPORT BY R/T [radio transmitter] to escorts and aircraft�
 4� Allow adjacent ships to catch up so as to increase the efficiency of the asdic sweep�72
These doctrines constituted part of what was referred to as Western Ap-
proaches Tactical Policy� They encapsulated correct assumptions about U-boat 
tactics, the application of weapons technology, new doctrines, and the adoption 
of an appropriate command philosophy—the four quadrants of fighting power� It 
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had taken the Admiralty two years and four months since the start of the war to 
establish WATU, but now the unit was an integral part of the command structure, 
and yet was showing itself to be decentralized enough to respond quickly to the 
changing characteristics of the campaign in the North Atlantic�
The Instructions provided a common doctrine, so that escorts could be told what to 
do in a given situation quickly and concisely� Roberts did not try to impose a doctri-
naire approach on tactics� On the contrary, captains and escort group commanders 
were encouraged to experiment with their own tactical schemes� Hence while there 
were standard instructions, their application remained elastic� Roberts insisted that 
group commanders show initiative and, at all times, display tactical aggression�73
WATU endeavored to ensure that the Atlantic Convoy Instructions never 
became a rigid template applied irrespective of changes in the character of the 
campaign� The instructions were improved and updated continually� There also 
was a recognition that maintaining operational tempo meant managing informa-
tion efficiently, including disseminating new tactics quickly� As a practical matter, 
in a predigital age, this meant that “Howard-Johnston [ASW staff officer in Derby 
House] was dispatched to the printers so that there would be no delay in applying 
the new tactics to the Western Approaches Convoy Instructions!”74
Teaching the Doctrine
As seen through the prism of double-loop learning, one of the most important 
functions WATU performed was applying its decentralized structure to the 
teaching of these new norms, policies, and objectives, once Roberts’s staff had 
developed them� Systematic dissemination of doctrine was best ensured by teach-
ing it� Between 1942 and 1945, WATU took doctrine back to its etymological 
roots�75 The course was not intended to ensure that a number of tasks could be 
performed on a repetitive basis; instead, the teaching was nuanced, and doctrine 
was interpreted as being authoritative but requiring judgment in its application� 
The integrated knowledge that WATU had accumulated enhanced operational 
effectiveness� The instruction also was interservice, in terms of its cohort: per-
sonnel from not only the Royal Navy but the Coastal Command of the Royal Air 
Force attended courses run at WATU�76 The aim was to ensure that this tactical 
doctrine facilitated application of one of the most important principles of war: 
unity of effort�
This raises three questions that need to be addressed to understand and ap-
preciate the effectiveness of this institutional learning: What was the content of 
these courses? How were they managed? And who attended them? The content 
of the courses consisted of four distinct modules�77 Its four modules covered a 
diverse set of topics in a short period, while ensuring that a singular objective 
was met and each course lasted one week� Roberts’s annual report of December 
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1944 provides an insight to the number of courses that had been conducted up 
to that date and how his staff managed the teaching challenge at WATU� “A total 
of 132 courses have passed through W�A�T�U� in line ahead at one day interval 
between each� If, during three years work, standard game and lecture routine 
had been adopted, the Staff would long ago have become tired and stale� � � � 
[I]t is of paramount importance to show the course officers that the Staff is always 
enthusiastic, in order to transmit enthusiasm and zest�”78
The numbers and ranks of the officers who attended the course reflected both 
hierarchical structure and operational need� RN attendees’ ranks ranged from 
admiral (one student) to warrant officer (six students); the most numerous rank 
was lieutenant (479 students)� Roberts ensured that WATU’s ASW tactical doc-
trine was disseminated widely throughout the officer corps of the Royal Navy, 
writ large� “No Admiralty appointment has ever been denied to even an R�N�V�R� 
Sub-Lieutenant from doing the full U-boat course�”79 Apart from officers from 
the naval reserves and Commonwealth navies, there also were officers from six 
foreign navies�80 As noted, WATU was part of a joint command, and 118 RAF 
personnel attended the one-week course� These attendees’ ranks ranged from air 
commodore (two students) to flight sergeant (five students)� Four civilian profes-
sors also attended�81 In all, between early 1942 and late 1944, 3,585 officers at-
tended courses run by WATU� “The peak of this period was reached in early 1944 
when each weekly course contained an average of 40 officers� The average at the 
end of 1944 had dropped to just 30, which average is maintained by requirements, 
space, and staff available� This averages 1,500 officers per annum�”82
Doctrinal Integration
By early 1943, WATU again had proved responsive and adaptive by integrating 
the new technology of the escort carrier into ASW doctrine� Although each carri-
er could operate only six or seven aircraft, it could maintain a continuous combat 
air patrol over a convoy and directly addressed what had become known as the 
“air gap�” This was an area in the middle of the Atlantic that could not be covered 
by shore-based Allied patrol aircraft� The escort carrier did much to comple-
ment the very-long-range B-24 Liberators based in Northern Ireland, Iceland, 
and Halifax� On February 11, 1943, Commander in Chief, Western Approaches 
sent a memorandum classified “Most Secret” to the secretary of the Admiralty� It 
confirmed that the process of integration had been completed successfully� “After 
experience had been gained in the operation of Escort Carriers, a new Article 
145 will be incorporated in A�C�I�s�”83 The new Instructions for the Operation of 
Escort Carriers, issued on February 7, 1943, took care to settle the issue of com-
mand within the existing command philosophy framework� “Command at sea is 
to be exercised in accordance with A�C�I� Article 16� With reference to paragraph 
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3 of Article 16, an Escort Carrier is NOT to be considered as forming part of the 
A/S Escort�”84 Thus, a new weapon was integrated doctrinally without compro-
mising the existing command arrangements, as the commanding officer of an 
escort carrier could not command other escort ships�
WATU replicated its activities within the North Atlantic theater and beyond it� 
By the end of 1942, a second tactical unit was operating in Londonderry� When 
Roberts submitted his annual report for the end of 1944, three more tactical units 
had been established in Belfast, Northern Ireland, and in Irwell and Osprey in 
Scotland� Tactical units also had been established in Bombay, Sierra Leone, and 
Halifax� Roberts summed up the relationship between WATU and these outsta-
tions as follows: “Tactical Units have been installed in the Empire which are not 
under my charge, but are ‘in touch�’”85 This further illustrates that WATU enabled 
the Royal Navy to replicate a learning organization that successfully could chal-
lenge existing norms, objectives, and policies pertaining to trade defense even 
when applied to geographically diverse theaters of operation�
The preparation for the D-day landings in Normandy provides another 
good example of WATU undertaking new doctrinal tasks� From mid-March 
to mid-May 1944, a number of special courses were held concurrently with the 
existing courses; the Admiralty appointed extra staff members to cope with the 
situation� “These special courses were in anti-E-boat (and anti-W-boat) warfare, 
and a total of 372 officers took part in the preparations for OVERLORD� During 
this period there was close liaison between W�A�T�U� and the port operational 
authorities concerned�”86 The value of this adaptive flexibility was recognized in 
a memo from the Commander in Chief, Western Approaches to the secretary of 
the Admiralty dated December 20, 1944� “The special tactical training given for 
Operation OVERLORD is deserving of the highest praise�”87
As emphasized previously, the operational objective of the naval escorts was 
to ensure the safe and timely arrival of the convoys� Tactically, the most effective 
way to achieve this was to avoid the U-boat wolf packs completely� This could 
be achieved by rerouting convoys past the enemy’s patrol lines� By August 1942, 
WATU had formulated and disseminated an additional tactical doctrine� This 
underlines the point that enemy practice often leads to the formulation of new 
doctrine� In this case, the objective was to enable naval escorts to react effectively 
to a shadowing U-boat, yet still enable a convoy to execute an alteration of course 
and thereby avoid an attack�
U-boats will sometimes remain shadowing for several days[,] reporting from time to 
time on H/F� If other U-boats are ordered to close the convoy to make a “Pack” attack 
the shadowing U-boat will, in the later stages, before attack, make signals on M/F� On 
receipt of a bearing of an M/F homing signal it should always be assumed that the 
convoy is concerned and an immediate search should be along the bearing obtained� 
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Should a U-boat be sighted, an escort should be left in the area to keep it down until 
dark, even if asdic contact is not gained, so as to cover a large alteration of course by 
the convoy�88
By early 1943, rerouting tactics had reached their limits� “Dönitz’s strategy, 
driven by the amount of tonnage sunk per U-boat day at sea, had forced him to 
concentrate his effort in the mid-ocean air gap so that by early 1943 it was literally 
filling up with submarines�”89 This area presented the increasingly large and nu-
merous wolf packs with many opportunities� Again, such a change on the enemy’s 
part required that the defenders adjust; in this case, they needed to engage and 
sink U-boats in and around the convoy, as stated in the ACIs: “[T]he close escort 
of a convoy was the last line of defence, and it fought if all else failed�”90
Yet by May 1943, Germany’s wolf-pack doctrine was facing severe challenge� 
During this month there were a series of battles around convoys� Naval escorts 
inflicted losses that were not sustainable� By late 1943, German staff records 
reveal the multifaceted challenges that new weapons technology and doctrine 
were presenting� “The U-boats had been seriously impeded by air and sea escorts 
of unprecedented strength and, in the nocturnal melee, had failed to gain bear-
ing through having to take avoiding action against air and surface radar, diving 
because of the approach of aircraft or destroyers, fighting off aircraft�”91 The 
teaching at WATU had enabled the dissemination and application of an effective 
ASW tactical doctrine that included the use of weapons technology that forced a 
suboptimal German response�
WATU had no equal in the German navy� After the German surrender in May 
1945, Captain Roberts had the opportunity to interrogate Rear Admiral Godt, 
operational commander of the U-boat arm� Roberts recounted,
I could not resist asking Godt if there was any form of Tactical Table [the exercise 
floor at Western Approaches Command, located in Derby House, Liverpool], similar 
to W�A�T�U� in his service� He replied that there was not, but in 1944 he had seen 
the “Illustrated” and had caused the article and the photographs of W�A�T�U� to be 
commented upon by his Staff� He admitted the value of such an Establishment, but 
he did not consider adapting it to his needs as it was firstly “too late in the war” and 
secondly he relied more on the sea training with the Tactical Flotilla�92
The article set out to discover the impact of organizational learning and the entity 
that implemented it during World War II� First, can a theory of organizational 
learning explain the improved effectiveness of one tactical organization during 
the Second World War—specifically, the development of antisubmarine tactical 
doctrine between 1942 and 1945—and illustrate the importance of acquiring new 
knowledge in an operational context like the Battle of the Atlantic? Second, to 
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what extent was WATU the product of a bureaucratic, centrally controlled, hier-
archical Admiralty and how was it able to collect, transfer, and integrate knowl-
edge to achieve three things: first, challenge existing norms, objectives, and poli-
cies that pertained to trade defense; second, facilitate adaptation of tactics and 
counter the tactics German U-boats used to attack convoys; and third, teach and 
disseminate doctrine to naval officers appointed to escorts in the North Atlantic 
and officers from the RAF’s Coastal Command? Finally, was the learning para-
dox—the ability to imbue a naval hierarchy with adaptability and flexibility—re-
solved, and does WATU represent only a concrete, historically specific case, or 
are there lessons worth learning for other navies in the twenty-first century?
Double-loop learning provides a framework to understand how WATU cre-
ated a learning climate that successfully challenged the assumptions about how 
naval escorts should react when a convoy was attacked� New norms, objectives, 
and policies were developed� Most importantly, it spurred pursuit of an answer to 
the critical tactical problem: How and from what range did the U-boats attack a 
convoy? Learning the correct answer to this problem brought about a complete re-
writing of the Royal Navy’s ASW tactical doctrine—in particular, what the escorts 
should do when a U-boat attack began� By late 1942 and early 1943, new weapons 
systems embedded in a tactical doctrine framework meant that the Admiralty 
could both protect convoys from U-boat attacks and at the same time turn the 
area around the convoys into a killing ground� The learning paradox was resolved�
In this process, the four quadrants of fighting power can be discerned: the 
correction of assumptions about how the conflict was being fought, changes 
in weapons technology, development of new doctrine, and adoption of an ap-
propriate command philosophy� All four helped WATU to enhance its tactical 
and operational effectiveness� The Royal Navy, thanks in part to the inception 
of WATU, overcame one of the most important challenges that any organization 
faces in a crisis: the proclivity to produce a dysfunctional response to sustained 
threats and problems� “Individuals and organizations tend to deal with threat in 
ways that will increase defensiveness and reduce the probability of learning to 
learn�”93 The German report previously cited reveals the Royal Navy’s initial ap-
proach to the ASW challenge near the North Channel in late 1940 to have been 
just such a dysfunctional response�
Pivotal to the Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was the neutraliza-
tion of the disruptive U-boat technology� This was achieved in part through the 
embedding of new and improved weapons systems, ranging from 10 cm radar 
to escort carriers, into a doctrinal framework� The effectiveness of these new 
“hard” weapons technologies was enhanced by a synthesis of the “soft” weapons 
of signals intelligence and doctrine� The integration of these diverse elements 
produced a force-multiplier effect that from late 1942 increased the tempo and 
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effectiveness of ASW tactical operations and enabled defeat of the U-boats at the 
operational level in the North Atlantic theater�
Finally, what lessons can twenty-first-century navies learn from the case study 
presented here? First, this historically specific case shows that a well-formulated, 
disseminated, and consistently applied doctrine can be a force multiplier�
Second, the strategic importance of certain geographical locations are not 
permanently discounted by changes in transport or weapons technology� Fur-
thermore, human agency has its limitations� The disruptive technology of the 
submarine meant that the Irish naval bases that covered the Western Approaches 
were just as important for the formation and routing of convoys in the Second 
World War as they had been in the First World War—the caveat being that in the 
former war the Royal Navy did not have access to them because of the geostrate-
gic blindness of British policy makers in the late 1930s�
Finally, poor geostrategic decision-making can be redeemed by alternative 
choices that offset the loss of operational efficiency and effect� In March 1941, 
although their country was still technically neutral and referring to itself as an 
associated power, U�S� military planners with presidential endorsement made 
the decision, in secret, to begin the construction of two naval bases in Northern 
Ireland� This was done on the basis of the recognition that the threat to sea com-
munications of the United Kingdom was a key risk that had to be addressed by the 
United States and the geostrategic center of gravity was the northwest approaches�
Navies of the twenty-first century can take away a number of other pertinent 
lessons� For a navy to learn there has to be an institutional appreciation that a 
discrepancy exists between an action taken and the result—in short, there are 
often unexpected consequences� Inquiry and reflection should result in correc-
tive action, which then should become “embedded in organizational memory 
� � � and in organizational routines and procedures�”94 A doctrine that simply 
encapsulates required routines and procedures is not enough; the command 
philosophy has to meet the circumstances as well� General Sir Rupert Smith has 
identified the dynamic relationship between doctrine and command philosophy� 
“If doctrine is the epoxy the commander’s way of command in the circumstances 
is the hardener�”95 The success of this combination will depend on a receptive 
attitude within an officer corps and how such receptiveness can be engendered� 
Furthermore, there is still a need for navies to teach doctrine� The learning out-
come can be a force multiplier that can give a competitive edge when forces are 
evenly matched or outnumbered�
This learning outcome is illustrated by one of the critical stages of the Battle of 
the Atlantic: “Through January and February [1943] Ultra provided the informa-
tion, but the Germans were reading the Allies’ daily estimates of U-boat positions 
and anticipated their movements� The battle for ONS 166 in late February, in 
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which 14 ships were lost in a six-day battle with 18 U-boats, was fought with both 
shore staffs reading the other side’s signal traffic�”96 A theory of organizational 
learning helps to explain how the Royal Navy, through the teaching of doctrine, 
improved tactical effectiveness of its naval escorts� The institution created to 
formulate and disseminate doctrine, WATU, proved adept at challenging existing 
norms, objectives, and policies� This example underscores the claim made about 
doctrine by Julian Corbett; it is “the soul of warfare�”97
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RESEARCH & DEBATE
THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE WEAVING WARGAMING MORE TIGHTLY 
INTO THE FABRIC OF THE NAVY
Robert C. Rubel
By now, the challenge and threat of a rising and contentious China and an in-
creasingly hostile Russia have penetrated the Navy’s corporate consciousness, 
and current leaders are taking steps to shift the service from a purely power- 
projection posture to one that focuses again on defending American command 
of the sea. The Navy is initiating adjustments to fleet design and architecture as 
well as a rebirth of fleet experimentation. While perhaps late in coming, these 
responses to the emergent challenges of our time are encouraging.
However, more is needed. In the years since the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
professional culture of the Navy has migrated from one that was founded on the 
dynamics of war at sea to one shaped by global policing and constrained budgets. 
The service is tasked heavily with presence duties, including support for conflicts 
ashore, and increasingly is constrained by having fewer ships and personnel. In 
light of this, the Navy has focused on efficiency and execution while creating a 
culture whose character is in stark contrast to the 
one that emerged in the years between 1890 and 
the start of World War II.1 That earlier culture 
has been characterized as a learning culture, one 
that prepared the service for successfully fighting 
against the Imperial Japanese Navy and overcom-
ing the threat of German U-boats.2 Perhaps the 
most difficult task Navy leadership will face in 
the coming years is shifting the current culture to 
one that shares certain key characteristics with the 
culture that produced the officers and sailors who 
Robert C. Rubel is a retired Navy captain and pro-
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on active duty in the Navy as a light attack / strike 
fighter aviator. At the Naval War College he served in 
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RESEARCH & DEBATE
THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE WEAVING WARGAMING MORE TIGHTLY 
INTO THE FABRIC OF THE NAVY
Robert C. Rubel
led the Navy to victory in World War II� There will be many elements involved in 
that effort, including major adjustments to personnel policies, training schedules, 
and education requirements� Wargaming will be one powerful instrument for 
transforming the Navy’s culture� It was so from 1887 to 1942, and can be again� 
But to achieve the necessary power and influence for wargaming, the Navy’s ap-
proach to it must change; the practice must be woven more tightly into the fabric 
of the Navy’s professional culture�
To many, the idea that the Navy would need to improve its wargaming posture 
might seem strange, if not downright ludicrous� After all, the Navy’s reputation 
for wargaming is almost legendary, and the history of wargaming at the Naval 
War College is a key element of one of the standard written works on wargaming� 
The author of that work contends that “the Naval War College, of all U�S� profes-
sional gaming organizations, has most consistently and successfully espoused the 
use of wargaming as both an educational and analytical tool�”3
Indeed, the Navy has used, and still does use, wargaming, at times very ef-
fectively� However, wargaming’s relationship to the fabric of professional devel-
opment and culture has changed over the years, a consequence of the changes 
in the Navy’s culture brought about by the factors previously mentioned� In the 
earlier era, wargames fused education and research, and Naval War College stu-
dents used them as a central component of the curriculum� In contrast, during 
the post–World War II era, gaming for research gradually became divorced from 
gaming for education� A research and analysis department was established at the 
College in 1951, concurrently with the introduction of a new advanced course 
on strategy� The department was designed to support other academic areas by 
developing tools for more-effective solutions to operational problems and con-
ducting specific research projects�4 Wargaming, always an important part of the 
teaching curriculum, became a tool for illustrating and synthesizing concepts 
taught in seminar, a policy Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner reinforced when he 
assumed the presidency of the College in 1972�5 Turner established an advanced 
research department to support a few students who wished to conduct more-
specific research and to support outside scholars�6 This later became the Center 
for Advanced Research and, in 1981, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies�
The separation of game-based research from education at the College, except 
for a few, specially selected students, had important Navy-wide consequences 
over time� In the first four decades of the twentieth century, Naval War College 
games were “sandboxes” in which students could try things out in an environ-
ment of “psychological safety” and new ideas could be advanced and differences 
of opinion could be aired without fear of embarrassment or punishment�7 Ideas 
emanating from the games found their way into fleet experimentation, either by 
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direct translation or through the actions of emergent leaders who were educated 
via the games�8
Once gaming for education became focused on skill building and research 
gaming became the province of specialized faculty and outside agencies, the 
sandbox nature of student gaming disappeared� This both reflected and facili-
tated the shift in the locus of innovation from a professional consortium con-
sisting of the Naval War College, the General Board of the Navy, and the fleet, 
to the laboratories� Innovation became almost entirely technological and the 
province of technical specialists� In this environment, the authoritative voice 
behind fleet design and fleet architecture was computer-based analysis to jus-
tify budgets, rather than informed experimentation� The result has been that 
in the ends-ways-means syllogism of strategy, ways have become divorced— 
institutionally—from means� In a permissive geopolitical environment, this 
disconnect did not have grave consequences; in today’s world of emerging naval 
threat, it could prove disastrous� In the late 1930s, Congress authorized the con-
struction of a fleet, the design of which was derived from lessons learned through 
wargaming and fleet experimentation� Soon, the nature of the threats from China 
and Russia likely will spur Congress to take action, but it will do so without the 
template created by a tapestry woven from education, gaming, and fleet experi-
mentation� The fleet that emerges from this potential congressional action is at 
risk of being ill suited to the challenges it will face�
The separation of research and education in the arena of wargaming is evident 
in a 1960 manual on the subject written by Francis McHugh, an experienced 
wargamer who served at the Naval War College from the 1930s to the 1970s� He 
asserted that a game should be directed toward one of two purposes: to provide 
military commanders with decision-making experience or to provide military 
commanders with decision-making information�9 While he does go on to admit 
that the very nature of gaming includes both elements to some degree, the idea 
that a game should, for purposes of effectiveness, be oriented toward one or 
the other reflects a kind of fragmentation of gaming institutionally� McHugh’s 
breakdown of purposes reflects the content of gaming, whereas his comment on 
the fusion of education and research has to do, as he said, with the very nature of 
gaming� Distinguishing these two elements, content and nature, is key to under-
standing how wargaming can be integrated better into the professional fabric of 
the Navy and how it can contribute to a rebirth of effective innovation�
THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE
The 1960s Canadian communications guru Marshall McLuhan defined a me-
dium as an extension of some human faculty�10 So, for example, a hammer is an 
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extension of the human hand, the wheel is an extension of the human foot, and 
so on� In his view, virtually any human invention is in some way a medium� He 
went on to say—in his well-known phrase—that “the medium is the message”; 
that is, irrespective of any content the medium may carry, the medium itself has 
a profound effect on humans� His most famous research focused on mass media 
such as radio and television, but he critically analyzed a wide range of media, 
including print, photography, automobiles, telephones, and many other human 
inventions� More relevantly, art and science, including their component disci-
plines and techniques, can be considered media�
Following this logic, we can regard wargaming as a medium� But what kind 
of medium? McLuhan distinguishes between hot and cold media� A hot medium 
leaves very little to the imagination of the listener, while a cold one elicits par-
ticipation or completion by the audience� From this it is clear that wargaming is 
a cold medium, requiring participation and completion by players and others as-
sociated with it� McLuhan regards hot media as fragmenting and exclusive, while 
cold media are inclusive and promote synthesis�11 This may be fairly self-evident, 
but probing deeper into the way wargames are used by the Navy (and, to be sure, 
the other services as well) reveals that wargaming’s nominal identity as a cold 
medium is distorted by its separation into education and research types, with the 
consequence that the medium’s potential value and influence are not achieved� 
In essence, wargaming as a medium is a thinking tool, and that perspective can 
have important implications for wargaming policy� In framing the discussion we 
will distinguish, as McLuhan would do, between the content of gaming and the 
nature of the medium itself� Game content, for our purposes, includes not only 
the scenario, orders of battle, and rules but the wider process of design, execu-
tion, analysis, and reporting� The nature of the medium is thus less concrete and 
material; it consists of the idea of competition in the context of simulation and, 
perhaps more importantly, the fact that it is something people do—it is a verb as 
well as a noun�
We have asserted already that the nature of wargaming is defined by two ele-
ments, competition and simulation� However, there is another aspect of gaming’s 
inherent nature: its character as a weakly structured tool� By “weakly structured” 
we mean that because of their dependency on human decisions in the context of 
competition, games do not produce the same output from the same inputs when 
they are played repeatedly� This aspect of gaming was brought out by Dr� John T� 
Hanley Jr� in his Yale University dissertation On Wargaming. Hanley relates the 
inherent nature and structure of wargaming to the kind of indeterminacy attend-
ing a problem� Indeterminacy encompasses those things we do not know about 
either the initial state of the relevant elements of the problem or the effects of our 
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potential actions to solve it� Hanley establishes a spectrum of indeterminacy that 
contains the following categories:
• None: The elements of the problem are known and are amenable to engi-
neering solutions�
• Statistical indeterminacy: The initial state is a random variable whose statis-
tics we know and the effects of our actions on it can be determined�
• Stochastic indeterminacy: The initial state may be known, but the process 
by which it transitions to a new state via our actions is subject to statistical 
variation�
• Strategic indeterminacy: The initial state is known but there are two or more 
competing “players” whose independent choices govern the end state�
• Structural indeterminacy: There are significant elements of the problem that 
are not known, to the point that we cannot define the problem in terms of the 
other forms of indeterminacy� “This covers indeterminacy in current state, 
the kinematics of the process, the acts of nature, the available response time 
and the perceptions, beliefs and values of the decision makers�”12
Hanley describes wargaming as a weakly structured tool that is appropriate for 
application to weakly structured problems�13 To be more specific, wargames are 
inherently exploratory mechanisms that reveal rather than prove� They provide 
indications of what is possible, although they cannot be regarded as predictive� 
The primary mechanism through which wargames produce such knowledge is 
visualization in one form or another� The games allow players and observers to 
see relationships that otherwise would be difficult or impossible to discern— 
geographic, temporal, functional, political, and other types� Seeing and under-
standing these relationships prepare the mind for making decisions in a complex 
environment� Moreover, such exploration occurs in an environment of uncer-
tainty and competition, particularly in two-sided games, enhancing the mental 
benefits derived from participation� This holds true whether the purposes of the 
game are educational or research�14
This last observation leads us back to McLuhan’s argument that a medium 
has an effect on its beholder or participant, quite apart from any content the me-
dium contains� It is one thing to say that gaming prepares the mind for making 
decisions—a rather straightforward effect of practice—but there is more depth 
to the matter than that, salutary as it is� If we look back again at the period from 
the onset of gaming at the Naval War College to the outbreak of World War II, 
we see that games, regardless of their content or purpose, shaped the culture of 
the officer corps� The games did this in part by constituting a constraint—some-
thing that imposes limits in the context of a complex-adaptive system—on the 
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evolving Navy officer corps of the time� That is, as a medium, gaming offered 
an alternative to other avenues of research and education that could have been 
pursued� “Constraints are essential to complex-adaptive systems� They channel 
the behavior of individuals in the system and focus their efforts� This activity can 
often foster the development of new approaches�”15 Gaming in the curriculum 
of the Naval War College fostered and facilitated an environment of exploration 
and open-minded critique, which led to and helped ensure the success of the 
subsequent series of fleet battle experiments� The net effect, as Hone points out, 
was the evolution of the Navy from a traditional, lore-based organization to a 
modern, learning one�
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The Navy has long used wargames as useful research and educational tools, but 
current policy is formed on the basis of their content, not their nature� While 
the content of games is the bread and butter of their utility, it is their nature as a 
medium that holds the potential for transforming the nature of the Navy’s profes-
sional culture� There have been calls for strengthening gaming in the Department 
of Defense generally, but the gist of these recommendations for improvement 
focuses on content�16 How would such recommendations look if they were 
focused on gaming as a medium?
The first recommendation would target those who sponsor games� The nor-
mal process is that a high-level leader determines that a game of some sort is 
needed and requests one from a gaming organization—for instance, the Naval 
War College Wargaming Department� The wargamers work with those in the 
sponsor’s organization to determine game objectives and design—content� The 
game then is executed using players, perhaps from the sponsor’s organization or 
ones from elsewhere who have the requisite knowledge� At the end of the game it 
is common for the sponsor to show up to take part in the “hot wash,” a discussion 
and critique session that focuses on lessons learned� Sometimes the sponsor does 
not even participate in the hot wash but simply reads the game report� This con-
verts the medium of a game to the medium of a conference or simply the printed 
word—thus losing the effect of the game as a medium�
Therefore, to leverage the game as a medium, the sponsor should participate 
in it as a player, or at least an observer� Notable examples of sponsors gaining im-
portant value from direct participation in games include Admiral Scott H� Swift, 
whose experience in a series of global wargames led him to establish the Pacific 
Fleet experiment program; Vice Admiral Thomas S� Rowden, whose participa-
tion in a game focused on the littoral combat ship prompted him to develop the 
distributed lethality concept; and Rear Admiral Thomas E� Zelibor, who used his 
participation in a global wargame to leverage a networked situational awareness 
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tool designed for the game to command the naval aviation element in the initial 
phases of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM�17 Lack of sponsor participation can be 
attributed to the pace of operations in the fleet and the intensity of administrative 
work inside the Pentagon; it is difficult for senior officers and civilian officials 
to block out time for gaming, which is time-consuming� However, the examples 
of Admirals Swift, Rowden, and Zelibor indicate that the missing element is true 
understanding of the value of personal game participation and the concomitant 
commitment to just do it�
Second, true two-sided gaming should be a widespread and essential part of 
the professional education process, from precommissioning through senior ser-
vice colleges and even flag-level courses� Although it constitutes an example that 
some might question, the German army in the 1920s and 1930s made gaming a 
central part of its rebuilding process� “In the training schedule of the officer can-
didate schools and the War College a large part of the time was set aside for war 
games�”18 The efficiency of the Wehrmacht, especially in the early campaigns of 
World War II, has become legendary� The currently trending concept of mission 
command comes from the German Auftragstaktik (order tactics), which requires 
independent thinking throughout the chain of command� “Mission command 
is built on subordinate leaders at all echelons who exercise disciplined initiative 
and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission�”19 Endemic 
wargaming can help build a culture in which the mission command philosophy 
can flourish�
There are several reasons that wargaming facilitates such a productive environ-
ment� First, a routine diet of two-sided gaming can generate and hone the ability 
to reason competitively� In the first several decades of the twentieth century the 
Navy used competitive gaming effectively� Through the games, officers “tested 
their techniques on each other; unlike games in most other services, the Navy’s 
problems employed opposing teams of officers� This provided valuable prac-
tice and helped emphasize the importance of creativity—essential to the art of 
command—rather than canned solutions� � � � The system of war games at 
the [Naval War] college � � � promoted continual learning and ever-increasing 
complexity�”20 It is all too common in today’s professional military education 
(PME) system for students to be taught only principles and “school solutions�” 
Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis leveled a rather devastating criticism 
of the current system: “PME has stagnated, focused more on the accomplishment 
of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity�”21 Wargames as 
generally practiced today in PME tend to be one-sided affairs in which the faculty 
maintains control to ensure course objectives are achieved� In this environment, 
how can “genius,” in the sense that Carl von Clausewitz uses it, be cultivated and 
recognized?
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Making two-sided gaming the default PME vehicle will help to re-create a 
sandbox in which innovative reflexes can be developed� The constraint of two-
sided gaming produces a particular kind of problem solving that is unique to 
the competitive environment� As players assess a situation and look for avenues 
of advantage, they engage in what can be termed divergent thinking; that is, they 
search for options� This process can lead to novel solutions� However, the players 
understand that they then must engage in convergent thinking—analyzing and 
selecting one option they think will work�
Repeated struggling in competitive situations is more likely to produce new 
ideas and insights, especially if such experience is widespread in the officer corps� 
The author has encountered this phenomenon repeatedly in two-sided games he 
has designed and directed� Beyond the potential for out-of-the-box thinking and 
“black swans,” cultivating competitive problem solving would help to inculcate 
the kind of ingenuity for which the former Secretary of Defense called�
But there are challenges� Two-sided gaming is not easy� Design of such games 
must take care to channel competitive instincts properly� Moreover, in two-sided 
games featuring free play moves, control becomes more difficult, making the 
achievement of preplanned objectives problematic and demanding greater con-
fidence and ability to ad-lib on the part of faculty� It is in no small part for these 
reasons that PME institutions generally have abandoned two-sided gaming� But 
such gaming is entirely feasible, given command commitment� The Naval War 
College possesses a highly capable wargaming organization that can design and 
direct such games�
TOWARD A FIGHTING CULTURE
Each of the Navy’s principal warfare communities possesses a robust training 
infrastructure that focuses on tactical proficiency� The personal competitive ele-
ment is essential, especially in fighter aviation and special operations� However, 
technical and tactical excellence does not translate automatically into an overall 
professional culture predicated on high-end naval combat� For at least the past 
quarter century—a similar span of time to that from 1865 to 1890—the Navy, like 
its post–Civil War forebear, has been engaged in policing� Alfred Thayer Mahan 
made a statement then that can be applied directly to today’s conditions:
How changed present conditions, how entirely concentration—which is military—
has taken the place of dispersion, it is needless to insist� This is an effect of Naval 
Strategy, adapted to changes in conditions; but it is fair, in drawing attention to the 
change, to repeat that the principles of Naval Strategy have not altered� They have 
merely received elucidation by experience and by reflection� Men’s minds have 
turned—it will be more accurate to say, have returned—to ideas and practices which 
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were familiar enough to our predecessors, who had been to school to War itself; but 
which, in the absence of that most excellent instructor, had lapsed out of mind�22
The shift in culture from a dispersed, presence-oriented service to one focused 
on concentration for war at sea required insurgency in the officer corps back 
then, and likely will require it again in some form�23 The earlier insurgents, such 
as Admirals William S� Sims and Joseph M� Reeves, leveraged wargaming as part 
of their campaign to transform the Navy� It is not simply the number, kind, and 
quality of games that matter; it is the recognition that the wargame, as a medium, 
has an intrinsic effect on the corporate culture of the Navy, one that can be en-
hanced through determined policy and support�
Similar to the officers and sailors of the early twentieth century, we do not 
have a clear picture of the nature of future naval combat; for instance, few officers 
in the earlier era had an inkling of how aircraft and radar would transform war 
at sea in the 1940s� But the culture that had been built through wargaming and 
fleet exercises produced an organization and leaders that could learn quickly and 
adapt to the circumstances of war� That kind of culture must be built again today�
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full-bodied cyber without the hype
Sam J. Tangredi
Cyberspace in Peace and War, by Martin C� Libicki� Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016� 478 pages� $55�
As a fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense 
University in the early 1990s, Martin Libicki was one of the first defense analysts 
to write on the security implications of information warfare and the Internet� His 
monographs The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of 
Free Silicon (1994) and What Is Information Warfare? (1995) were considered 
cutting-edge treatments, containing such recommendations as making heavy 
investments in smart sensors and establishing a corps of information warriors�
Many of his recommendations were met with varying degrees of skepticism 
at the time� In a review of The Mesh and the Net in the July–August 1994 edition 
of the prestigious policy journal Foreign Affairs, Professor Eliot Cohen displayed 
a retrospectively humorous lack of prescience by stating that Libicki’s “proposed 
courses of action—the creation of a corps of infor-
mation warriors, among others—make less sense 
than the author thinks� It would have made as 
much sense to create a corps of combustion engine 
warriors early in the twentieth century�” What a 
difference a couple of decades can bring�
Yet, throughout his early studies, Libicki him-
self remained skeptical that American civil infra-
structure would face a major cyberwarfare threat� 
As he states in the introduction to Cyberspace 
in Peace and War, “Then, as now, it was hard to 
conclude that cyberwar was going to trump every 
Dr. Sam J. Tangredi is a professor of national, naval, 
and maritime strategy and the recently appointed 
inaugural Leidos Chair of Future Warfare Studies 
at the Naval War College. A retired Navy captain, 
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Chief of Naval Operations and director of strategic 
planning and business development for the Navy 
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mand at sea. He is the author of numerous articles 
on strategy and defense policy and has published five 
books, including Anti-access Warfare: Countering 
A2/AD Strategies (Naval Institute Press, 2013).
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other form of warfare� I was confident that the threat from cyberspace could be 
contained, in part because I believed that people, aware of the threat, would not 
willy-nilly connect critical systems (such as those that supply electric power) to 
the Internet� In this, I was wrong” (p� 1)� Once Libicki recognized how wrong his 
assumption was and how vulnerable American companies would make them-
selves for the sake of cost cutting, profit, and expediency, he built an influential 
career analyzing the topic of information warfare and cyber war, primarily as a 
senior policy analyst with the RAND Corporation� At RAND he has written or 
contributed to over a half-dozen studies sponsored by the Department of De-
fense� At the time of this book’s publication, he also was a distinguished visiting 
professor in cybersecurity studies at the U�S� Naval Academy�
Drawing on his studies, previous work, articles, and reports, Libicki built 
Cyberspace in Peace and War into his masterwork, one of the most extensive 
yet clearly written compendiums on cybered threats, attacks, strategies, and 
vulnerabilities� At 478 pages, it looks like an encyclopedic manual—albeit with 
a well-written narrative—and in a sense it is� It may not have the conceptual 
depth of Chris C� Demchak’s Wars of Disruption and Resilience: Cybered Conflict, 
Power, and National Security (2011) or the breezy, popular approach of P� W� 
Singer and Allan Friedman’s Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs 
to Know (2014)� Rather, it has thoroughness; there seems to be not a single cy-
bered conflict topic that Libicki does not address in some detail, from “How to 
Compromise a Computer” (chapter 3) to “Sino-American Relations and Norms 
in Cyberspace” (chapter 33)�
Libicki refers to his book as a “text” intended to “make readers more intelli-
gent consumers of the news, more intelligent users of technical advice, and more 
intelligent critics of the decisions that countries make with respect to the threat 
from cyberspace” (p� 3)� As is apparent, it is not a book for cyber specialists, who 
presumably know more than the basics of the author’s long list of cybered topics� 
But it is a book for all others, particularly national security professionals who 
want an extremely comprehensive initial immersion into the subject� Libicki 
indeed scores a “hat trick” on his three goals�
The book’s format is eminently logical, with thirty-four chapters divided 
into five sections� In the first section, “Foundations,” Libicki discusses types of 
cybered attacks, methods of providing security, and what governments can and 
cannot do in terms of defense� The second section, “Policies,” begins with an 
examination of cyber espionage, system vulnerabilities, and how an operational 
cyber war might begin—Libicki sees surprise attack as a likely scenario� Section 
3, “Operations,” views the conduct of cybered war in terms of an organized cam-
paign that may or may not include kinetic effects�
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It will be most surprising to die-hard proponents of the belief that “cyber is 
its own warfighting domain equal to land, sea, air, and space” that Libicki—with 
his long study of information warfare—disagrees with this approach, declaring 
that there is “no domain, no cyber equivalent of Billy Mitchell” (p� 165)� Libicki 
instead states, “The desire to see cyberspace as a warfighting domain is deeply 
ingrained in doctrine and the minds of those who carry out such doctrine� This 
chapter argues that this concept is misleading, perhaps pernicious[;] � � � if cyber-
space is not a ‘domain,’ what is it? [O]ne answer may be that ‘it’ is a set of tools that 
have a related set of objectives in common” (p� 167)� In answering the argument 
that the military needs to assess cyber as if it were a domain if it is to properly 
man, train, and equip to fight in it, Libicki replies simply, “Militaries do this 
for electronic warfare without its having been elevated into a separate domain” 
(p� 167)�
Section 4, “Strategies,” expounds on both symmetric and asymmetric re-
sponses to cyber attack and the potential for escalation into kinetic warfare, and 
then focuses on the deterrence of such attacks, examining deterrence topics such 
as attribution, the will to retaliate, and punishment or denial� In the concluding 
chapter of this section, the author examines the outcome of cyber attacks against 
an opponent’s nuclear command-and-control systems� Those who think that 
there should be an arms-control regime to prohibit this may be disappointed 
by Libicki’s conclusion that the “low odds of making cyberwar work” against a 
hardened (and isolated) nuclear command-and-control system makes such a 
diplomatic effort essentially irrelevant�
Section 5 concludes the book by examining norms in cyberspace—with par-
ticular attention given to the Tallinn Manual, a document that the Naval War 
College Stockton Center for International Law played a major role in creating—
and Sino-American discussions� During People’s Republic of China president Xi 
Jinping’s visit to the White House in September 2015, he and President Barack 
H� Obama announced, “The United States and China agree that neither country’s 
government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellec-
tual property � � � with the intent of providing competitive advantages to compa-
nies or commercial sectors” (pp� 344–45)� But notably there was no agreement on 
an enforcement mechanism or the use of cyber espionage for military purposes� 
Libicki seems agnostic about the effectiveness of norms�
One of the questions this worthy book poses but deliberately leaves unan-
swered for readers to debate as a “fundamental question for U�S� policy” is wheth-
er “it is more important [for the United States] to pursue advantage in cyberspace 
(for both espionage and attack) or to make cyberspace more secure for everyone” 
(p� 350)� That is indeed a question for extensive debate, although it does raise a 
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second question: Can cyberspace really be made “secure”? On this question, the 
conclusion of Cyberspace in Peace and War seems to be “not really�” As Libicki 
implies, the choice to make cyberspace an insecure tool for infrastructure control 
was a matter of choosing a bad bed in which we now must lie, while constantly 
straining to prevent somebody (hackers, opposing governments, and others) 
from yanking off the covers� That dire scenario makes one want to pull the plug�
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from victory to failure the army study of the  
iraq war, 2003–2006
Dov S. Zakheim
The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, ed� Joel D� Rayburn [Col�, 
USA] and Frank K� Sobchak [Col�, USA]� Vol� 1, Invasion, 
Insurgency, Civil War: 2003–2006. Carlisle, PA: U�S� Army War 
College Press, 2019� 742 pages� Free (e-book)�
Sixteen years after the United States launched Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), 
the war remains highly controversial, and American troops continue to oper-
ate in Iraq, albeit at reduced force levels and with far more-limited operational 
and tactical objectives� Recognizing that it was time to take stock of the Army’s 
performance in a decade of operations, former Army Chief of Staff General 
Raymond T� Odierno initiated what the Army calls an “in-stride study” of the 
service’s performance, and the lessons it should derive therefrom� The result was 
a massive two-volume Army War College study edited by two Army colonels, Joel 
D� Rayburn and Frank K� Sobchak, and supported by a large staff that conducted 
hundreds of hours of interviews and reviewed thousands of pages of studies, 
memos, transcripts, and other materials, many of which were declassified specifi-
cally for the purposes of the study� The first of these two volumes addresses the 
run-up to the war and ends as the strategy of force reduction and handover to 
Iraqi units proved to be a complete failure� The study is dry and at times repeti-
tive, but it offers an unvarnished assessment of both the Army’s performance and 
the leadership decisions that drove strategy and operations before, during, and 
after the conduct of major hostilities�
Following what has become standard Pentagon procedure, both Odierno’s 
foreword to the study and a second foreword by General Mark A� Milley, the 
current Army Chief of Staff and the designated successor to General Joseph F� 
Dunford, USMC, current chairman of the Joint Chiefs, offer the reader their 
respective “bottom lines up front�” Odierno, who had served as a division, corps, 
and force commander in Iraq, and therefore was able to observe the war from tac-
tical, operational, and strategic perspectives, draws 
several major conclusions relating to all three 
levels of warfare� He bluntly observes that “those 
who rejected the idea that there is an operational 
level of war in counterinsurgency were wrong” 
(p� xxix)� Indeed, as the report demonstrates, the 
Dov S. Zakheim served as Under Secretary of De-
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Under Secretary of Defense (Planning and Resources) 
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Army continually committed a series of operational errors, primarily through de-
ployment decisions that left major sectors, notably Baghdad itself, vulnerable to 
insurgent and sectarian attacks� These decisions stemmed from a chronic short-
age of Army personnel� That shortage, as the study points out at some length, 
resulted both from Secretary of Defense Donald H� Rumsfeld’s desire to reduce 
force levels in Iraq as quickly as possible and from Army Chief of Staff General 
Peter J� Schoomaker’s determination to “transform” Army force structure in the 
midst of the conflict�
Odierno also notes that the Army failed to understand the nature of the oper-
ating environment “and the local political and social consequences of our actions, 
especially when facing an enemy who understands the environment better than 
we do” (p� xxix)� He adds that “when conditions on the ground change, we must 
be willing to reexamine the assumptions that underpin our strategy and plans 
and change course if necessary, no matter how painful it may be” (p� xxix)� To 
do so, however, Odierno, as well as General George W� Casey, USA, who headed 
the multinational force in Iraq, and other senior Army commanders, would have 
had to challenge the notion that prevailed in the Pentagon well into 2005: that 
the opposition to the allied coalition’s operations stemmed from “former regime 
elements” loyal to Saddam Hussein� In fact, by 2004 the coalition was facing two 
parallel insurgencies: one Sunni and the other Shia� The Sunnis resented what 
they perceived as allied favoritism toward the Shias� For their part, an element of 
the Shias, the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia, led by the firebrand cleric Muqtada 
al-Sadr, pressed for the expulsion of American forces and sought to be the domi-
nant Shia political and military entity�
Nevertheless, the study offers little evidence that the Army—or, for that matter, 
the Marines or the Joint Chiefs of Staff—actively sought to redefine the coalition’s 
real enemy� Their reticence may not have amounted to a “dereliction of duty,” as 
H� R� McMaster, himself a senior general serving in Iraq, would have defined the 
term, in no small part because the senior Army leadership at least initially shared 
the Pentagon’s view� Nevertheless, as Odierno implicitly admits, once the generals 
on the ground recognized that they were confronting an insurgency, they should 
not have waited as long as they did to push for a change in Pentagon strategy�
Yet another of Odierno’s takeaways is that “[w]e must also employ better ways 
of generating and partnering with effective and legitimate host nation forces and 
of accounting for the political pressures that constrain those forces” (p� xxix)� He 
implies ever so politely that the Army leadership focused too heavily on quantita-
tive measures, such as number of units trained, to reach optimistic conclusions 
regarding the speed with which coalition forces could hand over tactical leader-
ship to the Iraqi military� As the report notes, quantitative measures obscured 
the political-military realities that were the true determinants of Iraqi military 
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capability, which could be evaluated only subjectively� These realities included 
the corruption endemic at all levels of the military, as well as the ethnic hatreds 
that fueled what became a civil war and that the Iraqi Shia political leadership, 
including Ibrahim al-Ja‘fari and his successor as prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, 
fostered both actively and passively�
General Milley’s foreword outlines some additional lessons learned from Op-
eration IRAQI FREEDOM and the Army War College study� Milley rightly notes 
that “the promise of short wars is often elusive” (p� xxvii)� He might have dropped 
the word “often”; to paraphrase Clausewitz, it is difficult to predict any conflict’s 
outcome during “the fog of war�”
Echoing Odierno, Milley also asserts that “our Army must understand the type 
of war we are engaged with in order to adapt as necessary” (p� xxvii)� What nei-
ther he nor Odierno states explicitly is that accurate intelligence—at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels—is critical to understanding the changing nature 
of a conflict� As the report demonstrates, time and again such intelligence, and 
the analysis of its findings, simply was not available to senior commanders� In 
particular, General Casey and his superior, U�S� Central Command (CENTCOM) 
commander General John P� Abizaid, USA, appear not to have been made aware 
before the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari mosque, a Shia shrine in 
Samarra’, that the conflict was evolving from an insurgency into a civil war� The 
availability of that intelligence might have led them both to argue against the 
ongoing drawdown of American forces and to maintain a major force presence 
in Baghdad, which quickly became the epicenter of the civil war�
Echoing the land forces’ side of the long-standing debate with air forces, Milley 
writes that “OIF is a sober reminder that technological advantages and standoff 
weapons alone cannot render a decision” (p� xxvii)� Milley clearly is referring to 
the notion that technologically induced “shock and awe” would produce a quick 
victory on the battlefield� Yet to a certain extent that is exactly what happened; 
America’s technological superiority was a key factor in its decisive victory�
On the other hand, as the report makes clear, it was the failure of the military 
in general and of CENTCOM commander General Tommy R� Franks, USA, in 
particular to plan for the aftermath of conflict that led to its extending well be-
yond the defeat of Hussein’s Iraqi forces� The lack of a viable “phase four” plan 
was compounded by the appointment of Ambassador L� Paul “Jerry” Bremer—a 
man with no experience in the Middle East—to lead the Coalition Provisional 
Authority and of freshly minted Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, USA, to 
lead the coalition forces�
Indeed, Bremer’s decision to disband the Iraqi army and purge Iraq’s adminis-
trative bureaucracy of all Baathists, when to keep their jobs virtually all bureau-
crats had to belong to the party, led to a breakdown of governance that fostered 
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civil unrest� Moreover, because he reported to both President George W� Bush 
and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Bremer came to see himself as an American 
proconsul—the ultimate source of authority in Iraq� He not only clashed with 
Sanchez, whom he considered his subordinate, but also resisted suggestions 
from anyone other than the president� I discovered this personally when—with 
the support of the State Department, the Office of Management and Budget, and 
the National Security Council staff—he rejected my proposal to add funds to the 
highly successful Commanders’ Emergency Response Program�
The Army War College study offers numerous other lessons that can be 
learned from the many missteps that took place from the war’s inception through 
its first phase, which ended in 2006 and is the subject of the report’s first volume� 
Beginning with the run-up to the war, the report notes that
within the DoD [Department of Defense] itself, structural stovepipes inhibited 
information sharing � � � and, when combined with Rumsfeld’s managerial style and 
the personality conflicts among key leaders, resulted in a tightly compartmentalized 
planning process that focused too heavily on major combat operations and was not 
coordinated across DoD or the broader U�S� Government� The quick tactical victory 
over the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan � � � convinced [Rumsfeld] and others 
that a small U�S� force aided by indigenous fighters and air power could replicate the 
feat in Iraq� (p� 49)
Having served in the Pentagon during the period covered in this report, I can 
confirm both that planning indeed was restricted tightly to a very small group of 
officials—not necessarily including me—and that there was a tremendous degree 
of friction between the Pentagon and the State Department—virtually an intra-
governmental civil war� Both factors contributed to the absence of a viable Phase 
IV stability operations plan, which in turn fueled the insurrection and civil war 
that coalition forces confronted from 2004 to 2006�
The Army War College study also outlines the degree to which Iran intervened 
in Iraq virtually from the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Saddam regime� 
Tehran supported the activities of the Badr Corps, the military arm of the Shia 
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which initially targeted 
Sunni Baath loyalists, and even Shias whom it identified as “collaborationists�” 
To a lesser extent Tehran also supported Sadr’s JAM militia� With the passage 
of time, the Badr Corps’s death squads and the JAM—though mutually hostile, 
at times to the point of open warfare—attacked Sunnis of all stripes, in part as a 
response to Tawhid al-Jihad leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s decision to prioritize 
attacks on Shias so as to foment a civil war�
Indeed, Iran was not unhappy with the expansion of civil strife in Iraq� As 
the study points out, Tehran was concerned that the new Iraq would become 
too close to the United States and was determined to expel the Americans from 
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the region� To that end, Iran’s strategy involved creating instability inside Iraq— 
ironically mimicking al-Zarqawi’s strategy—“placing the responsibility for the 
chaos on the United States and its Iraqi partners, and ensuring pro-Iranian politi-
cians dominated the new Iraqi Government” (p� 187)� The study adds that “[i]n 
contrast to the insurgents’ and Zarqawi’s nihilistic but consistent strategies, and 
Iran’s calculated actions, the coalition in early 2004 had trouble formulating a 
coherent, countrywide strategy” (p� 272)� Indeed, it is arguable that—certainly 
until the arrival of General David H� Petraeus, USA, whose role as commander 
in Iraq is dealt with in the study’s second volume—the coalition had no coherent, 
viable, and consistent strategy� Moreover, with hindsight it is fair to say that the 
Iranian strategy worked�
Despite evidence of Iranian activities, the American political and military 
leadership chose not to confront Tehran directly� As a result, the Iranians pen-
etrated successive Iraqi governments almost without opposition, entrenching 
themselves in key ministries, notably the Interior Ministry� Neither al-Ja‘fari nor 
al-Maliki did much to prevent Iran’s growing influence, and what motivated both 
leaders was a desire to suppress the Sunni population to the greatest extent pos-
sible� To that end, they continually tolerated war crimes committed by the various 
Shia militias� Al-Maliki in particular was adept at fobbing off General Casey’s 
protests with the dubious argument that he feared a revival of the Baathists�
There is no denying that the Army and Marine Corps, supported to some ex-
tent by Iraqi and coalition forces, did achieve some notable tactical victories, such 
as the battles of Fallujah in 2004 and Tall ‘Afar in 2005� On the whole, however, 
these victories were short-lived, again because there were insufficient numbers of 
American troops to remain in place to preserve these and other hard-fought vic-
tories� Casey’s working assumption (which reflected Rumsfeld’s preferences)—
that the conduct of operations, including control of liberated cities and towns, 
could be handed over to the Iraqis—simply was not borne out� Iraqi forces were 
undermanned and, with the exception of some special forces units, were more 
loyal to their ethnic confreres than to the Iraqi government� Shia troops, and es-
pecially police, had no problem hunting down Sunnis who may or may not have 
been insurgents; they did not go after fellow Shias, however—all of which suited 
the Shia-led government�
The Army War College study also highlights the degree to which Washington 
suffered from the delusion that the holding of elections was a sign of progress 
toward a democratic Iraq� In January 2005, Iraq held an election for a provisional 
government, and al-Ja‘fari became prime minister� Iraq held a second set of elec-
tions in December 2005, and al-Ja‘fari retained his post� The elections, especially 
those of December, buoyed both Washington and the U�S� leadership in Iraq; they 
took them as evidence of the country’s evolution into a real democracy�
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Washington overvalued the importance of elections in a country riven by far 
deeper divisions, however� The Sunnis boycotted the January election, with the 
result that those elected did not fully represent the Iraqi population� Recognizing 
that they had erred in not participating in the vote, Sunni leaders believed that 
overwhelming participation by the Sunnis in the December election would result 
in their dominance of the new government� That did not happen, because, as 
the study makes clear, the Sunni leadership deluded themselves that Sunnis, not 
Shias, were the majority population of Iraq� Instead of fostering greater participa-
tion by the Sunnis in a new government, the elections solidified Sunni hostility 
toward both the Shias and the coalition, and the insurgency and the civil war 
continued apace�
By the summer of 2006, it was clear that the American strategy had failed� 
President Bush lost confidence in his military and civilian leadership and began 
the search for a new strategy that ultimately would be labeled the “surge�” It is at 
this point that the first volume of the Army War College study ends� Bush would 
replace Rumsfeld in the aftermath of the 2006 congressional elections and bring 
Casey back in January 2007 as Army Chief of Staff� The surge under the lead-
ership of General Petraeus would prove a success—only to be undermined by 
President Barack H� Obama’s 2009 decision to withdraw forces from Iraq� The de-
parture of the remaining American troops in December 2011 removed any brake 
that might have existed on al-Maliki’s determination to ensure Shia dominance 
in Iraq at the expense of the Sunni community� The ensuing situation in Iraq was 
the proximate cause of the emergence of ISIS and ultimately worked to the benefit 
of Iran, whose influence over the fortunes of Iraq continues to grow to this day�
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BOOK REVIEWS
WARS, HISTORICAL AND AMBIGUOUS
Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict That Made the Modern 
World, by Andrew Lambert� New Haven, CT: Yale Univ� Press, 2018� 424 pages� $30�
The idea of seapower serves as the 
foundational argument for Andrew 
Lambert’s Seapower States. Lambert 
does employ the more traditional 
phrase sea power—but chiefly as a foil 
to his ideas of seapower� Although 
some might claim that the difference 
between seapower and sea power is 
merely an academic abstraction, or an 
unnecessarily confusing construct, the 
author crafts a convincing argument� 
Lambert asserts that sea power is a 
Mahanian formulation of hard power� 
Any state can have the attributes of sea 
power—it only requires a powerful navy� 
This list of sea powers includes Rome, 
the United States, and contemporary 
China� What separates a state pursuing 
sea power from one demonstrating 
seapower is the relationship of the sea 
to the state’s existence� Sea powers do 
not need the sea to survive as great 
powers� The military and economic 
advantages of sea power are nice to 
have, but the state does not live and 
die by the sea� Such states often are 
continental land powers first, and 
their wealth, size, and influence leads 
to naval—sea power—ambitions�
Conversely, seapower reflects weak-
ness� Without international commerce 
and the moneys it generates, the 
seapower state would cease to be a great 
power� Various geographic, economic, 
political, and cultural attributes allow 
seapowers to punch well above their 
weight� Lambert categorizes Athens, 
Carthage, Venice, the Dutch Republic, 
and Great Britain as seapowers� This 
list is more restrictive than some; the 
author deliberately excludes Portugal 
and Spain, labeling them overseas 
empires, since their colonial possessions 
were a “useful adjunct to their core 
concerns,” while Lambert labels others, 
including Rhodes and Genoa, “sea 
states,” because they are “too small to 
aspire to great power status” (p� 204)�
To understand the nature of seapower 
states, Lambert asks readers to look 
beyond hard power and strategy to the 
very nature of society� Seapowers tend 
toward more-inclusive political systems, 
usually oligarchic republics; absolute 
rule is an anathema� Economically, they 
depend on maritime commerce not only 
for wealth but for the very resources 
needed to survive—often these states 
are not agriculturally self-sufficient�
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Commerce brings cultural exchange� 
Art and architecture reflect the sea and 
its significance to society� Yet although 
Lambert tries hard to focus on the cul-
tural aspects of seapower, he has trouble 
defining culture� Too often, his cultural 
arguments drift into economic and 
hard-power factors, for these allowed 
seapowers to exert disproportionate 
influence on the international system� 
Seapowers have sought great-power sta-
tus, but Lambert claims they have been 
limited in the courses of action available 
to them� They must play to their naval 
and economic strengths while avoiding 
land campaigns that are beyond their 
ability to sustain� They have neither 
the population to field large armies 
nor economies capable of sustaining 
large armies and navies simultaneously� 
Instead, seapower states prove most 
effective at fighting protracted naval 
wars for limited objectives, building 
wealth, and avoiding overextension�
Although they possess great wealth 
and powerful navies, seapowers are 
fragile—continental entanglements can 
spell disaster� In the case of the Dutch, 
landward threats proved inescapable, 
and Venice was weakened by terres-
trial distractions� Britain’s continental 
commitment in World War I “shattered 
the British seapower state” (p� 302)� 
Lambert claims that Britain was both 
the greatest and the last of these states� 
Because of the twentieth-century world 
wars, Britain passed the mantle of global 
maritime dominance not to a seapower 
but to a sea power—the United States�
It is important to grasp what this book 
is—and more particularly what it is not� 
We should not consider this definitive 
history, for there is much with which 
to quibble� Lambert’s evidence and 
interpretations are deliberately selective� 
Although some may consider this a 
weakness, understanding this mitigates 
the issue and allows the reader to focus 
on Lambert’s compelling interpretations� 
The book’s primary value becomes its 
argument about what the sea means 
to different states, by highlighting 
competing worldviews� Lambert claims 
that seapower states are inclusive 
and dynamic, while the great powers 
that have destroyed them often were 
“terrified” by what seapowers stood for�
Although Lambert writes from his 
own (British) perspective and reflects 
particularly on what he considers to 
have been the last and greatest of the 
seapower states, his argument has 
noteworthy contemporary application� 
He forces the reader to ponder the sea’s 
significance to contemporary China 
and the United States� Lambert claims 
both are continental powers� The sea 
is not integral for either in the manner 
that it was for seapower states; rather, 
the ocean becomes a frontier to be 
defended and exploited� The argument 
has substantial implications when 
understanding national objectives, 
strategy, and long-term sustainability� 
Lambert’s argument certainly should 
spur controversy, for the author builds, 
through a series of carefully constructed 
arguments and case studies, a thesis that 
questions the nature of the international 
maritime environment of the future�
KEVIN D� MCCRANIE
War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Re-
shaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century, by 
David Patrikarakos� New York: Basic Books, 
2017� 320 pages� $17�99�
Social media has deployed far-reaching  
global communication abilities, 
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pervading nearly every aspect of our 
lives, and there is a growing awareness of 
foreign adversarial attempts to interfere 
with our democratic processes through 
this evolving technology� Yet we never 
consider how a cell-phone-embedded 
camera and an application could affect 
the conduct of war� David Patrikarakos’s 
War in 140 Characters deftly demon-
strates this new relationship with the 
eyes of a professional correspondent 
who is observing a revolution not 
only in journalism but also in military 
affairs� He contends that we may 
be witnessing the near fulfillment 
of Clausewitz’s notion of total war, 
enabled by a new virtual levée en masse, 
through “the extraordinary abil-
ity of social media to endow ordinary 
individuals, frequently noncombatants, 
with the power to change the course 
of both the physical battlefield and 
the discourse around it” (p� 4)�
Through the author’s travels and inter-
views, the book details the rise of Homo 
digitalis. Patrikarakos offers profiles of 
individuals who, decades ago, would 
have had perhaps a minimal impact in 
the war zone� But such actors in contem-
porary battle spaces can be surprisingly 
effective� For example, a sixteen-year-old 
Palestinian girl who used Twitter to 
influence an Israeli military campaign 
in Gaza and a Ukrainian mother of 
two spearheading a Facebook logistics 
support effort against pro-Russian forces 
highlight the contrast between civilians 
and the traditional state hierarchies with 
which they contend� Patrikarakos’s other 
profiles offer a picture of struggling 
social media responses by teams of indi-
viduals working for organizations such 
as the Israel Defense Forces and the U�S� 
State Department� He rounds out his 
analysis by exploring the effectiveness 
of social media usage by postmodern 
authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir 
Putin and militant groups such as ISIS�
Patrikarakos contends that social media 
enables vast participation in a realm 
once controlled almost exclusively by 
state organizations� Social media is 
suited perfectly to enable interference 
by mobilizing mass popular support 
to pressure extraregional governments 
to act on belligerent forces embroiled 
in regional conflicts� The traditional 
barriers to entry into conflict, including 
military training and geographical prox-
imity, among others, are disappearing� 
“Content that once would have required 
a team of cameramen, trained journal-
ists, editors, and news anchors to reach 
a national or international audience 
can now be produced and disseminated 
in seconds” (p� 20)� This results in a 
lower cost for participation in conflicts, 
particularly as the narratives of war are 
more important than the physical acts 
that typically govern it� Ubiquitous capa-
bilities for coercive messaging allow for 
the exploitation of vital communication 
space once controlled exclusively by the 
state� A recurrent theme throughout this 
work on twenty-first-century conflict is 
that “the military dimension, events on 
the physical battlefield, no longer stands 
alone as the most important arena of 
conflict” (p� 245)� This notion is particu-
larly salient in the realm of war termina-
tion, as the global population influences 
when and whether a conflict truly has 
concluded� As an essential component of 
warfare, the concept of defeat historically 
involved a political concession com-
municated to and accepted by the 
losing side� In cyberspace, a consensus 
of defeat may be unattainable, given 
the sheer number of actors involved�
Beyond influencing a conflict’s narrative, 
social media actions can influence physi-
cal military operations� Patrikarakos’s 
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example includes a grassroots logistics 
effort that supported a national army 
by coordinating donations of money 
and supplies from across the globe� 
It proved so effective that Ukrainian 
military commanders sent in supply 
orders; in true e-commerce fashion, 
civilians fulfilled the requests and even 
delivered items—including uniforms 
and flak jackets—to units in the field� 
Contrast this effort to the U�S� Liberty 
Bond and war bond drives of the two 
world wars as an indirect mechanism for 
noncombatant support� The Ukrainian 
Facebook-driven campaign, although 
conducted outside sanctioned govern-
ment control, had more impact on the 
individual donor, because the donors 
could see the direct effects of their 
efforts� The nature of much civilian 
support for a belligerent on one side of 
a conflict has not changed—consider 
care packages and letters in the mail 
in wars past� Yet the characteristics 
have transformed through individual 
empowerment, displaying a magnitude 
and immediacy unseen in military 
history� It exemplifies a transfer of 
real impact on combat effectiveness 
from traditional institutions and 
hierarchies to networks of individuals�
For centuries the United States enjoyed 
a geopolitical position that protected 
our shores from direct interventions� 
Arguably, cyberspace, with its instant 
accessibility from afar, could counterbal-
ance that advantage� As we begin to 
understand cyberborne capabilities 
enabling conflicts, works such as War 
in 140 Characters should shape the way 
we think about our vulnerabilities� The 
book constitutes an author’s plea to un-
derstand better twenty-first-century war, 
and it leaves the reader compelled to 
ponder the strategic implications of the 
way ahead� Do information revolutions 
of the past, such as the advents of the 
printing press, radio, and television, 
illuminate a path forward for society to 
follow? It is clear from Patrikarakos’s 
work that increasingly effective individ-
uals promulgating disparate realities on 
social media will mandate entirely new 
approaches from traditional Western 
institutions if they are going to survive�
MARC D� BEAUDREAU
Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Poli-
tics, by Austin Carson� Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
Univ� Press, 2018� 344 pages� $35�
Professor Carson takes up two intriguing 
and related questions: Why do nations 
often choose to intervene covertly 
rather than overtly in military conflicts, 
and why do their adversaries, after 
detecting the intervention, often choose 
to stay silent about it (or, as he calls it, 
“collude”)? Using four case studies (the 
Spanish Civil War, the Korean War, 
the Vietnam War, and the Soviet war 
in Afghanistan), he develops his own 
theory of why nations act these ways�
His theory applies to “limited wars”—
conflicts in which some of the adversar-
ies (the outside great-power intervenors) 
are not employing the full range of their 
capabilities� Carson argues that main-
taining a war’s limited character provides 
the motivation for this collusion of co-
vertness� Demonstrating how this works 
is the core of his argument, and the case 
studies provide persuasive examples�
First, by intervening covertly—or by 
not publicizing an adversary’s covert 
intervention—a party avoids stirring 
up hawkish public opinion, both 
domestically and on the part of the 
adversary� By avoiding public demands 
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to “win the war” by whatever means 
necessary and risk a face-losing, 
disadvantageous settlement, both 
leaderships preserve maneuver room�
Second, by thus reducing the political 
consequences, both parties can signal 
their desire to keep the conflict limited� 
In essence, both sides bargain—while 
pursuing their respective interests—and 
cooperate in escalation avoidance� 
Since this point is the book’s key 
contribution to the literature on this 
subject, let us see how it works�
An intervenor proceeding covertly 
instead of overtly pays a price: he may 
be constrained in the size of the force he 
sends and the weaponry employed, his 
logistics may be more complicated and 
less efficient, and he forgoes whatever 
reputational advantage he might gain 
by being seen as having supported his 
allies and stood up for his principles� 
By paying this price, the intervenor 
signals to his adversary that his desire 
to win is constrained by his interest in 
keeping the conflict limited; he shows 
respect for the adversary’s reputation 
by not confronting him openly�
When the adversary detects the 
intervention yet does not use his 
knowledge to diplomatic or propa-
ganda advantage, he likewise signals 
his interest in avoiding escalation� He 
shows that he is avoiding a self-imposed 
requirement to confront the intervenor 
openly and defeat his intervention�
While Carson argues for the importance 
of this dynamic, he fully recognizes 
that many other reasons for covertness 
and collusion exist beyond the two he 
discusses: “[I]t bears repeating that my 
limited-war theory does not claim to 
be a ‘master cause’ of all secrecy in war� 
Alternative logics are compatible with 
my own logic even within the same 
conflict” (p� 63)� Thus, a government 
may intervene covertly if it hopes 
to hide its involvement from dovish 
domestic opinion, or if it seeks to 
gain an operational advantage from 
secrecy� Indeed, it is possible that 
keeping an (initial) intervention covert 
is a means of putting one’s adversary 
off his guard and thus achieving 
surprise when one subsequently 
intervenes in a more substantial way�
However, there are additional reasons 
for covertness/collusion that the 
book ignores or underemphasizes� 
If a government wants, for whatever 
reason, to follow a moderate course in 
a conflict, it has more than hawkish 
domestic opinion to worry about; it 
also must make sure that its adversaries 
or third parties do not interpret its 
moderation as weakness� Hence, it may 
employ covertness as a way of reducing 
the reputational stakes involved�
The same logic operates for the detector� 
While Carson notes that the detector 
might gain diplomatic advantages from 
going public, he underemphasizes the 
other side of the coin: complaining about 
an adversary’s intervention in a conflict 
and underreacting merely may advertise 
one’s weakness� A government also may 
collude if it fears that public knowledge 
of the adversary’s military action will 
fan fears of a wider conflict, scaring its 
own (dovish) public or third parties, 
and thereby increasing opposition to 
its own involvement in the conflict�
Additionally, a government may keep its 
intervention covert—or at least unac-
knowledged—for propaganda reasons; 
open intervention might contradict its 
own self-portrayal in its propaganda 
as pacific and anti-interventionist�
The book is at its strongest in showing 
how covertness and collusion can serve 
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the purpose of avoiding escalation� But 
ultimately, no government intervenes 
for the sake of keeping a conflict limited; 
regardless of that goal, its actions will 
be determined most by the political 
objective it seeks to achieve� The author’s 
theory sheds light on one aspect of the 
actors’ motives in cases in which the 
desire to avoid escalation is relatively 
strong� But, as in the case of any such 
theory, understanding such situations 
requires a full assessment of the goals 
and circumstances of each of the actors�
ABRAM N� SHULSKY
China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, ed� An-
drew S� Erickson and Ryan D� Martinson� An-
napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019� 352 
pages� $50�
In its long history, China has deployed 
substantial naval power, but only 
episodically� It never faced sustained 
naval threats, so the country’s maritime 
frontier was not a perennial strategic 
concern� But in more modern times, 
seaborne pressures from the Western 
powers and Japan became unremitting� 
Foreign navies even sailed deep into the 
country’s interior, establishing “treaty 
ports” hundreds of miles from the coast� 
This ended with the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949� Still, 
even though Western naval power was 
pushed offshore, seaborne forces nearby 
could attack China with impunity�
This rankled, but what to do? In 1965, 
Marshal Lin Biao (perhaps Chairman 
Mao’s closest comrade in arms) looked 
to the earlier defeat of Japan by the 
once-tiny People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) to ask, “How was it possible for a 
weak country finally to defeat a strong 
country?” His answer was found in 
Mao Zedong’s idea of “People’s War�” 
Although land based, the concept held 
promise for menacing forward naval 
positions of the United States, perceived 
as the foremost opponent� Having 
backed an insurgency in the Philippines, 
a coup attempt in Indonesia, and guerilla 
wars in Malaya and Vietnam, Beijing 
could imagine pushing the United 
States out of great anchorages such as 
Subic, Cam Rahn, and Singapore� As 
for Yokosuka, Japan—the U�S� Navy’s 
most important base in the western 
Pacific—a successful political campaign 
might chase the United States four 
thousand miles east, back to Honolulu�
This was naval warfare de facto, but 
it did not succeed� In the end, China 
learned that American sea power 
could not be neutralized on the cheap� 
However, China began to rise 
economically through its seaborne 
connections, and in the 1980s Admiral 
Liu Huaqing—sometimes called “China’s 
Mahan”—made a case for a strong navy� 
This vision was realized more fully in 
2012 when Communist Party leader Hu 
Jintao announced a new national goal: 
“to enhance our capacity for exploiting 
marine resources, develop the marine 
economy, protect the marine maritime 
rights and interests, and build China 
into a strong maritime power�”
During this same period of an economi-
cally rising China, the Naval War Col-
lege’s China Maritime Studies Institute 
became a leading center for analyzing 
China’s naval power� Two of the Insti-
tute’s mainstays, Andrew Erickson and 
Ryan Martinson, again have contributed 
to our understanding by assembling and 
editing twenty papers prepared for a 
2017 conference on what could turn out 
to be the most significant component 
of China’s modus operandi at sea: 
exploitation of the so-called gray zone�
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This anthology reminds us that the naval 
battle with China already is underway, 
and that it is about more than big ships, 
aircraft, and submarines� The PLA 
Navy, which certainly likes to show 
off its new fleet, also relies on a coast 
guard, fishing boats, and maritime 
militia, which are perfectly suited for 
a gray-zone space of neither war nor 
peace� As a result, China has succeeded 
in enclosing and then militarizing areas 
once thought of as high seas� China, 
in best Leninist fashion, continues to 
probe and push, encountering “mush” 
instead of the steel of real resistance�
This is certainly not “decisive naval 
battle–ism,” nor is it quite “people’s war 
at sea�” Still, Mao’s dicta echo: a struggle 
is 10 percent military / 90 percent 
political; avoid the decisive encounter 
until the very last moment; and, above 
all, protract, to enable one to build from 
weakness to strength� Soon after becom-
ing a Communist Party leader in 2013, 
Xi Jinping told his comrades in a private 
speech that China would remain weaker 
than the West for some time� China’s 
naval operations in the maritime gray 
zone—patient, purposeful, relentless— 
embody Maoist patience, buying 
time to maneuver from a position of 
relative weakness to one of strength�
The papers collected in this new work, 
China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, 
can help us better understand this 
maneuvering and meet the challenges 
the West already faces—challenges 
that only will grow as China’s naval 
strength and presence grow�
CHARLES HORNER
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
Marc D. Beaudreau is a military professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War 
College� He earned a BA from Ole Miss and an MA from the Naval Postgraduate School and was a 
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Charles Horner is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute� His most recent book is A China Scholar’s 
Long March, 1978–2015: Reflections on a Changing China (2018)�
Kevin D. McCranie is on the faculty of the Naval War College� He is the author of Admiral Lord 
Keith and the Naval War against Napoleon (2006), as well as Utmost Gallantry: The U.S. and Royal 
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Abram N. Shulsky is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute� He served as an adviser to the Under 
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force: You are 
about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven 
these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The hope and 
prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you. 
GENERAL DWIGHT D� EISENHOWER, USA
n June 2019, people around the globe paused to reflect on and commemorate 
what is believed widely to be one of the most significant historical events of the 
twentieth century: the Allied invasion of Normandy that began on June 6, 1944� 
On what is referred to universally as “D-day,” the largest amphibious assault in 
history brought over 160,000 troops ashore in the Normandy region of France to 
begin the process of wresting control of Europe from the forces of Nazi Germany� 
Readers seeking to dive more deeply into the details of D-day and the battles that 
followed may find the following books of particular value�
Crusade in Europe: A Personal Account of World War II, by General Dwight D� 
Eisenhower, USA� New York: Doubleday, 1948�
Five-star general Dwight D� Eisenhower was arguably the single most important mili-
tary figure of World War II� For many historians, his memoirs of this eventful period 
of U�S� history have become the most important record of the war� Crusade in Europe 
tells the complete story of the war as Eisenhower planned and lived it� Through his 
eyes, the enormous scope and drama of the war—strategy, battles, moments of fateful 
decision—become fully illuminated in all their fateful glory� Yet this is also a warm 
and richly human account� Ike recalls the long months of waiting, planning, and 
working toward victory in Europe� His personal record of the tense first hours after 
he had issued the order to attack—and there was no turning back—leaves no doubt 
of Eisenhower’s travail and reveals this great man in ways that no biographer has ever 
surpassed� (CNO Professional Reading Program, www�navy�mil/)
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
D-Day: The Battle for Normandy, 75th anniversary edition, by Antony Beevor.
New York: Penguin, 2019.
This is the closest you will ever get to war—the taste, the smell, the noise and the 
fear. The Normandy landings that took place on D-Day involved by far the largest 
invasion fleet ever known. The scale of the undertaking was awesome and what fol-
lowed was some of the most cunning and ferocious fighting of the war. As casualties 
mounted, so too did the tensions between the principal commanders on both sides. 
Meanwhile, French civilians caught in the middle of these battlefields or under Allied 
bombing endured terrible suffering. Even the joys of Liberation had their darker side. 
Antony Beevor’s inimitably gripping narrative conveys the true experience of war. He 
lands the reader on the beach alongside the heroes whose stories he so masterfully 
renders in their full terrifying glory. (Penguin Books, www.penguin.co.uk/)
The Dead and Those about to Die: The Big Red One at Omaha Beach, by John C. 
McManus. New York: Penguin, 2014.
A focused tale of the hellish ascendancy of the U.S. Army’s famed 1st Infantry Divi-
sion on June 6, 1944, underscoring how the Normandy invasion nearly went terribly 
awry. . . . [M]ilitary historian McManus elicits moving details of courage and hard-
ship from personal as well as historical sources, spotlighting the feats of this heroic 
division that took the brunt of the first-wave assault on Omaha Beach. Hardened by 
heavy fighting only months before in Tunisia and Sicily, considered somewhat ar-
rogant and full of themselves, many of the 1st expected to go home. Instead, General 
Omar Bradley, commander of U.S. ground forces in the coming invasion, discarded 
“the niceties of justice” and needed to rely on those troops. . . . The troops, disgorged 
from landing craft in huge, unmanageable swells, were overladen with gear and un-
able to move quickly, offering sitting-duck targets for the German gunners, while the 
beaches became clotted with machinery and armament launched on an unsustainable 
schedule. McManus does not spare us the slaughter of those first hours. . . . Getting 
the men off the beach became Col. George Taylor’s rallying cry (he is credited with 
the title’s quote), while the offshore destroyers helped dismantle the pillboxes to allow 
the intrepid leaders of the Big Red One to breach German defenses and push inland. 
An exciting account from the personable point of view of the soldier. (Kirkus, www 
.kirkusreviews.com/)
Every Man a Hero: A Memoir of D-Day, the First Wave at Omaha Beach, and a 
World at War, by Ray Lambert and Jim DeFelice. New York: HarperCollins, 2019.
Seventy-five years ago, he hit Omaha Beach with the first wave. Now Ray Lambert, 
ninety-eight years old, delivers one of the most remarkable memoirs of our time, a 
tour-de-force of remembrance evoking his role as a decorated World War II medic 
who risked his life to save the heroes of D-Day. . . . Every Man a Hero is the unfor-
gettable story not only of what happened in the incredible and desperate hours on 
Omaha Beach, but of the bravery and courage that preceded them, throughout the 
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Second World War—from the sands of Africa, through the treacherous mountain 
passes of Sicily, and beyond to the greatest military victory the world has ever known� 
(HarperCollins, www�harpercollins�com/)
The Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program encourages 
sailors and Navy civilians at all levels to engage in self-study to better inform 
themselves of the incredible legacy created by those brave men and women who 
have preceded us� There is no better “case study” of leadership and valor under 
fire than the events of D-day� It is fitting and altogether proper that we recall the 
debt owed to those who served with such distinction�
JOHN E� JACKSON
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